What should we make of the IS claim of responsibility?

1.- Does the incident at all look like a possible "Islamic State" attack? 

I would put it this way: Downing a Russian airliner is quite conceivably something that the "Islamic State" would be wanting to achieve right now, given that the Russian air force has, among other groups, also hit the IS in recent airstrikes in Syria.

2.- What exactly has the "IS" claimed this far? 

The most important item so far is the written claim of responsibility put out via IS and pro IS Twitter channels. It is in the name of the "Sinai Province" of the IS, of which we know that it actually exists. The format and style of the claim also resemble what we have been seeing in recent months, not only on a daily basis from within IS territories in Syria and Iraq, but also when IS "wilayat" or "provinces" (meaning branches) claimed certain attacks, for example in Kuwait or Tunisia earlier this year. This written claim is therefor either authentic or a fairly sophisticated fake.

In this claim, the IS Sinai province says that "soldiers of the Caliphate" had managed to down the Russian jet, killing all of the "Russian Crusaders" on board. It makes reference to the Russians killing scores of people in Syria every day and goes on to state that the Russians and their allies won't be safe in Muslim lands or in the skies above them.

The IS Headquarters, however, seems to have elevated this claim to another level when it put out an audio version of the claim later today. This audio is a verbatim of the written claim but was published by the official IS radio station "al-Bayan", meaning that the IS central command or Headquarters or leadership or whatever you want to call it echoed the claim of the Sinai Jihadists and thus documented that they thought it was credible enough to amplify it.

Apart from that, the claim was also run prominently on the website of al-Shmukh, a top tier Jihadist internet forum. If they run it, they also think it is likely true.



Then there is, thirdly, a rather obscure video of 20 seconds length. As far as I can see, it was taken off YouTube already, but there is still an embedded version of it to be found here.

In this short clip, a plane is shown that eventually drops out of the sky, apparently hit by a missile or rocket or blown apart by an onboard explosive device. I don't think that anyone can confirm at this point that this video even shows the Russian plane in questions. This video is even more obscure because it carries no audio claim, but features, at the very beginning, the logo of the IS province in the Sinai - albeit an outdated version of it.

This makes me very skeptical of the authenticity of this particular video.





3.- Is the claim by the IS Sinai province credible? 

First of all, it is important to note that the IS Sinai Province claim doesn't contain a single shred of information that would reveal insider knowledge of the attack or the modus operandi. No weapon system is mentioned, no information on what exactly it was that brought the jet down is offered. That is usually not a good sign.

Secondly, a lot of people who know more about jets and weapon systems than I do are saying that the plane was flying much too high for the IS to be able to hit it with the most advanced system at their disposal, which apparently are man pads. I will not weigh in, as this is a technical discussion. But as far as I understand we don't know yet if the jet was perhaps brought down by an explosive device onboard the plane - which leaves us with the theoretical possibility that the IS brought one there. These questions may, however, soon be answered by experts with access to the flight recorder, etc.

What makes me wonder in regard to the credibility of the claim is another thing: The IS usually doesn't lie. It does lie, to be sure, but not as a rule. And as a rule of thumb I believe it is fair to say that the bigger the operation or attack in question, the less likely it has been (so far, at least) that the IS was presenting a complete lie. This record is not impeccable, as especially in the beginning of the IS's expansion in Syria it seems that the IS was sometimes quite happy to claim responsibility for other groups' attacks.

However, the IS HQ is taking a risk here by amplifying the claim published by their Sinai group if it turned out to be a lie. Retaining credibility is of great concern to Jihadist groups: you can quickly loose support and supporters if you are caught claiming stuff you didn't do. It is not sustainable.

Bearing this in mind, I am wondering if the IS for some reason may really believe it was them - even if in reality it may not have have been them. Sounds crazy, I know. Just a thought.

4.- So, what should me make of all of this?  

That's easy:

* This incident should NOT be counted as an IS terror attack (yet).
* We should consider the written claim of responsibility by the IS Sinai province as quite possibly authentic, but not beyond doubt. Furthermore we should bear in mind that even if authentic, it can still be false or untruthful.
* We need to look closely at what the technical investigations will tell us.
* We should look out for IS publications containing credible pieces of insider information.

A few Thoughts on "Counter Narratives" and "Counter Messaging"

If we look at the lives Western foreign fighters led before they decided to go to Syria, we will find that they are truly diverse. We find former Gangsta Rappers as well as converts from well-to-do, bourgeois families among them; we see former pretty criminals, drug consumers and drinkers, but also university student, workers and pupils. What we usually don't find is recruits who used to be politically active.

That's interesting, because it wouldn't be at all counter-intuitive to assume that radicalization can be the result of frustration over not having been able to achieve anything through political activism. But that's not the case, apparently. What we see instead is that many of those who end up waging war in Syria have been radicalized at a dramatic speed. As if there had been a vacuum that needed to be filled as quickly as possible.

In fact, I think this is actually what happens. Many of those who radicalize do it because the ideology of Jihadism offers them simple and all-encompassing answers to all their questions and problems - and it instills them with a deep sense of purpose and meaning, something most other ideas on offer seem to be failing at. Jihadism basically says that you can leave behind your troubled past this very moment; your slate will be wiped clean; all crises are over; all conflicts from your past life are meaningless. You will be a new person, with a new identity. You are truly re-born. Or: Given a second chance.

You have to understand this mechanism if you want to fight Jihadist ideology. My question is: Does the renewed talk about counter narratives and counter messaging take this into account?

As the New York Times is reporting, the US State Department is in the midst of revamping its respective efforts. There is talk of making use of as many as 350 State department Social Media accounts in order to repel the IS's propaganda flow. The "Think again. Turn Away"-Initiative, which hadn't been faring as well as had been hoped for, will apparently be made part of a broader initiative that will also enlist the help of Pentagon and intelligence analysts so as to make sure that messaging is co-ordinated, not only among US agencies, but also with partner states.

One of the inherent problems with a state-run counter messaging proposal is made aptly visible in this quote by Nicholas Rasmussen, the director of the National Counterterrorism Center: "We try to find ways to stimulate this kind of counter narrative, this kind of counter messaging, without heaving a U.S. government hand in it." The problem is that, quite frankly, the more state involvement there is, the more it smacks of counter propaganda - a concept which is not easily reconciled with our ideas of a free, liberal society.

Don't get me wrong. I don't think it is a mistake to point out blatant lies by Jihadists. I just think that this effort is not addressing the core of the problem.

I don't even like the term counter narrative. Because in my understanding, Jihadism is the counter narrative here. (And that is true even if you take into account the historical  emergence of the Salafiyya in reaction to the rise of the West.) Our problem is not that we need to find an answer to the ideological challenge of Jihadism - our problem is that our original narrative has become too unattractive. It can not fulfill the needs of those who later become Jihadists.

Our first question therefor should be: Why is our original idea not attractive enough anymore? Is it because we don't teach it well enough (in our schools, for example)? Is it, because it is not exciting enough (since party politics are "boring")? Is its, because we can't offer quick and complete solutions, unlike Jihadism? Or is it because we don't really keep our promises (because, e.g., we are all equal on paper, but it is much harder to find a flat or a job if you are a Muslim with an Arabic name)?

To me, it looks like this: The moment in which a 17-year-old starts believing a Jihadist hardliner, he has already stopped believing "us.

But at the same time, this may be true, too: Another 17-year-old, who in the same moment experiences that he is not powerless because he secured funding for a basketball court from the municipality or perhaps because he just successfully registered a demonstration against the next Gaza war, may become quite immune towards Jihadist recruiters.

I don't want to downplay personal factors. Broken families, lack of (male) examples - all of this plays into radicalization processes, as well. But the sense of being unable to achieve or change anything, is also a big driving force.

The truth is that Jihadism has many thousands of voluntary helpers across the Globe who spend hours on hours in front of their laptops trying to spread their ideology. These people are truly committed. If we want to counter their influence, we need more than state-run and state-instigated programs. We need volunteers ourselves, in order to counter the volunteers of extremism.

I have nothing against help from the state, wherever it is helpful and makes sense. But actually, no-one needs a mandate or even a laptop to his own bit of counter messaging. I guess this is my point. We can't and we shouldn't delegate this to the state or its agencies alone.

--

NB: This is a somewhat different version of a German blog post I published on ZEIT ONLINE today. 

„This threat will stay with us for at least a decade“

What kinds of terror attacks do we have to expect in Europe, and how dangerous are returning Foreign Fighters? Norwegian terror expert Thomas Hegghammer* shares his insights in this interview with DIE ZEIT**.

DIE ZEIT: In the Paris attack, there was a link to Yemen. In Belgium, where the police foiled a terror attack last week, we saw Syria returnees among the suspects. In Germany, the police arrested several Jihadists, some of whom had been to Syria, some of whom hadn't. What do these instances tell us about the current threat?

Hegghammer: Firstly, that it is varied indeed. The security services have to look at different kinds of threats all the time. I would also add to the list the sympathizers of the „Islamic State“ (IS). We have seen plots hatched by IS sympathizers in North America, Australia and Europe. In fact, there have been more plots by IS sympathizers than by actual Syria returnees.

DIE ZEIT: What do all these people have in common?

Hegghammer: Apart from the fact that they are radical Islamists who want to perpetrate violence? Not much, really. They don't organize formally. They take good precautionary measures. That's about it. If you look at their profiles, they are a very mixed bunch.

DIE ZEIT: But it is clear, that the pool of potential terrorists is bigger today than it was a few years ago. Does that mean this threat is going to stay for quite a while?

Hegghammer: O yes, at least for another decade! Syria and the IS phenomonen have given Jihadism in Europe a new lease on life. We will be facing threat levels like this for many years.

DIE ZEIT: Should we expect more attacks, but on a smaller magnitude than we were fearing before?

Hegghammer: It's impossible to make good predication of frequency and scale. The quantity need not go up, but it could. And attacks need not become smaller, there can still be big ones like Madrid or London every now and then. But I believe there are two new trends. We are currently observing more attacks with hand-held weapons than with explosives. And the attackers tend to seek out targets that leave little doubt about the message - like Charlie Hebdo, Jewish schools, Policemen or soldiers -, rather than, say, general transportation systems.

DIE ZEIT: A lot of these plots seems to be results of calls to „individual Jihad“ via „Inspire“ and other Jihadist propaganda. Has this phenomenon now taken centre stage?

Hegghammer: I am not sure. Look at Paris: the Kouachi brothers were part of an old network, exactly like what we used to have in the 2000s. In Belgium, we saw a rather large network of 10 to 15 people. That's not exactly „invidiual Jihad“. The attacks in Ottawa and Sydney, on the other hand, were. We have to understand that new tactics are being added, but old ones are being kept.

DIE ZEIT: You have worked extensively on „Foreign Fighters“. What's more important as a driving factor: adventure and life stlye or religion and ideology?

Hegghammer: People leave for different reasons, but if I were to hightlight one, it’s the desire to be part of a historical project. It's partly escapism. These people want to get away from the West, from corruption and discrimination, and they want to move into this assumedly pure zone where they think they can find true Islam.

DIE ZEIT: We like to think of the Western world as free and able to accomodate all kinds of religious lifestyles. Why does this concept not work for these people?

Hegghammer: Disillusionment is not limited to radical Islamists. Many young people across Europe are frustrated, see no future, are in opposition to the current order. But they have no alternative. The secular, drug-using delinquent in a Paris suburb – where is he going to go? Islamists, in contrast, are being offered an escape route. So availability is a factor here: Syria is easy to get to. It's an utopia that is at hand.

DIE ZEIT: Some Israeli soldiers escape to Goa after military service; some leftists start communes when they are sick of consumerism; but they usually don't turn into terrorists. Where does this element come from?

Hegghammer: Jihadism is a destructive project, concealed in a constructive one. They don't join in order to become terrorists. But they can become terrorists in the process. And our problem is that radicalizing and preparing to go abroad to fight is a kind of activity that is just below the threshold of police intervention. In a way, the reason we have a radicalization problem in Europe is that the Islamists are not that radical. Because a lot of these networks stay clear of terrorist plotting, there is little the state can do against them. If these people were all organized terrorists, we wouldn't have any problem defeating them. But as long as they are operating below that threshold, our hand are tied. All these gateway groups, like Sharia4Belgium, Sharia4Denmark, etc., they have become masters at toeing the line.

DIE ZEIT: So the window to act is too tiny?

Hegghammer: Exactly. And we can't just lower the threshold, or we will end up punishing people for opinions.

DIE ZEIT: Is there any indication of how long it takes foreign fighters to cool down once they return? Or do they stay radical?

Hegghammer: We know very little about Syria returnees so far. But what we do know is the proportion of people who returned from previous battlefields and then plotted attacks. Before Syria, that rate was 1 out of 15 to 20. If you look at open source data about returnees from Syria who were involved in terror plots across Europe, we have so far seen about 10 plots with roughly 20 returnees involved. That is 20 out of 3000 who left to fight abroad, or 20 out of just over 1000 who have already returned, repectively. So far, it is only a small minority who have become terrorists. The question before us is: How do you stop that minority without over-reacting towards the relatively harmless majority?

DIE ZEIT: But many returnees have only returned recently. Some of them still may become active as terrorists...

Hegghammer: Yes, that number will increase. But I think we can already say that the rate is not going to be extremely high. Given the sheer numbers, however, the absolute number of terror plots may well be higher than previously.

DIE ZEIT: How should our societies deal with this long-term threat?

Hegghammer: Some intelligence services in Europe will have to substantially grow, they need more analysts. Not necessarily new methods or new survaillance powers. Adding data usually just means having to process more data. Smarter analytical software can help, but we need more brains, too. Our publics also need to be prepared for more news like what we have heard in the past two weeks, and they need to be persuaded not to panic. Mind you, we are still no-where near the level of terrorist activitiy we had in the 70s and 80s from the far left and far right. We should be able to psychologically tolerate even an increase in terrorist activity.

DIE ZEIT: What other measures are sensible?

Hegghammer: We need a sophisticated system to deal with returnees. We need soft measures to re-integrate those who can be re-integrated, and tough measures to incarcerate those who need to be incarcerated. And there is the internet. I am very aware of free speech concerns, but we have reached a point where something needs to be done about the access of Jhadis to broadcasting tools. JM Berger makes a really good point about this when he argues that the question at stake is not in fact free speech, given that Twitter and Facebook are really like TV stations. Should these people have the right to voice their opinion? Of course! Should they also have the right to broadcast them? Well, I don't think so.

DIE ZEIT: Prisons are also a problem in regard to radicalization.

Hegghammer: And that is a true dillemma. You have three options, none of which is great: Put Jihadists in a prison together, and they will wind each other up. Spread them out, and you will have the risk of the radicals radicalizing other people. Third option: Solitary confinement. But that's inhumane. This dillemma is accentuated by the European tradition of short sentences. In the US, Jhadists get very long sentences. They die in prison or grow old there. In Europe, they will be back on the streets after a few years. For me, all this is a good argument for putting as few people in prison as possible.

DIE ZEIT: How do you prepare for day X? Can resiliance be learnt?

Hegghammer: That's almost impossible, because whether an attack has a unifying or polarizing effect, has to do with the target. And you have no control over that. Take Paris, for example: There is a lot of tension now, the country hasn't simply united after the attack. And that has to with the nature of the target. It was very controversial. When the Twitter-Hashtag „JeSuisCharlie“ came up, that kind of forced people to identify with that controversial target. And lo and behold, within hours you had alternative Hashtags like „JeSuisAhmed“ or „IamnotCharlie“. It was very different in Norway, when Breivik killed 77 people, because it is hard to disagree that killing children is bad. That made it much easier to stand together. 

* Thomas Hegghammer is the director of terrorism research at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment and an internationally renowned expert on Jihadist ideology, Foreign Fighters and Saudi Arabia. (Foto Credit: Christian Vinculado Tandberg / FFI)

** This interview was conducted by Yassin Musharbash for DIE ZEIT. A slightly edited and shortened German version of this interview was published in the current issue of DIE ZEIT which can be purchased online here. We have a cover story this week called "Living with Terror", apart from the interview you will find an in-depth-story on German reactions to the Paris attack and the Belgian arrests as well as a report from Belgium (and other good stuff). 

A German Fighter with the "Islamic State"

December 4th, 2013 - It was bound to happen some time, and it happened last Saturday: The "Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria" (ISIS) presented their first German language video, introducing in it their first German recruit in Syria (that we know of): A young man calling himself "Abu Osama".

By now it has been established that "Abu Osama" is a 26 year old convert named Phillip B. from the West German city of Dinslaken. According to our information at DIE ZEIT he left Germany roughly half a year ago. He seems to have been part of a group of five or six, all of whom have by now returned to Germany, except, of course, for him. 

In the 10 minute video, "Abu Osama" calls upon Muslims in Germany to join the cause since fighting Jihad in Syria is an obligation. He says "Syria is a blessing" and that there are safe areas, even for children and families. He says he chose his kunya out of adoration for Osama Bin Laden, but he does not threaten Germany. 

He shares with his audience the information that he embraced Islam about four years ago and that his journey is the answer to his questions about the meaning of life. He poses with an assault rifle, but he doesn't divulge anything about participating in combat. 

"Abu Osama" isn't the first German Islamist to show up in Syria by a long shot. The official estimate  here is now at "above 220" according to the head of domestic Intelligence, Hans-Georg Maaßen, whom we are quoting with this number in tomorrow's edition of DIE ZEIT. Please note, though, that this number isn't a head count. 

The question now of course is: What does it mean that we have at least one German member of ISIS? Because before last Saturday, we weren't sure at all where they end up. There were signs of a cluster of Germans forming around a media unit calling itself Sham Center, but that was pretty much it. 

I think that it is troubling. ISIS is by far the most ruthless and brutal of organizations in Syria. It also is the group where I believe the issue of an internationalist agenda may come up first. In addition, Germans in Waziristan have shown a clear tendency to follow one another and then form little groups around those who got there first. We therefor may see more Jihadists from Germany within ISIS ranks soon. 

What adds to this concern is another piece of information we learned about during our research for our ZIET-story: According to our sources, Mohamed Mahmoud, an Austrian who already spent years in jail for terrorism charges and is known to have AQ-connections, tried to establish a German batallion of fighters under ISIS command but was turned down by that group for reasons unkown. What we do know is that he himself never made it into Syria but has nor for quite some time been held in Turkey under less than harsh conditions, meaning that he is still able to communicate with Jihadists in Syria, Iraq and Germany. 

Mahmoud is considered to be part of the loosely knit network that also former Berlin Gangster rapper Denis Cuspert a.k.a. "Abu Talha al-Almani" belongs to. Abu Talha was injured in Syria a few weeks ago in an air strike. It is unclear what group, if any, he is associated with, but in the light of the ISIS video and the Mahmoud story he is definitely a person of interest. 

In the mean time, I want to close this post with two more quotes of Hans-Georg Maaßen, head of the German domestic Intelligence agency "Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz" (BfV) -- for all those of you who are interested in Germany's take on this. 

On the issue that most Foreign Fighters active in Syria travel through Turkey, Maaßen says: "Turkey is an important factor in the region. We hope for and expect a significantly closer cooperation." 

If you think those are the least subtle words you have heard so far from a German official, you may be right. 

On the other other hand, Maaßen maintains that co-operation with the US remains unimpaired by the NSA affair: "Co-operation in fighting international terrorism is continuing unchanged. Information flows both ways, also with a view to Syria and travel pattern to that country."

And with that I will leave you for tonight. Even though something tells me we shall be discussing German Islamists in Syria again soon. 

Pancakes & Propaganda

October 15th 2013 - At what point does an authentic self portrayal turn in propaganda? In the case of extremists, it is often hard to tell. People who fully commit to an extremist ideology tend to see themselves less as individuals and more as examples; whatever happens to them is interpreted as a symbol. Whatever they do, is considered a signal.

And yet, no text and no personal account can ever be 100 per cent propaganda. Somebody describes something, an every day experience, a thought, an encounter - and unless the entire text is just one big lie, it will reveal parts of a deeper truth that lies beyond the realm of propaganda. Studying it can be telling.

Last month a young German woman started a blog, describing in it her life as the wife of a Jihadist fighter in Syria; I believe her blog is a case in point.

She describes herself as "the wife of a Mujahid, a mother of mini-Muhajirin and a neighbour of Ansar, Muhajrin and Mujahidin. It is a story like out of a picture book. No, it is even better. It is just like the story of our beloved prophet and his family and the sahaba."

There are five blog entries so far, all from September. They touch pancake recipes as well 9/11, the sound of gunfire in the night as well as the family cat called "Nonah".

Of course the blog is partly propaganda. For example when she celebrates the anniversary of 9/11 with "American pancakes" that "fly into our mouths", while expressing hope that other ingenious heads will device new plans for different planes and calling Osama Bin Laden an "honorable Sheikh".

But more interesting are those passages in which it becomes palpable what she finds attractive about the Islamist-Jihadist ideology which she of course considers to be the purest form of her religion: "In the land of the Kuffar, you are subject to their laws, you do, what your boss tells you, unless you are busy filing for welfare. But here the laws of Allah prevail. Here you don't work for Hans-Peter from 7 to 4, having to pray in sometimes dirty and inappropriate places. Here you work for Allah in full concentration for 24 hours per day. Allah's religion is not an aside, it is the centre."

The "dunya", the worldly life, she considers to be "trashy" and worthless: "It makes you forget how close death is. But here you won't forget, because of the sounds of bombs, hitting afar and close by… and suddenly you realize your mistakes and you ask yourself whether you are ready for the Akhira (the afterlife). Do I please God? Am I among the saved ones?"

All the known factors of radicalization mix right here: Seemingly simple answers to the complicated questions of life; a radical break with an earlier life; a vacuum that is suddenly filled with meaning. 

Unfortunately we don't learn about how she got to know her husband and who may have been the driving for of radicalization. But is is quite clear that the author is very happy with her life as the wife of a Mujahid: "'Get ready, we will go to a nice place and eat Fallafel and Kebab', my husband said. We packed and took to the river. We, the women, sat in own place, the men in another. Food was great. We had salad with it and water from the well. Suddenly shots rang out. Our men were aiming at an orange object on the other side of the river with their assault rifles. That was fun! And it was a wonderful feeling to see my own husband shoot his rifle. A real man,  a Mujahid. Not a blue helmet or a German soldier." 

She also talks about her bad conscience when the family needs to evacuate because of a bush fire and the emergency bag, which is her responsibility, isn't properly packed. 

But of course in the end all is well: "What might my brothers and sister in Germany be doing right now? It is late at night. I am hearing bombs hitting the ground, answered by barking dogs. And there is the sound of chirping crickets, of course. Just like every night." 

This is what Jihad romantic looks like. 

German authorities believe there are now as many as 170 fighters from Germany in Syria, numbers still rising. We don't know how many women are among them, but she is certainly not the only one. 

We also don't know with what groups the German fighters end up in many cases.  In the case of the blog author, there is some indication that she is with a larger German colony, as her blog is hosted by Sham Center, a media enterprise that has German members. They also seem to have connections to "Jund al-Sham". There is no way of telling whether they participate in battle. But the fact that the blog author hasn't posted anything for almost three weeks may be an indication that the situation got tougher. 

Of course five blog posts aren't enough for a full profile of any person; neither are they enough for full-on generalizations. But I think that something transpires here nonetheless: For some who have gone to Syria, it is not necessarily all about killing. And surely not all about the demise of the Assad regime, either. For some the battlefield is apparently attractive for other reasons: As a stage to enact role models inhaled at home. As an ultimate test allowing them to prove they are serious about their convictions. Perhaps also as a place to flee to from a sense of being under attack, but also maybe to flee to from doubts. And lastly as a kind of virtual time machine that seemingly makes it possible to re-invent oneself in a pseudo-7th-century kind of environment where you are free to imitate the examples you have heard so much about. 

The price, of course, may be your own death - and the death of your own children; but apparently the factors pulling some of these people in are stronger than that fear. 

I find it difficult to understand all that. But at the same time I am convinced it is important we don't ignore this sentiment. More Western Islamists, male and female, will travel to Syria. Many will come back. Once they are here again, it will be decisive we have an idea what drove them there and what may be driving them now. 

PS: It is not easy to verifiy this blog is actually written out of Syria. In theory it could be a fake. I don't think so, though. The content, the stlye, the place it is published - all of this seems authentic and plausibel to me. I asked other experts, and they agree. Should I change my opinion in this regard, I will let you know. 

PPS: This is an English version of my German blog post at DIE ZEIT online, where I work. It can be found here. 

PPPS: I have to thank @lizzypearson who came up with the English headline for this post after reading the German version. 

Zawahiri's "Guideline for Jihad"

September 18th, 2013 - The recent publication by al-Qaida's Al-Sahab Media Wing of a 5-page Arabic document by Al-Qaida's Amir Aiman al-Zawahiri is interesting for several reasons, foremost of which is that publications whose target audience is the actual cadre and body of sympathizers of al-Qaida have become rarer and rarer over the past few years; yet it is these documents that help us understand the organization better than videos and audios directed at a global audience with the intent to warn, scare or intimidate "the enemy".

In this case, al-Zawahiri explicitly asks for this paper to be distributed among the rank and file of supporters, members and leaders of all groups "within in the community of Qaidat al-Jihad". So even though not everything that al-Zawahiris has to say is entirely new, some parts of this document titled "General Explanations about the Jihadi Work" are worthwhile taking a look at.

1.- Al-Zawahiri is trying to reinstall a sense of coherency into al-Qaida's activities. He tries to achieve this by making clear that all actions taken in the name of the organization have to be in line with the general narrative of al-Qaida being the vanguard of resistance against the "crusader onslaught" on Islam. I would say that this is an attempt to try and win back sympathies within societies where many people over the past years have started to mainly perceive al-Qaida as a force that indiscriminately murders people. Al-Zawahiri would like Al-Qaida to be seen instead as a group sticking to a particular mission which it follows on behalf of all Muslims. Thus he needs coherency.

2.- Al-Zawahiri also asks his cadre and fighters to practice restraint. Fewer Muslim and civilian targets and fewer attacks on Muslim "deviant" groups, he apparently hopes, will help serve the same purpose: Improving al-Qaida's image in the Muslim world. It is likely also for this reason that he demands that al-Qaida, as a rule, should only retaliate.

3.- I say "as a rule" here, because al-Zawahiri of course doesn't fail to make clear that attacking US and Israeli targets is always OK. By this, Al-Zawahiri is effectively saying: Listen, you can bomb away, if you like, but please stick to the few rules that I have come up with in the larger, strategic interest of this enterprise! He is not forbidding either violence or terrorism. He just wants it better explained and more targeted.

4.- It is not new that al-Zawahiri (or other AQ leaders, for that matter) ask for restraint. The AQ Central reaction to Abu Musab al-Zarqawis butchering in Iraq is one example. Abu Yahya al-Libi's fatwa against market bombs is another. However, I believe there is an additional factor at play here. Al-Zawahiri is an Egyptian, and he always looks to Egypt with special interest. Given that the Muslimbrothers there have just lost "their" president and claim to power by action of the army, al-Zawahiri knows that there must be hundreds, perhaps thousands of angry, radicalized, disenfranchised MB who are at the tipping point, because they have just learnt the hard way that playing the democracy game doesn't play out. These people are not naturally al-Qaida supporters. But a more civil, more restrained, more focused, more political version of al-Qaida could win their sympathies. I believe this is what al-Zawahiri is (also) aiming at.

Of course it remains to be seen whether al-Zawahiri's initiative will yield any results on the ground; I have doubts. But it may help him strengthen his own position within the organization. Until now his audios and videos have not been very impressive or inspiring. Now he has for the first time left a clear mark since he took over from Bin Laden. That is in itself an important step for him.

PS: This is an English version (not a translation) of a blog post from my German language blog on the website of DIE ZEIT, where I work. 

PPS: Aaron Zelin has both, Arabic and English versions of the document on Jihadology. 

Personalized Jihad?

April 25th 2013 - The Boston Attack and what we know about it at this point doesn't exactly turn conventional wisdom of the terrorism research community upside-down: vulnerable young men, a vacuum to fill, a family falling apart, a personal re-invention, ties to a homeland and a region affected by bloody conflict, perhaps a radical friend, perhaps a lot of radical video consumption, perhaps a fatal journey abroad, a bit of Inspire... And yet, there are a few aspects in this case I am still chewing on. To put it another way: Maybe we should call in the psychologists.

It's mainly these points that strike me as possibly significant when trying to draw conclusions from the Boston attack:

1.- While this is obviously not even remotely the first terror attack in which brothers took part, it's still different from most others that I am aware of in that we have reason to believe that Tamerlan was the driving force and that Dhzokhar submitted to his idea. We have a lot of indication of a radicalization of Tamerlan, but as of now very little, if anything at all, that would suggest that Dhzokhar even was a committed Jihadist when he signed up for it. In what sort of capacity, and for which reasons did he take part? They may lie in a sphere to which political scientists, Arabists, journalists or whatever else most of us may be don't necessarily have the best understanding of and access to. What I mean, to put it bluntly: What if this was an attack that meant something different to each of the perpetrators?  I am aware that there are other instances in which one participant exerted undue influence over others. And yet, if we are trying to take it from here and to assess what may be coming next, we should probably bear in mind that apparently even a jihadist terror attack may be something that someone can be drawn into even though his "real" motivation may much rather be that he doesn't want to be the one left behind or the one leaving someone else behind.

2.- There is one other dimension to this attack that I can't get out of my head: This was two excelling sportsmen attacking a sporting event. Why the Marathon? Only because it was the biggest event that fit the schedule? Perhaps. But maybe this is also something that other professions have interesting perspectives on. I personally find it distantly but oddly reminiscent of school shootings: Going back to something you were once part of and maybe experienced humiliation at.

I am no psychologist and I feel bad even trying for a second to think like one. But it is exactly this discomfort that makes me wonder if I have sufficient analytical tools at my disposal to see all important dimensions in this attack.

To elaborate a little: My background, for example, is in Arabic and Islamic Studies and Political Sciences and I work as a journalist. I tend to stress the importance of ideology. For example, I made great efforts trying to explain to people that what may look like illogical and arbitrary targets to "us" are in many cases perfectly reasonable targets from a Jihadist perspective if you are acquainted with their sources and ways of thinking. But the more attacks by "lone wolfs" or self recruited Jihadists we see, the higher the chance is that they might mix personal with ideologically prescribed considerations. Since no-one is leading them (in many cases), no-body gets to "correct" them. So with Jihadism becoming more individual, it also may become more personalized. And that would perhaps mean we have to take into consideration additional or slightly different factors in order to do risk analysis or threat assessment, etc.

This is just a blog post, not an academic paper, not a newspaper editorial, not a conference contribution. Please take it as such. It is just a few thoughts that I have been developing over the past few days. They may be absurd, already proven wrong or considered solved. But then, what's a blog for if not (also) for throwing thoughts at people to see what they have to say.

So, I am curious about your reactions!

Cheers, Y. 

In the Twitterverse (Re: Boston)

April 21st 2013 - I knew why I was feeling so tired when a colleague of mine who is currently in the US asked me by email if I was Boston: „You twitter so intensively and so late at night that I thought you must be on Boylston Street.“ I can only hope I didn't really give anyone the impression via Twitter that I was in Boston when in fact I was in Berlin. (I don't think I did.) But in a way being on Twitter is akin to „being there“ – only that the „there“ is not a physical place but a debate revolving around such a physical place and something that's going on there. On Twitter I can chose whose messages about that particular going-on I want to expose myself to. By doing so, I willfully expose myself to an unfiltered stream of messages – some true, many wrong, most half-half. As long as I bear that in mind, Twitter is a grand medium.

Of course it is also a mind boggling medium. Just think about how people on Friday starting live tweeting Police scanner info, leading to the Boston Police requesting people to refrain from doing so (passed on via Twitter) for fear that the fugitive might learn about police positions via Twitter. More real time experience is hardly possible any other way.

At the same time that episode hints at the potential power of Twitter – in both ways, good and bad. On the one hand you had Bostonians offering shelter and help via Twitter to those effected by Monday's bombing. On the other hand you have preachers of hate constantly disemminating and re-inforcing false, premature, biased and uninformed Pseudo-information – let't not forget, for example,  that for many hours in parts of the Twitterverse first a Saudi and then an Indian student were „the“ culprits. Neither of them ever where suspects. Almost no-one on Twitter who re-tweeted that bullshit apologized. Of course not. Because all they wanted was that people believe it. 

On the other hand, Twitter is just great to stay tuned to real news (as in: provided by proper journalists). Google news can't compete when you want to know what has just been published, anywhere in the world, on the particular issue you are interested in. Plus: you may receive the link via someone you know and trust, so you really want to check that article out because that person thought it important.

For parts of the past week I scanned Twitter and watched CNN in parallel. By comparison, CNN lost. It lost against MY Twitter feed, though. It may have won in comparison to other peoples' feeds. Because there is no single entity called Twitter. YOU are following but ONE of any number of possible debates and streams of messages. But in this regard one very valid question is: If I am really interested in an issue, like the Boston bombing and the ensueing manhunt, why would I wait for a journalist to pick up the news, produce and edit and launch it online, if I can simply and just as well follow the Police Department, the District Attorney, the FBI, etc. myself – and by doing so be the very first to receive their statements? (News outlets have to learn to think of ways of dealing with that. If something was on Twitter a half hour earlier, it it really still breaking news?) 

Twitter though can be unreal at times – ironically, by way of it's built-in hyperrealism. In the case of Boston, one such moment was when Watertown was locked down and resident live tweeted from areas Journalists had no access to any longer -- but maybe even more so when a little later the fugitive's Twitter account became known, and suddenly his words, his thoughts were becoming part of the debate. Plus comments about them. Plus comments about them by people who claimed to have known him. (Of course the checking of such claims is left to you – which is whay Twitter is not a substitute for Journalism.) Twitter is, in a lot ways, best compared to tuning in to a stream of chatter of people you don't know. Like being able to eavesdrop on conversations. It's what people will say, much as in the analog world, withouth thinking too hard: „Have you heard...?“ – what follows may well be wrong, or half right, or even true. You have to able to deal with that, if you want to really use Twitter as a resource. But it can be fruitful. (Plus: Of course, speaking as a Journalist here, even wrong or hateful or willfully misleading Tweets can be interesting, as they also tell stories.)

In any case, here is why I love Twitter despite of all the hectic, the chaos, the unorderliness: I can be part of a global conversation, the limits of which I define. I like to expose myself to chatter as it can lead me towards valid information or avenues of inquiry worth persueing. But at the same time I cherish reasonable discussion and debate, which can also be found on Twitter. In my case, having been on the terrorism beat for over a decade, the latter means that I follow a number of international terrorism experts, many of whom (not all) I know personally from the real world. I want to know what they have to say. Twitter allows me to have a five day on-and-off debate with them without having to call them, one by one. What a resource!

Much of what I have said so far you all probably know and maybe you have experienced it in a similiar way. But I feel the urge to point out that I think it is unfair to discredit Twitter, as some do, for being generally too fast, too loud, too quick, too little cautious. The opposite is also true. There were times during the Boston crisis when the better experts on Twitter (and I could name more, but I want to particularly point out @azelin, @intelwire and @muradbatal) were soooo much better than what TV networks had on offer, that one question needs to be asked: Shouldn't these networks, rather then feel threatened by Twitter (as they seem to be) look at ways of how they could become better by following the right people on Twitter?

There may be little news in this post for many of you. But let me conclude by saying that as a Journalist with access to wire services, I preferred Twitter throughout the past week. Because I follow just the people I need to in order to not miss anything, to be in many many cases even be informed earlier.

Twitter of course is a better resource for gaining information than for sharpening your argument. I personally need times off Twitter to contemplate. But I love Twitter. Even if it is redundant, exhausting, intensive, loud and immediate. I simply find too much valuable info, debate and input in it that I wouldn't get any other way. Plus: Some Tweeps are just great people to hang out with, even digitally. 

Cheers, Y.

PS: This post is an adapted version of a German language blog post I wrote for my blog at @zeitonline, the website of the weekly newspaper I work for, DIE ZEIT.  

AQ, Mauretani & Internet Cables

March 29, 2013 - Egypt's naval forces yesterday reportedly intercepted scuba divers who were trying to cut submarine internet cables. Some of you noted that in the previously unknown letter of Sheikh Younis al-Mauretani to Osama Bin Laden that I reported about last week attacks of this kind had been floated as ideas. Of course it is way too early to say anything meaningful about the actual background of the operation foiled in Egypt, let alone about a potential connection to Al-Qaida. At this point, I believe it could very well be a coincidence.

But just in case you are interested, here is what al-Mauretani had to say on the issue in the OBL-letter: 

* We will delegate people to study maritime issues and to personally prepare for the fact that the organization will one day need them for Jihadist activities. These people will be asked to specialize, since it is necessary to master the technique of trafficking and everything else in connection with the seas, as we have in mind attacks on maritime targets such as pipelines and internet cables and tankers. 

* ... not to even talk about an operation like the one you have suggested and for which we would need a special apparatus with the highest capabilities... . This apparatus demands the highest degree of precision and simultaneity as well as a huge amount of information and activities. Not to mention the destruction of all cables of the internet at different places worldwide -- we have seen, after all, how a simple problem a year ago led to unrest at the stock exchanges in the Near East. 

You think these passages are somewhat cryptic? I agree. But if anything, these sentences rather clearly corroborate the notion that AQ was at least thinking about targeting internet cables. Can they do it, though? Is it still a live plan? I daresay no-one knows right now. Maybe results of the Egyptian investigation will tell us more. 

Have a good night, 

Y. -

Attiyat Allah Obituary in Talai' Khorasan

Good day!

There is a four page obituary for Attiyat Allah Al-Liby in the current edition of Talai' Khorasan, written by a certain Abu al-Bara'a al-Kuwaiti. Interesting! I have just read it, and for those of you interested in this sort of thing, here are a few points from the text that I found noteworthy (most of the text isn't exciting, as a matter of fact, but very redundant).

- So apparently Attiyat Allah was born in 1969 in Misurata in Libya
- One of his teachers is named as Abdallah al-Faqih
- But he also had several teachers in Mauretania
- In late 1988 he is said to have gone to Afghanistan and have joined al-Qaida, as a very early member, as the text notes. His base was Camp Jaji, at least then, it seems
- He is said to have taken part in the Khost campaign
- learned explosive techniques
- He then went to Algeria in 1995 to take part in the leadership of "Jihad" there. But this didn't work out well, it seems, and he left again for Afghanistan
- In 2006 Osama Bin Laden asked him to go to Iraq to lead the "Jihad" there "side by side" with Abu Mu'sab al-Zarqawi. But that also didn't work out, he never made it there.
- He again returned to Afghanistan and became the second man behind Mustafa Abu al-Yazid for five years
- He is then described, somewhat oddly, as the "Number Two" (or literally from the Arabic: "The second man") of the organization after the deaths of Bin Laden and Abu al-Yazid. Would love to know what this is supposed to mean exactly.
- He had two sons, the author says: Ibrahim, who died two years before him, and 'Issam, who died with him. Both were teenagers.
- He is portrayed as computer and internet savvy and is said to have read tech magazines.
- He is also described as the "engineer" of the attack of Abu Dajana al-Khorasani on the CIA base in Afghanistan.

OK folks, would love to hear your thoughts!

Cheers, Y.

-August 22nd, 2012

On the currently reported Threats against Germany - A Perspective

OK, from the echo on German news websites it appears like AFP ran an item tonight about a terrorist threat directed towards Germany. It sounds pretty alarming: If Filiz G. a.k.a. Umm Saif Allah al-Ansaria is not released from prison, attacks may take place in the streets of Berlin. The threat, according to these reports, was published on Shmukh forum just after it re-surfaced earlier today. German chancellor Merkel is said to be directly addressed in the threat. Mention is said to be made of the Toulouse incident.

I checked this out as best I could. And it turns out that such a threat has indeed been posted on the forum's general discussion area. I am at least pretty certain that the item I found is the item that caused the reporting. However, neither was it posted by the forum admins themselves (as it sounded from the reports) nor was its published or endorsed by any known Jihadist entity. The posting much rather seems to be the work of an exited agitator calling himself "he who will make al-Qaida victorious".

So, in other words: This is ONE posting by ONE unknown man on ONE website. It is, in my humble opinion, far less alarming than similar demands made by AQIM a few days ago -- who, by the way, seem to be holding a German hostage.

This kind of threat appears regularly on the forums, and while it may be an indication of a general mood among Jihadists or their sympathizers, it shouldn't be blown out of proportion. The posting is comparable to the recent posting of a picture of New York City in connection with the claim that AQ was to come back there soon in another forum: It is meant to excite people or scare them. But is in most cases unsubstantiated. (I am not saying, though, it should be completely disregarded. I am just saying that other kinds of claims, threats and messages need to be taken much more seriously.)

In this case though, I really wish somebody could bring it to the attention of AQIM and all the rest of those who want Filiz G. released from jail, that it REALLY REALLY looks like she will walk free very soon anyway. They just don't seem to be reading the news.

PS: If anyone of you is interested in the content of the posting: I have seen sillier ones; the author says that people like Mohamed Merah are everywhere and that they may strike at any time. You can read most of it in the (shitty) pic that I made of it just now.

Al-Qaida offline - again

Most of you will have noticed: Shmukh, easily the most important Jihadist internet forum, has been down for a week or so by now. They are now running a banner saying they will be back up "in the shortest time possible". That may mean another couple of days, judging by experience.

What we are seeing here is by no means unique or new. Over the past years, this has happened roughly every 12 - 18 months or so. The interesting thing is, that we rarely learn for certain what the reasons were. Sometimes the outage seemed to have been related to arrests of administrators or people close to them. Sometimes it appeared as though the sites were brought down by crude force. And in at least one case it was fairly clear that while there was an arrest first, the folks who arrested the administrator (and who were state actors) chose to ran the site themselves for a few days. (Not a bad idea, from there point of view, I'd argue.) 

Over time, a pattern emerged: Every major outage is an occasion for newer or second tier forums to grow large(r) and (more) important. Some of you might remember the names of the top tier forums of earlier times like falluja, ekhlaas, firdaws, hikma or even ma'sada... all gone for good. (Does anyone of you still remember what was there before forums grew important? Anyone? I am referring to Abu Banan's mailing list of course, but that's just an aside..)

However, every time a major forum goes down for a while, users start wondering whether it is still trustworthy once it re-emerges. Judging from the chatter on the forums, I would dare say that generally speaking many users in fact don't really trust the forums that much anymore. Or to be more precise: they trust the terrorist content that they find there, like AQ-C videos or claims of responsibly by the AQ branches, etc. But they are, in not so few cases, not really sure anymore, who runs the forums and does exactly what with them. 

They still come back though, because they "need" the "stuff" and want to be part of the scene and because they experience teaches them that it s not really dangerous to visit the forums and read or even post. But in my opinion the degree of easiness with which people used to chat and comment and discuss on the forums has gone down a fair deal over the years. 

Maybe I am wrong, or I read too selectively. Maybe not. I can't be sure. Only of one thing, of course: Forums will be back, in one form or another. And they will keep fulfilling the same function they have now. Give them a couple of days... 

Interesting Arrest in Spain

According to this report by Fox News Spanish police arrested a man who allegedly worked 8 – 15 hours online every day on behalf of AQ-C, AQAP and AQIM, busying himself with what was described as recruiting and transportation issues. He is also said to have administered one of the world's most important jihadist forums.

Now this clearly sounds interesting, and I fully share @azelin's speculation that this sounds as if the man (apparently a Jordanian-born Saudi) may have been involved in the al-Fajr project.

Al-Fajr kept me quite busy for a while back in 2008 when I published an article about them after I had learned what Western intelligence services believed to have found out at the time - namely that al-Fajr, which appeared then and still appears mainly as a distribution network for propaganda from the outside, was in reality also a secret communications channel linking AQ central leadership with the leadership of the branches and top tier website administrators. This way crude and uncut versions of terror videos were said to be moved.

Another example according to my sources at the time was that AQ central used the communication system for reminding Iraqi cadres of handing over due money in one case. It was also believed that only around two dozens people had the necessary log in information for that „forum inside the forums“ or for what one agent dubbed „al-Qaida's intranet“.

It is of course not easy to judge whether al-Fajr still has that role today. But if it turned out to be true that the man arrested in Spain was in fact an al-Fajr operative, it would be a very interesting case indeed – and one where I would dearly like to follow court proceedings should he ever be prosecuted.