How ISIS will react to the Mosul Offensive

October 18th, 2016 - In recent weeks I have had the chance to speak to several knowledgable and interesting people. I can't identify most of them by name and therefore won't identify any of them just to be on the safe side.

Suffice it to say that one of them says of himself that he is an ISIS member (full bai'a and all); that two more consider themselves supporters of ISIS and know a number of people who formally joined and/or are currently in Syria or Iraq; that another two are former Baath era military officers and that three of them are members of Syrian rebel groups.

Of course this is a group of truly varied backgrounds. The interesting thing, however, is that they largely agreed on how ISIS has prepared for the battle of Mosul and what might be happening next.

This is what they largely agree on:

* ISIS will not waste a significant number of fighters in the defense of Mosul. The lowest estimate was as low as 300.

* ISIS will try and make the unavoidable fall of Mosul as expensive as possible for the attackers: They will encounter massive amounts of booby traps; perhaps snipers.

* ISIS will try and exfiltrate into a) those desert areas of Iraq that are close to communities where there is a certain degree of tacit or open support for them and b) those areas of Syria and Iraq still under their control including some that have probably been prepared for that purpose in advance like al-Qaim but also the lesser known area of Bir Qassab in Syria.

* ISIS will not be destroyed by the loss of Mosul at all but is quite capable of surviving and perhaps even making a come-back after a while, especially when Mosul and the liberated areas can't be pacified properly.

* Foreign fighters of ISIS will have a hard time leaving the theatre of war: Most of their passports would have been burnt a long time ago, most of their governments know them and would immediately arrest them. This means they will either die fighting or try and lay low with the local contingent.

* ISIS will soon return to guerrilla tactics, especially in Iraq, attacking "everyone not IS" with all means possible, ranging from sniping attacks to IEDs and skirmishes.

Some of this may not be super exciting stuff and you may have come across it elsewhere. But I found it interesting that a group that diverse would agree on so many things.

Syrian Elephants in the Room

November 29th, 2015 - I acknowledge that the Paris attacks have changed the debate. I understand why France chose to retaliate with air strikes on Raqqa, one of the in fact two capitals of the "Caliphate" the "Islamic State" (IS) pronounced last year. I even get why the German government has decided to support France and all the other countries bombing the IS with reconnaissance capabilities.

However, there still are two elephants in the room when we are discussing fighting the IS, and they ought to be addressed.

The first problematic issue, the first elephant if you so want, is that the IS exists in Syria AND Iraq. Russian President Vladimir Putin has seen to it that currently most politicians in the West talk and argue as if the Caliphate was a problem that is inextricably linked to the fate of "president" Bashar al-Assad. Well, it is not.  As a matter of fact, consider these two things:

1.- If the IS were to be driven out of all Syrian territory tomorrow, with - for argument's sake -  the help of Putin, Assad, the US, all Arabs: Would the IS be defeated? - Clearly not.

2.- If Assad stays in power or not, how much of a difference does it make in terms of the chances of the IS to survive? - Clearly: very little.

What does that mean? It means this: The political future of Syria and the demise of the IS are in fact two mostly separate issues. I know this is counter-intuitive. But looking at it in this way makes the choices in front of us much easier. We do not need Assad to finish the IS. Period.

Which leads me to the second elephant in the room: The fact that the ongoing discussion of whether there should/might/can be a role for Assad or one of his relatives or proxies in the future as a leader of an interim Syrian government that would in one way or another include opposition forces and at a later point in time hand over power to that opposition seems to be based on the idea that Syria still somehow is a state and will be a single united state in the future.

Well... as much as I would like that as somebody who really loves Syria and the Syrians, I believe we should face the possibility that partition, de facto or de jure, is the more likely scenario. Because here is the thing:

1.- Assad is not going to get all of Syria back.
2.- The opposition is not going to be able to get all of Syria under it's control.

This is not purely a matter of military might. It also has to do with legitimacy. Assad has killed hundreds of thousands, but there are millions who support him inside Syria and wish for him to stay in power. It is a fact. These people are spread over a largely coherent mass of land in the country. Most of the rest of the country (not counting IS territory) is strongly against Assad and will not accept a future tole for him or one of his proxies. He has a lot of actual legitimacy in one part of Syria and almost zero legitimacy in the rest of the country.

To put it another way: What if the question is the wrong one? Should we really be discussing a role for Assad for all of Syria at this point in time? I don't think so. But do those people who staunchly support him have a right to be heard? Well, I am not fond of admitting it, but I think they do. (I am saying that even though I personally think he needs to be sent to The Hague.)

It all boils down to this: What is better, a real ceasefire with a de facto partition? Or an agreement pertaining to the whole of Syria, but one that is going to be so feeble that the likelihood it will just jumpstart another round in this terrible war is rather big?

I know, I know, I haven't even discussed the Kurdish issue. And I haven't offered any ideas on Iraq. But hey, there are just a few thoughts.

Good night, Y.

What to look for when looking at today's terror attacks

June 26th, 2015 - This is going to be a brief blog post. Because we know way too little for any kind of sustainable analysis yet. But there are few points that can be made and which can help in directing and informing our understanding of what happened today.

1.- The attack in Kuwait was an IS attack - and it may be connected to the attack in Tunisia. 

The claim of responsibility published a few hours ago fits the bill. I believe it to be authentic and I consider the attack on a Shiite mosque in Kuwait City an IS attack for the time being.

As for the attack in Tunisia's tourist paradise in Sousse: In this case IS sympathizers, or people who would call themselves actual members of the IS, are the most likely perpetrators. The IS has called for attacks in Tunisia on several occasion, destabilizing the only country that actually made a democratic turn after the events of 2011 is a prime target for the group. There are several thousands of Tunisians who are fighting on behalf of the IS in Syria and Iraq; they have ab extensive networks of supporters and sympathizers in the country; and the IS has struck there before - in March, in the capital Tunis.

It is not unlikely that the Kuwait attack and the Sousse attack have been co-ordinated, at least roughly. We saw a similar thing in March, when a mosque in Sanaa in Yemen and a museum in Tunis were struck within 48 hours - and, intriguingly, the respective IS claims of responsibility bore a very high degree of similarity. In the case of the Sousse attack, we don't have a claim of responsibility yet. So let's wait and see.

2.- The attack in France resembles other plots and attacks by self-recurites sympathizers

It seems to have been rather amateurish (the perpetrator did not manage to instigate the massive explosion he probably had in mind); it seems to have been executed by a single person; it seems to have had a personal dimension untypical of attacks planned by networks in that the murdered and decapitated victim appears to have been the alleged perpetrator's boss.

As Thomas Hegghammer and others have pointed out, most attacks and plots executed and hatched in the West in the past few years go back originated with self-recuited sympathizers. Right now, this seems to be the most likely scenario. It would also mean that there is likely no connection to the attacks in Sousse and Kuwait.

3.- The attacks in Kobane are separate from these other attacks 

I don't know this for a fact, it is just an assumption. But I am rather sure that even if the IS leadership in Syria/Iraq did have prior knowledge of the fact that something was planned in Tunisis and Kuwait, they would not have chosen to stage an offensive in Kobane just to amplify that signal. My reading is that the IS in the theatre can't really afford to coordinate his attacks inside the theatre with what people may be planning in the larger region. Other criteria for plotting apply, synchronization is not relay of importance.

4.- Please bear in mind the following 

It is still very early. Findings may soon change the hypothesis I have laid out here. If that happens, I will re-calibrate accordingly. 

The Paris Attacks - one Plot or two?

We have fairly solid evidence by now that the attack on the Paris satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo was commissioned by AQAP. In total, there are three indications of this:

* On Friday, shortly after the perpetrators Cherif and Said Kouachi were killed by French police, a ranking AQAP cadre first sent a communique to several journalists by email and then posted a series of tweets that amounted to a claim of responsibility by the group

* Even before that, the two perpetrators during their operation had already told a by-stander and later a journalist they they were acting on behalf of AQAP

* Lastly, earlier today, an 11 minute video was published by AQAP. It appears legit and it features high ranking AQAP member Nasir bin Ali al-Anissi. In the video, he not only claimed the attack as AQAP's, but also insisted that one of the two brothers (he didn't say which one) had been appointed amir of the operation and had been in direct touch about the operation with Anwar al-Awlaki. This would in theory be consistent with reports according to which Said Kouachi spent some time in Yemen in 2011.

Overall, there is little reason to doubt that there was indeed a connection between the brothers and AQAP. The idea to attack Charlie Hebdo may very well have been born in Yemen in 2011, at a time when AQAP was experiencing an influx of foreign fighters, quite a few of whom where from France and who quite possibly would have known about Charlie Hebdo and the kind of cartoons the magazine had been printing.

So was this an AQAP attack? 

Yes. But it may have been more than just that.

Because there is another thread to be scrutinized here. On the morning following the Charlie Hebdo attack, a young man by the name of Amedy Koulibaly shot and killed a policewoman in Paris. The day after, when the Kouachi brothers had been tracked down by the police and were holed up in an industrial area near the airport with a hostage, Koulibaly re-entered the stage and took control of a Kosher supermarket. He took hostages as well and let it be known that he would kill these hostages unless the Kouachi brothers were let got.

Of course they weren't let got. But very interestingly, Koulibaly during the hostage situation explained to a journalist that he was acting on the behalf of the "Islamic State" terror organization. He re-iterated this claim in a video he later published. The IS did not claim the attack for itself. But according to some reports, it did praise the attack during a Friday sermon in the city of Mossul.

At the same time, though, Koulibaly also stated that he had co-ordinated with the Kouachi brothers.

Now how does all of that add up? Especially since AQ and the IS are enemies: They are fighting each other in Syria. They are competing for leadership of the global Jihadist movement. It is highly unlikely they respective leaderships would have agreed to a shared plot.

First of all, it is important to note that the Kouachi brothers have known Koulibaly for years. Apparently a while ago they asked him for money, presumably in order to help finance their plot. This may well be how he Koulibaly got into it all.

But what are we really looked at here? 

I believe it makes most sense to treat the Paris incidents as two separate plots. Even though there may have been a degree of co-ordination, perhaps only regarding timing, it effectively were two distinct plots. And intriguingly each of these attacks fits rather neatly with what AQ and IS have asked for and have been demanding or trying to accomplish for a while, respectively.

AQAP as well as AQ Central have been talking about revenge for the cartoons for a long time. In 2010, AQ Central sent an operative to Denmark in order to research Jyllandsposten, the paper that became known in 2005 for publishing Mohammed cartoons. He war arrested in time, but his plan seems to have been to take the staff as hostages and later execute them.

In 2011, German police arrested a man who they accused of having been dispatched by Junis al-Mauretani of AQ Central in order to plan attacks in Europe. Police recovered a notebook in is possesions. One item was about what they believed were potential targets. Charlie Hebdo was among them.

Add to that AQAP's several death lists with cartoonists' names on them and verbal and written threats against cartoonists - and what you get is a clear indication that striking either Jyllandsposten or Charlie Hebdo was something that AQ wanted really badly. Looked at from an AQ perspective, the Kouachi brothers were like two drones that finally and precisely hit their long assigned target. This long term way of thinking, in combination with a taste for precision, is an AQ hallmark.

The IS, on the other hand, has also asked it's followers for attacks in the West, but is not equally focussed on precision targeting. The IS has been talking about very crude kinds of attacks (Killing people with stones or tossing them of high places or even burning crop fields) and it has not spoken about Mohammed cartoons much at all. IS has also made it clear that anybody should feel invited to perpetrate such an attack in their name and that training by them or contact with them wouldn't be needed. That is true of Koulibaly, as far as we know. If his attack had occurred just by itself and the Charlie Hebdo attack had never happened, most experts would have had little trouble classifying it as an event most likely induced by IS propaganda and perpetrated by a radicalized individual.

I am, of course, aware of the fact that AQ and AQAP have also asked for similar attacks, but it wasn't their main approach. It has been for the IS though.

It is therefor safe to say that the acts that Koulibaly perpetrated fit the IS pattern much better than the al-Qaida pattern. Killing a policewoman because she was French and killing hostages because they were Jewish is rather crude. Koulibaly also said these people had to die because France was part of the anti-IS coalition. This is an argument that the Kouachi brothers did not make. But it is an argument that the IS made when it asked for attacks in the West.

So let's agree this was really two attacks that only took place simultaneously because the perpetrators knew each other and didn't mind about their different leanings and also because they obviously didn't care that AQ and IS may not like their unprecedented alliance: What does that mean? 

First of all: Pragmatism beats ideology. Apparently attackers can be more than robots. For Koulibaly and the Kouachi brothers, doing this together was more important than ideological purity. It is telling that in the AQAP video, Al-Anissi devotes a few sentences to this and interprets the simultaneity of the attacks as "co-incidence". he needs to do that to maintain ideological purity, but it is of course not true.

Secondly: We may need to take into account that this may happen again. Security services tend to sort radicals they are keeping track of in terms of known group allegiances. But these can be trumped. In the real life, things can happen that don't happen on an analyst's spread sheet. Both these plots could have happened weeks apart from one another. They only happened at the same time because the guys knew each other.

Thridly: AQ is not dead. It is still a threat, among other reasons precisely because it entertains a long term perspective.



NB: This Blog Post relies in parts on an analysis I wrote for the current edition of DIE ZEIT. It is available for purchase online via www.zeit.de 

The "Islamic State" and the illegal Sale of Antiquities

December 4th, 2014 - As some of you may have noted, a team of 12 reporters here at DIE ZEIT (in co-operation with German public TV programme "Report München") have conducted an in-depth-investigation into the finances of the "Islamic State", covering everything from extortion to taxes to oil smuggling to the kidnapping business. You can find an English version of our article here.

However, you will not find a section on the sale of illegal antiquities there. Why is that -- given that this sort of criminal activity is allegedly a major source of income for the IS? In June, for example, the "Guardian" quoted an Iraqi official saying that "they (the IS, YM) had taken $36m from al-Nabuk alone (an area in the Qalamoun mountains west of Damascus). The antiquities there are up to 8,000 years old," (…).

The reason we didn't cover this aspect in our article but rather published a separate piece in this week's edition (not available online yet)  is simple: We could not find any evidence that the IS is directly involved in the sale of illegal antiquities.

We in no way doubt that antiquities are being stolen and sold in Iraq as well as in Syria. But according to what we were able to find out through our sources in the region, the IS does in fact allow criminals to dig out and steal such antiquities in exchange for a fee -- but is not necessarily involved directly in selling.

Furthermore, we have found no evidence whatsoever of antiquities on the black or grey market whose origin can beyond doubt be traced back to areas that the IS is holding or has been holding. Again: This doesn't mean that private collectors don't buy this sort of thing through illicit networks in a way that wouldn't leave traces. But we can't prove this happened -- and we can't prove that the IS was involved, indirectly or directly. This is important, because the illegal sale of antiquities is nothing that the IS invented. It has been practiced in Iraq as well as Syria for many years by criminal gangs who engage in forging as well. The fact that about a third of the antiquities confiscated by the Syrian customs authority in recent months were fake speaks to that.

Given that we didn't find any evidence we had to assume that the IS is probably not making that much money off of antiquities after all. It the very least, that's a distinct possibility. They may be making some money through the above-mentioned fees, but we assume that it is not exactly dozens of millions they are generating that way.

We have come across anecdotal evidence that IS doesn't mind other people taking antiquities away -- at least those antiquities that they don't think needs to be destroyed straight away (which definitely is a grave problem). Some sources told us, e.g., that in IS territory caterpillars have been used to "dig" up antiquities. But again: We weren't able to prove a direct link.

Perhaps we will know more in a few years when some of the stolen antiquities may, after all, appear on the grey or black market. In any case, we - for the time being - remain sceptical that the sale of antiquities is in any way a major means of income for the IS. At least not if compared to the amounts of many they make off of oil sales, extortion and Western hostages.

Before I conclude, I want to make clear that this research on antiquities wasn't conducted by myself alone. Major research was conducted by my colleagues Fritz Zimmermann and Tobias Timm at DIE ZEIT, freelance crisis reporter Alexander Bühler and Ahmet Senyurt at "report München".

AQIM & AQAP adress Jihadists in Syria & Iraq

September 16th, 2014 - The al-Qaida branches on the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) and in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have published a joint statement addressing their "brothers" in Iraq and Syria. Here are a few quick thoughts about this document. (Includes a correction at the end.)

1.- It's a first: AQAP and AQIM have never published a statement together before, a fact that is emphasized by the fact that the document is labelled "Communiqué No. 1". That's not exactly a sensation, but interesting nonetheless.

2.- There are two main messages in the communiqué: A call for unity among the Jihadists in Iraq & Syria. And a call to their own sympathizers "in the Peninsula and those countries that are part of the evil alliance" to fight back against this alliance that has decided to fight the Islamic State to fight back.

3.- It is noteworthy however, that the document doesn't mention either Jabhat al-Nusra or the Islamic State by name. That's no coincidence. The AQ branches are not taking sides and they are clearly trying to avoid re-kindling or rather intensifying the strife between those two groups, even though Jabhat al-Nusra is, in theory, part of their team, while IS isn't. (Please not the correction at the end of this post.) 

4.- Which leads us to this: The very fact that AQIM and AQAP do not in any way at all criticize the Islamic State is indicative of two things: There is likely a degree of sympathy towards the "Caliphate" within the ranks of these two branches; and they are independent enough of AQ central's Amir Aiman al-Sawahiri to take their own decisions in how to address the issue.

5.- The call to unity, however, was received by internet Jihadis without much enthusiasm, as far as I can see. It seems like the crowd wasn't exactly waiting to be lectured about this issue by AQAP and AQIM (the latter of which is not very good at maintaining unity itself).

6.- In terms of reactions or consequences, I think that the call to their own sympathizers to react to Western led and Arab backed efforts to reign in the Islamic State is most important. In the worst case it may lead to actions like embassy attacks etc. in the larger region.

But be that as it may, this communiqué isn't much of an event in and of itself. It is much rather part of a development the outcome of which nobody knows yet - but it will be one of these three options: AQ and IS are either going to merge in one way or the other; or they will keep fighting each other; or they will find some kind of modus vivandi and exist alongside each other.

The statement in questions leaves all of these options open and contains no hints other than a general preference for unity. But attempts at unity can of course fail (and have failed) for many reasons, large or petty. material or personal, ideological or profane.

CORRECTION: The Islamic State is mentioned by name in the document, I have overlooked that at first, and Aymen al-Tamimi pointed me to it. However, I don't believe that changes much of my argument in this post, but that's up to you to decide. I would still maintain the notion that AQAP and AQIM have written nothing that would intensify the strife between Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State. 

Do we have to talk Scenarios?

June, 10th, 2014 - The take-over of large parts of Mosul by ISIS has huge repercussions, some in the short term, quite a few in the long term. All of them are scary. None of them allow for any side interested in the future of Syria, Iraq or, in fact, the Middle East, to not at least think about possible reactions.

Why? Because Mosul is not any city. It is a big city, it is a commercial centre, it is the gateway to Syria and it is home to a diverse ethnic mix - including many Sunnis, but also Kurds, Christian, Yezids, among other groups. 

As long as ISIS can hold on to Mosul, a major hub is added to the loosely connected chain of islands under ISIS influence, now ranging from the outskirts of Aleppo in Syria to parts of central Iraq. It is telling and concerning that Iraq's security services apparently didn't put up much of a fight but instead seem to have left in a hurry. Given that the state of Iraq didn't manage to regain control over Faluja and Ramadi, I don't see how that is going to happen in the case of Mosul. 

It is going to be vital now what the Kurdish factions decide to do. They are probably the only ones who could make a difference at this point, but I assume they will, for the time being at least, concentrate on protecting the Kurdish areas in the environment of Mosul rather than challenging ISIS full-on. 

Given that, ISIS stands to exploit their seizure of Mosul - which includes, according to reasonable reports, not only weaponry and military vehicles, but also funds. Some of these additional resources will be poured into the Syrian struggle, making life harder for those Syrian rebels fighting the Syrian regime and ISIS at the same time. Those are the immediate repercussions. 

But it is also worthwhile noting that ISIS is coming closer to making good on their promise of statehood (not in any traditional, international law kind of sense, of course). I am ready to call their entity a pseudo-state at this point. Or perhaps even a proto-state. Why is that? Because they have displayed a learning curve as far as governing goes. Wherever ISIS takes control, the following things happen: Implementation of a harsh version Sharia law; supplying citizens with food; changing school curricula; training Imams; offering other services. Recently, e.g., ISIS boasted they had set in place a consumer protection agency. I don't think many Syrians like this style of governance; but they may, in many cases, prefer enduring it to fighting against ISIS. 

Now all of this is concerning enough. But the situation is even more concerning because ISIS isn't and never was about either Iraq or Syria. ISIS (even back then when it was the official Iraqi branch of al-Qaida) was about creating a coherent area of influence, ready to serve as an operational basis. National borders don't mean anything to ISIS. (And it is telling that in the wake of the fall of Mosul, some of their pundits declared the end of the Sykes-Picot-borders). To put in different terms: ISIS isn't fighting against anyone as much as they are trying to gain from the current situation in Iraq and Syria. And they are having successes. The momentum is on their side. 

This is why we may have reached a point where we need to talk about scenarios - because I, for one, believe that this debate will start soon. Who has a mandate, who feels a responsibility, who is capable of taking on ISIS? 

As I see it, no-one within Syria and Iraq has the power by himself to accomplish this. The Iraqi state already failed in Faluja and Ramadi. The Kurdish militias may not be strong enough. Jabhat al-Nusra and their allies in Syria aren't either. 

But allowing ISIS to go on should not be an option. ISIS fighters may not be a large force, but they also shouldn't be underestimated. They will not stop at Mosul. Why should they? So what's next? 

ISIS is currently exercising control over an area almost the size of Belgium. That is enough to have anyone worry. If they consolidate their position, if they are able to move resources and fighters, train fighters and make plans for expansion, they will do just that. The result would be that the problem grows bigger swiftly, with every new territorial gain increasing the risk of terror attacks beyond Iraq and Syria. 

I am not a fan of military inventions, as I have stated here before. I also am convinced that the best moment to intervene in Syria has long, long passed and won't come back. But I also believe that it is silly and ignorant to just close one's eyes in the face of this danger. 

Clearly, there is no power in sight that would at this point in time propagate intervention. However, I daresay that we will wee a debate about deploying US drones to Iraq in Syria soon - as dangerous as that would be, given the densely populated areas we are talking about here. 

I am quite ready to admit that I don't have a solution either. I guess all I am saying is that this problem is not going to go away by itself. So what I would really like to see is an informed debate about options before we find ourselves in a situation where our only option left to us is to discuss measures already taken. 

That means that now is the right time to talk scenarios. Even if we may not enjoy that. 

No Recipes and Old Recipies

April 4, 2014 - Can I be honest with you? As a (half-) Jordanian who has friends in Syria and knows that country pretty well, I find it harder and harder every day to log on to my Twitter timeline in the morning. I have been covering terrorism for more than a decade now and during the worst years of the Iraqi insurgency I would spend my mornings in the newsroom watching decapitation videos, so it's not that I am not used to graphic images.

But in the case of Syria, what makes me take in my timeline with eyes half-shut only is images of dead or wounded children that will stay with me no matter what. Such is the extent of brutality and arbitrary as well as targeted violence in this conflict that I can't help but feel sad, lost, angry and helpless at the same time almost every single day.

I also feel defeated, for there is nothing in sight, no power, no credible force, no convincing idea or concept for a solution, that would allow me to believe that this is going to be over any time soon. Instead I am afraid that things may yet get worse for the people I care about most - civilians who just want to go about heir lives. This can't only be about taking sides between the parties in the armed conflict (like Russia and Iran supporting the regime, and Saudi and Qatar supporting the armed opposition). It should be about the people of Syria.

The Lebanese civil war lasted from 1975 until 1990. I have reached a point at which I wouldn't rule out any more that the Syrian civil war might last as long. What a terrible outlook.

I feel personally closer to Syria, but I also love Egypt. During the revolution, in early 2011, I spent almost three weeks there. It was a great experience. But not much of that spirit seems to be left.

Instead, the new regime of the day has decided to crack down on the Muslim brotherhood and to frame that as an Egyptian version of the War on Terror. I am aware of the Egyptian debate and why this idea may resonate with a large number of Egyptians.

But this is not what this post is about. I am trying to make a different point here: If we have no recipe in the case of Syria, we have ample reason to interpret what the Egyptian government is doing as a bad recipe.

A recipe that has failed before, decades ago. Failed in such a spectacular way that it helped Al-Qaida grow. Failed in such a way that it turned people into militants who weren't militants before.

I understand that there is even less space for interference in the Egyptian case. But this post is not really about how we - the international community - should react. Instead, it is about how in both theaters we should be aware that what lies ahead us may be even worse than what we have seen so far.

I hate to spell it out. I don't want it to be true. I hope I will be proven wrong. But at this point my conclusion is that in Syria and Egypt many more people will die at the hand of militant Islamists (and in the Syrian case, of course, by the hand of the regime, too.)

What this means for the Global Jihadist Movement, for Al-Qaida and other Islamist networks is something that I am very interested in - but not in this post. In this post I am just expressing my sadness. Two great countries, two great peoples -- and many more lives that will be lost in vain.

I am dreading tomorrow morning's logging onto Twitter. Do you know what I am talking about?

A German Fighter with the "Islamic State"

December 4th, 2013 - It was bound to happen some time, and it happened last Saturday: The "Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria" (ISIS) presented their first German language video, introducing in it their first German recruit in Syria (that we know of): A young man calling himself "Abu Osama".

By now it has been established that "Abu Osama" is a 26 year old convert named Phillip B. from the West German city of Dinslaken. According to our information at DIE ZEIT he left Germany roughly half a year ago. He seems to have been part of a group of five or six, all of whom have by now returned to Germany, except, of course, for him. 

In the 10 minute video, "Abu Osama" calls upon Muslims in Germany to join the cause since fighting Jihad in Syria is an obligation. He says "Syria is a blessing" and that there are safe areas, even for children and families. He says he chose his kunya out of adoration for Osama Bin Laden, but he does not threaten Germany. 

He shares with his audience the information that he embraced Islam about four years ago and that his journey is the answer to his questions about the meaning of life. He poses with an assault rifle, but he doesn't divulge anything about participating in combat. 

"Abu Osama" isn't the first German Islamist to show up in Syria by a long shot. The official estimate  here is now at "above 220" according to the head of domestic Intelligence, Hans-Georg Maaßen, whom we are quoting with this number in tomorrow's edition of DIE ZEIT. Please note, though, that this number isn't a head count. 

The question now of course is: What does it mean that we have at least one German member of ISIS? Because before last Saturday, we weren't sure at all where they end up. There were signs of a cluster of Germans forming around a media unit calling itself Sham Center, but that was pretty much it. 

I think that it is troubling. ISIS is by far the most ruthless and brutal of organizations in Syria. It also is the group where I believe the issue of an internationalist agenda may come up first. In addition, Germans in Waziristan have shown a clear tendency to follow one another and then form little groups around those who got there first. We therefor may see more Jihadists from Germany within ISIS ranks soon. 

What adds to this concern is another piece of information we learned about during our research for our ZIET-story: According to our sources, Mohamed Mahmoud, an Austrian who already spent years in jail for terrorism charges and is known to have AQ-connections, tried to establish a German batallion of fighters under ISIS command but was turned down by that group for reasons unkown. What we do know is that he himself never made it into Syria but has nor for quite some time been held in Turkey under less than harsh conditions, meaning that he is still able to communicate with Jihadists in Syria, Iraq and Germany. 

Mahmoud is considered to be part of the loosely knit network that also former Berlin Gangster rapper Denis Cuspert a.k.a. "Abu Talha al-Almani" belongs to. Abu Talha was injured in Syria a few weeks ago in an air strike. It is unclear what group, if any, he is associated with, but in the light of the ISIS video and the Mahmoud story he is definitely a person of interest. 

In the mean time, I want to close this post with two more quotes of Hans-Georg Maaßen, head of the German domestic Intelligence agency "Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz" (BfV) -- for all those of you who are interested in Germany's take on this. 

On the issue that most Foreign Fighters active in Syria travel through Turkey, Maaßen says: "Turkey is an important factor in the region. We hope for and expect a significantly closer cooperation." 

If you think those are the least subtle words you have heard so far from a German official, you may be right. 

On the other other hand, Maaßen maintains that co-operation with the US remains unimpaired by the NSA affair: "Co-operation in fighting international terrorism is continuing unchanged. Information flows both ways, also with a view to Syria and travel pattern to that country."

And with that I will leave you for tonight. Even though something tells me we shall be discussing German Islamists in Syria again soon. 

Al-Qaida revisited

November 15th, 2013 - Folks, the following is an article on the state of al-Qaida in 2013 that I was asked to contribute to the "Security Times", a special edition of the "Atlantic Times". The original online link is here (and the original layout is nicer, of course, too). I hope you enjoy it - and I am excited about your comments. I would also like to thank some of you for your input, namely Leah Farrall, Will McCants, Greg Johnson, Aaron Zelin, Andrew Lebovich and Raffaello Pantucci. Don't hold them responsible for any of what I say here, though - they were just kind enough to comment on the draft! 

In September 2013, al-Qaeda published a five page Arabic document called “General Clarifications for Jihadist Action.“ It was authored by Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Amir or leader of al-Qaeda, who had been Osama Bin Laden’s deputy and became his successor after the Saudi was killed by US Navy Seals in May 2011. The document is fascinating for many reasons, but especially because it isn’t addressed to a Western audience as speeches by al-Qaeda’s leadership often at least partly are for propaganda purposes. Instead it is, in Zawahiri’s own words, addressed to “the leaders of all entities belonging to al-Qaeda and to our helpers and those who sympathize with us” as well as to “their followers, be they leaders or individuals.”

This is a large group of people. And it is noteworthy that al-Zawahiri doesn’t seem to be placing a lot of emphasis on the brand name of his group. Instead everybody is invited to feel addressed. So what is al-Qaeda in 2013? An open network? Or still a hierarchical organization? Is it a network of networks? Or a system of franchise operations?

The truth is that al-Qaeda in 2013 is all of the above. Al-Qaeda can be structured as it is in Yemen. But it is also open, given that the central leadership has repeatedly asked sympathizers in the West to act in its name and on their own initiative. Al-Qaeda’s presence and influence can be obscure as is the case with the co-operation with al-Shabaab in Somalia. Or opaque, as it is in relation to various local Jihadist groups across the Arab world calling themselves Ansar al-Sharia, whose agendas overlap with al-Qaeda’s. Then again, the central leadership can appear like a company’s headquarters, for example when the North African branch, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), reprimands fighters for not filling in forms properly. Wile in other instances al-Qaeda even hides behind other names – like Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria.

At first glance this may seem erratic. But from al-Qaeda’s point of view it is an asset to be able to appear in whatever form may be best at a given place or moment in time. The case of Jabhat al-Nusra, now probably the strongest faction in Syria’s civil war, illustrates that: Even though the group was set up by al-Qaeda in Iraq, it didn’t use that group’s name so as to not alienate Syrians. Only after its support base had solidified, did the group admit to being part of the al-Qaeda nexus.

It is partly by this means that al-Qaeda over the past two years managed to establish bridgeheads in Arab countries destabilized by rebellions. In Libya and in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula for example it is quite evident that al-Qaeda plays a role – in all but name. Should al-Qaeda cadres one day feel they would benefit from the brand name, they will introduce it there.

The exploitation of the unstable situation following the Arab rebellions is currently al-Qaeda’s most important project. At first the uprisings weakened al-Qaeda because the Jihadists had always claimed they would be the ones to cause the fall of the “tyrannical“ Arab regimes, or “the near enemy.” But this ideological defeat has since been compensated for by a huge influx of volunteers, an active role in Syria’s civil war and large areas elsewhere in which the network can operate fairly freely for lack of state control.

After roughly a decade in which al-Qaeda’s main interest was to plot spectacular attacks against Western targets, or “the far enemy,” the pendulum is now swinging back toward the near enemy. This is not only a strategic decision by the central leadership. It is also what most new recruits are interested in.

This is not to say al-Qaeda is no longer interested in launching attacks on the West; Al-Zawahiri called for them. And al-Qaeda’s branch in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP), headquartered in Yemen, is likely still devoting resources to that end. Of all groups in the nexus they have the greatest capabilities to do so. With Ibrahim al-Asiri they have a master bomb maker in their ranks who has already proven his expertise when AQAP tried to down a US jet in 2009 and two cargo planes in 2010. Furthermore, AQAP’s Amir Nasir al-Wuhayshi has recently been promoted to al-Qaeda’s overall Number 2. He will want to prove his ability, and an attack outside the region is hard currency in this regard.

But the focus is now on the Arab world – and on Africa, where the expansion politics of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, started years ago, are now paying off. In the conflict that shook Mali in 2012, AQIM’s fighters played an important role, in alliance with other Jihadist networks. They have been driven out of Mali’s towns since, but are still in the region. In addition, Jihadist veteran and training networks now connect Northern Africa not only with Mali but also with Nigeria. Add to that a large number of weapons that were acquired from the Libyan army’s depots, and it becomes quite clear that a string of African states in which militant Islamists are active may witness eruptions of violence instigated or supported by AQIM in the years to come.

In Somalia meanwhile al- Shabaab may be under pressure; but as the attack on the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya in September 2013 demonstrated, the group is capable of high profile terror attacks. They may have been helped by AQAP. But in either case there is little reason to assume that strikes like this will not happen again as long as African Union forces are fighting al-Shabaab in Somalia.

In the Middle East prospects are equally bleak. The demise of the Assad regime is clearly not the only aim that Jihadists are pursuing in Syria. They want to establish an Islamist proto-state; and they are enthusiastic about the proximity to Israel. Approximately 6,000 non-Syrian Jihadists are currently in the country, many have battlefield experience. They constitute a troubling long-term problem in any scenario. Concerns over what they may plan to do in the future are rising in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey – even more so as al-Qaeda in Iraq is perpetrating mass casualty attacks at almost the rate seen in 2005 and 2006 while at the same time maintaining a presence in Syria.

In Egypt another pressing issue exists: Since the military unseated President Mohamed Morsi in July 2013, Islamists there feel disenfranchised. Al-Qaeda is interested in winning them over. It is partly for this reason that al-Zawahiri in his “guidelines“ portrays al-Qaeda as a group that will not use excessive violence and has a clear agenda. Egpytian Muslim brotherhood supporters are not natural allies of al-Qaeda, but a more focused, more civil version of that group may be attractive to some. A lot has been written in the past few years about the alleged end of al-Qaeda. Certainly, the US drone campaign has killed many important leaders and diminished the group’s capabilities.

But al-Qaeda is once more proving to be very resilient – because it is able to adapt. Just as it did, for example, at the beginning of the Afghanistan war when the group all but gave up its safe haven and ordered most cadres to go back to their home countries to continue the project from there. This is how AQAP and AQIM came about.

We are presently witnessing another transformation, as al-Qaeda not only shifts focus but also allows for more co-operation and integration with local groups at the expense of micro-management by a central leadership, which can’t be maintained under these circumstances. Of course this transformation comes at a risk: Al-Qaeda is lacking coherence and leadership. In almost every theater there are severe internal conflicts. AQIM has splintered; al-Shabaab assassinates dissident cadres; in Syria al-Qaeda is present with two groups at the same time, one loyal to al-Zawahiri, the other to the AQIM leadership.

All of this has weakened al-Qaeda. The organization is not in good shape – as an organization. But what could be called the global Jihadist movement – with al-Qaeda at its helm – is faring well. The net result is as troubling as it is evident: Al-Qaeda and its allies are as big a threat to global security as they have ever been.

Yassin Musharbash is a Berlin-based investigative reporter and terrorism analyst with the German weekly newspaper Die Zeit.

(c) The Security Times, Yassin Musharbash 

Pancakes & Propaganda

October 15th 2013 - At what point does an authentic self portrayal turn in propaganda? In the case of extremists, it is often hard to tell. People who fully commit to an extremist ideology tend to see themselves less as individuals and more as examples; whatever happens to them is interpreted as a symbol. Whatever they do, is considered a signal.

And yet, no text and no personal account can ever be 100 per cent propaganda. Somebody describes something, an every day experience, a thought, an encounter - and unless the entire text is just one big lie, it will reveal parts of a deeper truth that lies beyond the realm of propaganda. Studying it can be telling.

Last month a young German woman started a blog, describing in it her life as the wife of a Jihadist fighter in Syria; I believe her blog is a case in point.

She describes herself as "the wife of a Mujahid, a mother of mini-Muhajirin and a neighbour of Ansar, Muhajrin and Mujahidin. It is a story like out of a picture book. No, it is even better. It is just like the story of our beloved prophet and his family and the sahaba."

There are five blog entries so far, all from September. They touch pancake recipes as well 9/11, the sound of gunfire in the night as well as the family cat called "Nonah".

Of course the blog is partly propaganda. For example when she celebrates the anniversary of 9/11 with "American pancakes" that "fly into our mouths", while expressing hope that other ingenious heads will device new plans for different planes and calling Osama Bin Laden an "honorable Sheikh".

But more interesting are those passages in which it becomes palpable what she finds attractive about the Islamist-Jihadist ideology which she of course considers to be the purest form of her religion: "In the land of the Kuffar, you are subject to their laws, you do, what your boss tells you, unless you are busy filing for welfare. But here the laws of Allah prevail. Here you don't work for Hans-Peter from 7 to 4, having to pray in sometimes dirty and inappropriate places. Here you work for Allah in full concentration for 24 hours per day. Allah's religion is not an aside, it is the centre."

The "dunya", the worldly life, she considers to be "trashy" and worthless: "It makes you forget how close death is. But here you won't forget, because of the sounds of bombs, hitting afar and close by… and suddenly you realize your mistakes and you ask yourself whether you are ready for the Akhira (the afterlife). Do I please God? Am I among the saved ones?"

All the known factors of radicalization mix right here: Seemingly simple answers to the complicated questions of life; a radical break with an earlier life; a vacuum that is suddenly filled with meaning. 

Unfortunately we don't learn about how she got to know her husband and who may have been the driving for of radicalization. But is is quite clear that the author is very happy with her life as the wife of a Mujahid: "'Get ready, we will go to a nice place and eat Fallafel and Kebab', my husband said. We packed and took to the river. We, the women, sat in own place, the men in another. Food was great. We had salad with it and water from the well. Suddenly shots rang out. Our men were aiming at an orange object on the other side of the river with their assault rifles. That was fun! And it was a wonderful feeling to see my own husband shoot his rifle. A real man,  a Mujahid. Not a blue helmet or a German soldier." 

She also talks about her bad conscience when the family needs to evacuate because of a bush fire and the emergency bag, which is her responsibility, isn't properly packed. 

But of course in the end all is well: "What might my brothers and sister in Germany be doing right now? It is late at night. I am hearing bombs hitting the ground, answered by barking dogs. And there is the sound of chirping crickets, of course. Just like every night." 

This is what Jihad romantic looks like. 

German authorities believe there are now as many as 170 fighters from Germany in Syria, numbers still rising. We don't know how many women are among them, but she is certainly not the only one. 

We also don't know with what groups the German fighters end up in many cases.  In the case of the blog author, there is some indication that she is with a larger German colony, as her blog is hosted by Sham Center, a media enterprise that has German members. They also seem to have connections to "Jund al-Sham". There is no way of telling whether they participate in battle. But the fact that the blog author hasn't posted anything for almost three weeks may be an indication that the situation got tougher. 

Of course five blog posts aren't enough for a full profile of any person; neither are they enough for full-on generalizations. But I think that something transpires here nonetheless: For some who have gone to Syria, it is not necessarily all about killing. And surely not all about the demise of the Assad regime, either. For some the battlefield is apparently attractive for other reasons: As a stage to enact role models inhaled at home. As an ultimate test allowing them to prove they are serious about their convictions. Perhaps also as a place to flee to from a sense of being under attack, but also maybe to flee to from doubts. And lastly as a kind of virtual time machine that seemingly makes it possible to re-invent oneself in a pseudo-7th-century kind of environment where you are free to imitate the examples you have heard so much about. 

The price, of course, may be your own death - and the death of your own children; but apparently the factors pulling some of these people in are stronger than that fear. 

I find it difficult to understand all that. But at the same time I am convinced it is important we don't ignore this sentiment. More Western Islamists, male and female, will travel to Syria. Many will come back. Once they are here again, it will be decisive we have an idea what drove them there and what may be driving them now. 

PS: It is not easy to verifiy this blog is actually written out of Syria. In theory it could be a fake. I don't think so, though. The content, the stlye, the place it is published - all of this seems authentic and plausibel to me. I asked other experts, and they agree. Should I change my opinion in this regard, I will let you know. 

PPS: This is an English version of my German blog post at DIE ZEIT online, where I work. It can be found here. 

PPPS: I have to thank @lizzypearson who came up with the English headline for this post after reading the German version. 

A few Thoughts on Syria Intervention(s)

September 7th, 2013 - I am, as a rule, not a fan of military interventions. I have never served in the military and when I actually had to make a choice about whether or not to, because back then Germany had compulsory military service, I chose to do civil service instead.

But I also studied International Relations, and I am realist enough to believe there are wars of choice and wars of necessity. The problem with Syria at the moment, though, is that this particular paradigm doesn't help. As far as I am concerned, the situation in Syria is unique. Unique at least in the sense that I don't find it helpful to compare it to what many people now compare it to: Halabja; Bosnia; Serbia; Libya. None of that helps me make up my mind.

What I do see though is that what should be separate discussions are more and more turning into one single discussion. Which again does explicitly not help.

Here is what I think.

1.- There is dirty little secret, an elephant in the room, that few people talk about, and it is this: The best (not the perfect, but the best) moment for an international intervention in Syria has long passed. It would have been roughly one and a half years ago when costs and results would have been possible to calculate. They aren't anymore. Which is why until the use of chemical weapons on a large scale became a near indisputable fact a lot of people were happy not to be asked about such an intervention anymore and were evenly happy not to raise the issue anymore. Now the situation has changed. There is an obvious reason to discuss the issue again.

2.- But, and this is a big but: This very fact means that we are now talking about a different kind of intervention for a different reason. Or to be precise: At least some of us are. Which leads me to this:

3.- What's being discussed at the moment, is really three different interventions: a) punitive reaction to use of CW. b) An intervention that would degrade the Syrian regime's capabilities and thus change the balance of power in favour of the opposing forces. c) An intervention that would actually (even if not publicly announced) degrade the capabilities not only of the regime but perhaps also of those powers within the opposition that are deemed dangerous, namely the Jihadists.

4.- These different approaches need to be treated and discussed separately. I believe that it is possible, e.g., to be in favour of one option and for very good reasons to be against the other ones at the same time. I personally for example think that CW use can't go unanswered. But am I in favour of an intervention that would degrade the regime to a degree that it would practically hand victory (whatever that is in Syria) to the opposing forces (no matter who they might be in a given place)? Not so sure.

5.- Which leads to another issue which in a way also is another elephant in the room that some participants in the debate like to not discuss: What kind of situation do we want to see in Syria? "I want Assad gone" is just not enough anymore. In my view, it is high time to talk about how the international community is going to react to the presence of a solidified Jihadist force in Syria. The fact of 6000 foreign fighters needs addressing as there won't be any domestic power able to reign them in in the foreseeable future, no matter what the outcome of the civil war. They will look for and find niches and operate from out of there. 

6.- And there is another big issue: How is Assad going to react? What do we know about the decision making processes in the Syrian regime? I daresay: Not a whole lot. Which effectively means, the possible scenarios in front of us range from "he will do nothing" to "all hell will break loose". I personally deny to make predictions about the regime reaction to strikes. I know too little.

7.- Given that, what should guide our decisions? A principle (CW use can't go unanswered!) or a desired outcome (We will make sure he can't use it anymore!) or caution (What if he starts a doomsday scenario?) or pragmatism (We have to react, but if we are going to, it is an opportunity to influence the outcome of the civil war)? I have to admit I have no easy answer. I personally lean towards reacting in a limited way. It seems the safest way to possibly achieve deterrence while at the same time not provoke the apocalypse.

8.- But I also believe that it is time to ask the question of what Assad is actually fighting for. What is he hoping to achieve at this point? Regaining control of the entire country is unrealistic. But if that is true, the question is: Wouldn't any hope of starting a politically moderated settlement have to start with this? I hate to say this because I would personally like to see all of this regime removed; but the regime hasn't collapsed, and it doesn't look like it is going to, so at least we have to think about  another terrible questions: How long could this civil war last? How many more may have to die in the absence of a military solution or a political settlement?

9.- My last point: At this moment in time, I believe, it is also necessary to take precautions against the prospect that the Syrian drama spreads to other countries in the region. It already has started to. But if powers like Germany are unwilling to take part in any proposed kind of interventions, they should at least make more of an effort to help stabilize Jordan and Lebanon and take in Syrian refugees.

This has been a long post. I hope I didn't bore you. If it didn't help you, it did at least help me in organizing my thoughts. I have spent most of my life discussing and studying the Middle East. The Syrian conflict really gets to me. I love that country and I really hope that one day not too far away I can visit their again and meet my Syrian friends. It's just that right now I can't see the light at the end of the tunnel. 

Obama in Berlin

June 19th, 2013 - When Barack Obama spoke in Berlin in 2008, I was there. As one in a crowd of what I think where 200.000 people. It was a nice, sunny day, just like today, there was beer and hope. Both in large quantities. Obama's speech was awesome. Inspiring. A portrayal of a world he wanted to help become real. I was one of those Europeans who would have voted for him if only we had been allowed to. I also would have voted for him as Secretary General of the United Nations. Or captain of the Enterprise, for that matter. I just felt that he was a man who could bring about change. Actual and real change. He was the antidote to George W Bush. To cynicism. To anything evil, wicked, twisted.

Today Obama was in Berlin again. I am four years older, as is Obama, as is the world. He spoke in front of 4000 selected people, I wasn't one of them. I listened to the live stream instead. It was still a good speech by many standards. It didn't stir any of the emotions I had in 2008.

I am not naive. I have a reasonable understanding of what a US president can achieve. This is not about blame. Or even disappointment. At least not on a purely emotional level.

But the thing with today's speech is that I felt Obama was trying to sell us cheaply. I mean, honestly, as nice as it sounds to diminish the US and Russian nuclear arsenal: That just is not one of the hot issues in international politics right now. Today is about Syria much more than about that. About the repercussions of drone warfare. About civil liberties vis a vis eavesdropping. Guantanamo. Pakistan. The Middle East. TURKEY.

Obama touched on most of that - a little. But he offered no vision, he instilled no hope or optimism, he didn't chart a course, he didn't inspire anyone on any of these issues today.

Maybe that's asking for too much. Really, it may be. He is not my president, after all. He is not almighty. He can't walk on water.

But I do still feel entitled to a stake in what he says and does. He is a Nobel Peace Laureate! When he was awarded that prize I remember saying to a friend that I wished he would not accept it - and declare instead that he would gladly do so AFTER his term or his two terms in office. When he felt he had earned it.

I know I am leaving out a lot of perspectives here, for one: the US domestic one.

But since many of those who will read this will be Americans, I thought you might be interested in what it feels like to be an Obama fan in Europe - and be somewhat disappointed.

I guess I am disappointed because I didn't get a sense of how he was re-defining his grand vision and ideas now that he is on the job. I would have been very happy with him admitting that things aren't easy, that it is all about finding partners and taking small steps.

But that's not what I heard today.

What I heard was another set of grand ideas, as if nothing had changed. As if he was still a candidate.

And THAT is why I somehow didn't feel that I was being taken seriously.

I would still vote for Barack Obama if I could.

But I also wish I would have been more impressed than I was today.

Jabhat al-Nusra responds

April 10, 2013 - Today, Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) responded to yesterday's declaration of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) according to which they were in fact a union and shared the common name of Islamic State in Iraq and reader Syria (ISIGS). The 7 min Audio is by al-Jawlani, a known JN leader. There is little reason to suspect it is not authentic: The download links were supplied by JN's twitter account, Jihadists on their websites take it to be true.

The audio is interesting, but also somewhat confusing.

Here are a few points and a few thoughts on what they could mean.

1.- Jawlani says JN leadership only learned about AQI statement from the media. He refers to it as "if it is authentic..." - This clearly indicates there was little in the way of synchronizing the declaration. Jawlani can be understood as being not too happy about the process.

2.- Jawlani does, however, explicitly swear (literally: "repeat") allegiance (bai'a) to Ayman al-Zawahiri. He does it in the name of all JN members. - This means that, despite of whatever differences there may remain between AQI nd JN leaderships, JN does consider itself part of th AQ universe.

3.- Jawlani does, however, NOT embrace the common name of ISIGS. He also maintains that "nothing will change" in JN and that "JN will stay as you have gotten to know it". - I take this to show that Jawlani fears that the AQ-Connection may cost JN sympathies in Syria (re-visit @azelin's piece from yesterday for the dynamic involved here!)

4.- Jawlani's talks a little about the history of JN. He describes it as a "project" put before AQI's al-Baghdadi in Iraq. Al-Baghdadi approved of it, Jawlani says. He also says there is a "long history" they share. - So there definitely is a strong tie between JN and AQI.

However, there seem to remain certain differences in the interpretation of the exact nature of their relationship. Are they one, as al-Baghdadi suggested yesterday? Or are they two? Or one and and a half? Does Jawlani think that al-Baghdadi's statement was premature? Today's statement didn't make this any clearer.

So, there is a lot to interpret, discuss and debate for all of us. I am curious about your input!

Cheers, Y

PS: I mistakenly twittered at a very early moment in time that Jawlani did in fact confirm the existence of ISIGS. I corrected that later. I would like to repeat this correction here. He did not explicitly embrace that term and make it his own. My bad. It was based on a misunderstanding of the original Arabic. 

AQI + S = ISIGS

April, 9th, 2013 - Cole Bunzel on Jihadica has already made a number of crucial points about the declaration by AQI Amir al-Baghdadi that Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria is in fact part of AQI's Islamic State of Iraq, which as Al-Baghdadi claims, should from now on be referred to as „Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria“.

In any case, I just want to add a little to his analysis with which I almost entirely agree.

First of all, I believe it is important to bear in mind that this is NOT a merger. I think al-Baghdadi is speaking the truth when he claims that AQI sent people to Syria to start a platform there. Jabhat al-Nusra therefor IS AQI right from the start. As such, it has profited from transfer of cadres as well as know-how (esp bomb making, I would imagine.) Jabhat al-Nusra also implemented some of the „leassons learnt“ from AQI - like trying not to alienate local population too much. (They aren't consistantly good at that, though – I have interviewed refugess from Aleppo and Homs who told me how Jabha-cadres hunted down and executed Christians. This is reminiscent of what AQI did with Shiites in Iraq.)

Secondly, though, the union means that we are now pretty much dealing for the first time with the equivalent of something like AQAP in the Near East. Iraq and Syria together are the defining places in this region. AQ has now transcended the last reserve of national borders.

Thirdly, the union being what it is (namely a brain child of AQI and AQI's original ideology, as is apparent from al-Baghdadis speech), we should expect a rise in the threat level in the region, esp in Jordan and Lebanon, but also Turkey and Israel. Al-Sarqawi, the founder of AQI, always made it quite clear that Jihad in Iraq for him was a means of getting closer to Jerusalem. This is Jihadist dialectics. AQ has now come much closer to Israel, thanks to their network in Syria. They will try to close in, so to say. And given the more or less destabilized areas available to them (Lebanon border, partly also the Iraqi and Turkish and Jordanien border) they have room to manouver. More chaos = more opportunites for AQ.

So, in a nut shell: I believe it is IMPORTANT, even though it might have been little surprising, to know that AQI and Jabhat al-Nusra form a unified body. This is not about AQ supporting Jihadists in Syria, this is AQ expliting another local conflict. In the end, the aim is larger: dominance on the ground where it can be won; attacks on Israel; international attacks.

Cheers, Y.

On the difference between Analysis and Facts

March 13, 2013 - Germany's growing Salafi scene is all the rage right now in the media here. Two events came together today: First, police apparently foiled a possible plot to kill an activist of an islamophobic party in Western Germany; the arrests apparently took place last night. Second, police raided a number of places this morning to collect evidence after the ministry of the interior banned a number of Salafi organizations.

The problem that I see in a lot of the media reporting at the moment is that facts are being mixed with analysis - and domestic affairs with international ones. I believe it is important to make differentiations not necessarily wherever possible - but, please, at least wherever they are necessary!

Here is an example: A number of media in Germany have reported recently (and today, again) that Syria was a hot spot right now and that radical Islamists from Europe, including Germany, have travelled there. They also reported that German fighters had been located in Mali and Libya.

I am very sceptical of this. I KNOW of course that Syria is a hot spot, and I KNOW of several European Jihadists there right now. But I do NOT KNOW a single confirmed case of a German fighter there at this moment with a Jihadist group. Does that mean it is not happening? No. Quite the opposite. As any good analyst would say, and I agree, it is rather likely that there are Germans fighting alongside Jihadists in Syria right now. But if I don't KNOW for sure, I shouldn't make people believe I do. I think the reporters here are mixing analysis ("very likely", "to be expected", etc.) with fact (Abd al-XYZ from ABC is now confirmed in DEF). ((And I say that as a journalist who speaks to sources in the security institutions quite regularly, so I believe I would pick that sort of information up at some point, like, let us say, not months after my colleagues elsewhere would.))

Now the second issue at stake here is the sometimes missing distinction between militant Salafism or even Jihadism on the one side - and terrorism on the other. Of course the two CAN be the same and in fact in many cases are. But, alas, not in ALL CASES. It is conceivable, and we know examples of that from Afghanistan in the 80s to the Balkans in the 90s, that Islamists feel they need to spend time fighting the invaders/crusaders/oppressors -- but come back to where they live in Western Europe and feel NO urge to start plotting terror attacks here to kill Kuffar.

What does that means? It means that Salafists going to Syria to fight can be very different from Salafis trying to kill somebody in Germany. They shouldn't be treated as the same phenomenon. Of course they may have a lot in common. But there may be important aspects that distinguish them from one another. For example as regards the question of who they accept as an authority.

So what we are really talking about may be as many as 4 different phenomena:

1.- Jihadists associated with terrorist groups like Jabhat al-Nusra, who, upon their return to Germany, would need to be considered a real threat.

2.- Islamists who have joined Islamist/Jihadist groups in Syria because they feel they ought to be part of that struggle, but who may come back and not be a threat to the public here.

3.- Salafis in Germany with no foreign experience or allegiance who are radicalized over grievances here and react to them in a sometimes violent way and may well be a threat to the public or to individuals.

4.- Salafis who are maybe radical but not militant - and who may be members of or acitivts in just the organizations banned here today. Are they a threat? Rather not.


Again: I am not trying to talk the problems down here; I just believe we can not confront any threat if we are not diligent. And some reporters are not diligent.

Sorry for the rant.

Cheers, Y.