„This threat will stay with us for at least a decade“

What kinds of terror attacks do we have to expect in Europe, and how dangerous are returning Foreign Fighters? Norwegian terror expert Thomas Hegghammer* shares his insights in this interview with DIE ZEIT**.

DIE ZEIT: In the Paris attack, there was a link to Yemen. In Belgium, where the police foiled a terror attack last week, we saw Syria returnees among the suspects. In Germany, the police arrested several Jihadists, some of whom had been to Syria, some of whom hadn't. What do these instances tell us about the current threat?

Hegghammer: Firstly, that it is varied indeed. The security services have to look at different kinds of threats all the time. I would also add to the list the sympathizers of the „Islamic State“ (IS). We have seen plots hatched by IS sympathizers in North America, Australia and Europe. In fact, there have been more plots by IS sympathizers than by actual Syria returnees.

DIE ZEIT: What do all these people have in common?

Hegghammer: Apart from the fact that they are radical Islamists who want to perpetrate violence? Not much, really. They don't organize formally. They take good precautionary measures. That's about it. If you look at their profiles, they are a very mixed bunch.

DIE ZEIT: But it is clear, that the pool of potential terrorists is bigger today than it was a few years ago. Does that mean this threat is going to stay for quite a while?

Hegghammer: O yes, at least for another decade! Syria and the IS phenomonen have given Jihadism in Europe a new lease on life. We will be facing threat levels like this for many years.

DIE ZEIT: Should we expect more attacks, but on a smaller magnitude than we were fearing before?

Hegghammer: It's impossible to make good predication of frequency and scale. The quantity need not go up, but it could. And attacks need not become smaller, there can still be big ones like Madrid or London every now and then. But I believe there are two new trends. We are currently observing more attacks with hand-held weapons than with explosives. And the attackers tend to seek out targets that leave little doubt about the message - like Charlie Hebdo, Jewish schools, Policemen or soldiers -, rather than, say, general transportation systems.

DIE ZEIT: A lot of these plots seems to be results of calls to „individual Jihad“ via „Inspire“ and other Jihadist propaganda. Has this phenomenon now taken centre stage?

Hegghammer: I am not sure. Look at Paris: the Kouachi brothers were part of an old network, exactly like what we used to have in the 2000s. In Belgium, we saw a rather large network of 10 to 15 people. That's not exactly „invidiual Jihad“. The attacks in Ottawa and Sydney, on the other hand, were. We have to understand that new tactics are being added, but old ones are being kept.

DIE ZEIT: You have worked extensively on „Foreign Fighters“. What's more important as a driving factor: adventure and life stlye or religion and ideology?

Hegghammer: People leave for different reasons, but if I were to hightlight one, it’s the desire to be part of a historical project. It's partly escapism. These people want to get away from the West, from corruption and discrimination, and they want to move into this assumedly pure zone where they think they can find true Islam.

DIE ZEIT: We like to think of the Western world as free and able to accomodate all kinds of religious lifestyles. Why does this concept not work for these people?

Hegghammer: Disillusionment is not limited to radical Islamists. Many young people across Europe are frustrated, see no future, are in opposition to the current order. But they have no alternative. The secular, drug-using delinquent in a Paris suburb – where is he going to go? Islamists, in contrast, are being offered an escape route. So availability is a factor here: Syria is easy to get to. It's an utopia that is at hand.

DIE ZEIT: Some Israeli soldiers escape to Goa after military service; some leftists start communes when they are sick of consumerism; but they usually don't turn into terrorists. Where does this element come from?

Hegghammer: Jihadism is a destructive project, concealed in a constructive one. They don't join in order to become terrorists. But they can become terrorists in the process. And our problem is that radicalizing and preparing to go abroad to fight is a kind of activity that is just below the threshold of police intervention. In a way, the reason we have a radicalization problem in Europe is that the Islamists are not that radical. Because a lot of these networks stay clear of terrorist plotting, there is little the state can do against them. If these people were all organized terrorists, we wouldn't have any problem defeating them. But as long as they are operating below that threshold, our hand are tied. All these gateway groups, like Sharia4Belgium, Sharia4Denmark, etc., they have become masters at toeing the line.

DIE ZEIT: So the window to act is too tiny?

Hegghammer: Exactly. And we can't just lower the threshold, or we will end up punishing people for opinions.

DIE ZEIT: Is there any indication of how long it takes foreign fighters to cool down once they return? Or do they stay radical?

Hegghammer: We know very little about Syria returnees so far. But what we do know is the proportion of people who returned from previous battlefields and then plotted attacks. Before Syria, that rate was 1 out of 15 to 20. If you look at open source data about returnees from Syria who were involved in terror plots across Europe, we have so far seen about 10 plots with roughly 20 returnees involved. That is 20 out of 3000 who left to fight abroad, or 20 out of just over 1000 who have already returned, repectively. So far, it is only a small minority who have become terrorists. The question before us is: How do you stop that minority without over-reacting towards the relatively harmless majority?

DIE ZEIT: But many returnees have only returned recently. Some of them still may become active as terrorists...

Hegghammer: Yes, that number will increase. But I think we can already say that the rate is not going to be extremely high. Given the sheer numbers, however, the absolute number of terror plots may well be higher than previously.

DIE ZEIT: How should our societies deal with this long-term threat?

Hegghammer: Some intelligence services in Europe will have to substantially grow, they need more analysts. Not necessarily new methods or new survaillance powers. Adding data usually just means having to process more data. Smarter analytical software can help, but we need more brains, too. Our publics also need to be prepared for more news like what we have heard in the past two weeks, and they need to be persuaded not to panic. Mind you, we are still no-where near the level of terrorist activitiy we had in the 70s and 80s from the far left and far right. We should be able to psychologically tolerate even an increase in terrorist activity.

DIE ZEIT: What other measures are sensible?

Hegghammer: We need a sophisticated system to deal with returnees. We need soft measures to re-integrate those who can be re-integrated, and tough measures to incarcerate those who need to be incarcerated. And there is the internet. I am very aware of free speech concerns, but we have reached a point where something needs to be done about the access of Jhadis to broadcasting tools. JM Berger makes a really good point about this when he argues that the question at stake is not in fact free speech, given that Twitter and Facebook are really like TV stations. Should these people have the right to voice their opinion? Of course! Should they also have the right to broadcast them? Well, I don't think so.

DIE ZEIT: Prisons are also a problem in regard to radicalization.

Hegghammer: And that is a true dillemma. You have three options, none of which is great: Put Jihadists in a prison together, and they will wind each other up. Spread them out, and you will have the risk of the radicals radicalizing other people. Third option: Solitary confinement. But that's inhumane. This dillemma is accentuated by the European tradition of short sentences. In the US, Jhadists get very long sentences. They die in prison or grow old there. In Europe, they will be back on the streets after a few years. For me, all this is a good argument for putting as few people in prison as possible.

DIE ZEIT: How do you prepare for day X? Can resiliance be learnt?

Hegghammer: That's almost impossible, because whether an attack has a unifying or polarizing effect, has to do with the target. And you have no control over that. Take Paris, for example: There is a lot of tension now, the country hasn't simply united after the attack. And that has to with the nature of the target. It was very controversial. When the Twitter-Hashtag „JeSuisCharlie“ came up, that kind of forced people to identify with that controversial target. And lo and behold, within hours you had alternative Hashtags like „JeSuisAhmed“ or „IamnotCharlie“. It was very different in Norway, when Breivik killed 77 people, because it is hard to disagree that killing children is bad. That made it much easier to stand together. 

* Thomas Hegghammer is the director of terrorism research at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment and an internationally renowned expert on Jihadist ideology, Foreign Fighters and Saudi Arabia. (Foto Credit: Christian Vinculado Tandberg / FFI)

** This interview was conducted by Yassin Musharbash for DIE ZEIT. A slightly edited and shortened German version of this interview was published in the current issue of DIE ZEIT which can be purchased online here. We have a cover story this week called "Living with Terror", apart from the interview you will find an in-depth-story on German reactions to the Paris attack and the Belgian arrests as well as a report from Belgium (and other good stuff). 

The Paris Attacks - one Plot or two?

We have fairly solid evidence by now that the attack on the Paris satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo was commissioned by AQAP. In total, there are three indications of this:

* On Friday, shortly after the perpetrators Cherif and Said Kouachi were killed by French police, a ranking AQAP cadre first sent a communique to several journalists by email and then posted a series of tweets that amounted to a claim of responsibility by the group

* Even before that, the two perpetrators during their operation had already told a by-stander and later a journalist they they were acting on behalf of AQAP

* Lastly, earlier today, an 11 minute video was published by AQAP. It appears legit and it features high ranking AQAP member Nasir bin Ali al-Anissi. In the video, he not only claimed the attack as AQAP's, but also insisted that one of the two brothers (he didn't say which one) had been appointed amir of the operation and had been in direct touch about the operation with Anwar al-Awlaki. This would in theory be consistent with reports according to which Said Kouachi spent some time in Yemen in 2011.

Overall, there is little reason to doubt that there was indeed a connection between the brothers and AQAP. The idea to attack Charlie Hebdo may very well have been born in Yemen in 2011, at a time when AQAP was experiencing an influx of foreign fighters, quite a few of whom where from France and who quite possibly would have known about Charlie Hebdo and the kind of cartoons the magazine had been printing.

So was this an AQAP attack? 

Yes. But it may have been more than just that.

Because there is another thread to be scrutinized here. On the morning following the Charlie Hebdo attack, a young man by the name of Amedy Koulibaly shot and killed a policewoman in Paris. The day after, when the Kouachi brothers had been tracked down by the police and were holed up in an industrial area near the airport with a hostage, Koulibaly re-entered the stage and took control of a Kosher supermarket. He took hostages as well and let it be known that he would kill these hostages unless the Kouachi brothers were let got.

Of course they weren't let got. But very interestingly, Koulibaly during the hostage situation explained to a journalist that he was acting on the behalf of the "Islamic State" terror organization. He re-iterated this claim in a video he later published. The IS did not claim the attack for itself. But according to some reports, it did praise the attack during a Friday sermon in the city of Mossul.

At the same time, though, Koulibaly also stated that he had co-ordinated with the Kouachi brothers.

Now how does all of that add up? Especially since AQ and the IS are enemies: They are fighting each other in Syria. They are competing for leadership of the global Jihadist movement. It is highly unlikely they respective leaderships would have agreed to a shared plot.

First of all, it is important to note that the Kouachi brothers have known Koulibaly for years. Apparently a while ago they asked him for money, presumably in order to help finance their plot. This may well be how he Koulibaly got into it all.

But what are we really looked at here? 

I believe it makes most sense to treat the Paris incidents as two separate plots. Even though there may have been a degree of co-ordination, perhaps only regarding timing, it effectively were two distinct plots. And intriguingly each of these attacks fits rather neatly with what AQ and IS have asked for and have been demanding or trying to accomplish for a while, respectively.

AQAP as well as AQ Central have been talking about revenge for the cartoons for a long time. In 2010, AQ Central sent an operative to Denmark in order to research Jyllandsposten, the paper that became known in 2005 for publishing Mohammed cartoons. He war arrested in time, but his plan seems to have been to take the staff as hostages and later execute them.

In 2011, German police arrested a man who they accused of having been dispatched by Junis al-Mauretani of AQ Central in order to plan attacks in Europe. Police recovered a notebook in is possesions. One item was about what they believed were potential targets. Charlie Hebdo was among them.

Add to that AQAP's several death lists with cartoonists' names on them and verbal and written threats against cartoonists - and what you get is a clear indication that striking either Jyllandsposten or Charlie Hebdo was something that AQ wanted really badly. Looked at from an AQ perspective, the Kouachi brothers were like two drones that finally and precisely hit their long assigned target. This long term way of thinking, in combination with a taste for precision, is an AQ hallmark.

The IS, on the other hand, has also asked it's followers for attacks in the West, but is not equally focussed on precision targeting. The IS has been talking about very crude kinds of attacks (Killing people with stones or tossing them of high places or even burning crop fields) and it has not spoken about Mohammed cartoons much at all. IS has also made it clear that anybody should feel invited to perpetrate such an attack in their name and that training by them or contact with them wouldn't be needed. That is true of Koulibaly, as far as we know. If his attack had occurred just by itself and the Charlie Hebdo attack had never happened, most experts would have had little trouble classifying it as an event most likely induced by IS propaganda and perpetrated by a radicalized individual.

I am, of course, aware of the fact that AQ and AQAP have also asked for similar attacks, but it wasn't their main approach. It has been for the IS though.

It is therefor safe to say that the acts that Koulibaly perpetrated fit the IS pattern much better than the al-Qaida pattern. Killing a policewoman because she was French and killing hostages because they were Jewish is rather crude. Koulibaly also said these people had to die because France was part of the anti-IS coalition. This is an argument that the Kouachi brothers did not make. But it is an argument that the IS made when it asked for attacks in the West.

So let's agree this was really two attacks that only took place simultaneously because the perpetrators knew each other and didn't mind about their different leanings and also because they obviously didn't care that AQ and IS may not like their unprecedented alliance: What does that mean? 

First of all: Pragmatism beats ideology. Apparently attackers can be more than robots. For Koulibaly and the Kouachi brothers, doing this together was more important than ideological purity. It is telling that in the AQAP video, Al-Anissi devotes a few sentences to this and interprets the simultaneity of the attacks as "co-incidence". he needs to do that to maintain ideological purity, but it is of course not true.

Secondly: We may need to take into account that this may happen again. Security services tend to sort radicals they are keeping track of in terms of known group allegiances. But these can be trumped. In the real life, things can happen that don't happen on an analyst's spread sheet. Both these plots could have happened weeks apart from one another. They only happened at the same time because the guys knew each other.

Thridly: AQ is not dead. It is still a threat, among other reasons precisely because it entertains a long term perspective.



NB: This Blog Post relies in parts on an analysis I wrote for the current edition of DIE ZEIT. It is available for purchase online via www.zeit.de 

AQIM & AQAP adress Jihadists in Syria & Iraq

September 16th, 2014 - The al-Qaida branches on the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) and in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have published a joint statement addressing their "brothers" in Iraq and Syria. Here are a few quick thoughts about this document. (Includes a correction at the end.)

1.- It's a first: AQAP and AQIM have never published a statement together before, a fact that is emphasized by the fact that the document is labelled "Communiqué No. 1". That's not exactly a sensation, but interesting nonetheless.

2.- There are two main messages in the communiqué: A call for unity among the Jihadists in Iraq & Syria. And a call to their own sympathizers "in the Peninsula and those countries that are part of the evil alliance" to fight back against this alliance that has decided to fight the Islamic State to fight back.

3.- It is noteworthy however, that the document doesn't mention either Jabhat al-Nusra or the Islamic State by name. That's no coincidence. The AQ branches are not taking sides and they are clearly trying to avoid re-kindling or rather intensifying the strife between those two groups, even though Jabhat al-Nusra is, in theory, part of their team, while IS isn't. (Please not the correction at the end of this post.) 

4.- Which leads us to this: The very fact that AQIM and AQAP do not in any way at all criticize the Islamic State is indicative of two things: There is likely a degree of sympathy towards the "Caliphate" within the ranks of these two branches; and they are independent enough of AQ central's Amir Aiman al-Sawahiri to take their own decisions in how to address the issue.

5.- The call to unity, however, was received by internet Jihadis without much enthusiasm, as far as I can see. It seems like the crowd wasn't exactly waiting to be lectured about this issue by AQAP and AQIM (the latter of which is not very good at maintaining unity itself).

6.- In terms of reactions or consequences, I think that the call to their own sympathizers to react to Western led and Arab backed efforts to reign in the Islamic State is most important. In the worst case it may lead to actions like embassy attacks etc. in the larger region.

But be that as it may, this communiqué isn't much of an event in and of itself. It is much rather part of a development the outcome of which nobody knows yet - but it will be one of these three options: AQ and IS are either going to merge in one way or the other; or they will keep fighting each other; or they will find some kind of modus vivandi and exist alongside each other.

The statement in questions leaves all of these options open and contains no hints other than a general preference for unity. But attempts at unity can of course fail (and have failed) for many reasons, large or petty. material or personal, ideological or profane.

CORRECTION: The Islamic State is mentioned by name in the document, I have overlooked that at first, and Aymen al-Tamimi pointed me to it. However, I don't believe that changes much of my argument in this post, but that's up to you to decide. I would still maintain the notion that AQAP and AQIM have written nothing that would intensify the strife between Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State. 

5 Things we don't know about the Caliphate

August 26th, 2014 - Right now, a lot of people (and media) are asking for information on the "Islamic State", the "Caliphate" of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and other things related to Jihadist activities in Syria and Iraq. That's perfectly understandable. But while I am answering as many of these questions as I can, I think it is equally important that we (and by "we" I mean those of us who have followed events there since, let's say, the days of Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi) don't forget that there are a whole lot of questions we can't answer (even if these are not the questions we are usually asked).

So in the interest of self-discipline, academic transparency and self-questioning, here is a brief list of the five most important things we (or I, at least) do not know about the Caliphate, but really wish I knew:

1.- How important is the role of al-Baghdadi?

He is obviously the poster guy of IS, but in what ways does he direct operations, how much power of command does he yield, and what is his relation to his deputies and field commanders, given that at least some of them are apparently former Ba'ath regime military men? How much initiative are commanders in the field allowed? Have rules been laid out of whether or not and if so how to execute people - and if so, before or after the first instances occurred? Mind you, I haven't read a single article in which even three commanders of IS have been plausibly named. But understanding the extent of al-Baghdadi's control and wether he is all micro or macro would be very helpful indeed.

2.- Is there a plan for expansion of the "Caliphate"?

And by that a mean: A real, tangible one, not the ideological version. In propaganda videos, all sorts of targets are being named: Samarra, Najaf, Baghdad in Iraq; Damascus, Mecca, Jerusalem on a more ideologically motivated level; Rome as a symbol. But that is not helpful in predicting the IS's next moves. These will be determined by their reading of military conditions on the ground, or so I assume. So will they sit in Mosul and Raqqa and consolidate before their next move at a big city or town? Are they busy forging new alliances elsewhere in order to repeat what happened in Mosul? Are they clever enough not to try and take Baghdad - or stupid enough to play with that idea at this point? I can make assumptions, but they are based on my idea of IS, rather than facts.

3.- Does al-Baghdadi/IS want to strike in the West? 

The thing is: With al-Qaida, we always had a pretty good idea of what they thought was in their interest. With IS, we do not. With al-Qaida, we knew that - to a degree - we could rely on their words; they hardly ever struck in places they didn't mention/threaten/warn before. With IS, we do not know. IS is not like al-Qaida. There is no reason to assume they follow the same lead here. Al-Baghdadi may in fact be plotting huge attacks in the West without ever mentioning any desire of that sort. Or the opposite may be true: He may be all about focusing on the region and not give a thought to striking anywhere in the West.

4.- Is there communication between IS and al-Qaida's branches? 

Success is sexy. Aiman al-Sawahiri is not. Is it conceivable that one day we will wake up to a video message by the leadership of AQAP or AQIM or both pledging allegiance to al-Baghdadi? Absolutely. Or so I believe. And that would be a game changer. Because the "Caliphate" as a state would suddenly become much more supranational/supra-state than it is. Such a move would spell the end f al-Qaida and likely be a rallying cry for many more recruits to come. It is, in a way, a very-bad-case-scenario. Right now, I can't assess the likelihood of this happening. AQ and its branches haven't been saying a whole lot about IS at all. So: Is there communication? Perhaps even negociations? I don't know. I daresay no-one really does. Which means that this 3-a.m.-scenario lingers above our heads....

5.- How stable/instable are relations to allies and helpers? 

It is evident that IS could not have taken Mosul by itself. We have hints that the relation to former regimes cadres and Sunni Sheikhs in Iraq are at least instable. But that's about it. We don't know these parties' calculations well enough to foresee how far these alliances may carry IS. And whether they can be brokered in other areas than the ones where they already exist. Is money a factor here? And if so, how convincing is it? And how much of it does IS have?



There are more questions, of course. Maybe some of you have strong opinions on one of these, maybe some of you have entirely different questions. In any case, I believe that admitting to what we don't know will eventually help us more than pretending we have all the answers.

As always, I am looking forward to your comments!

Cheers, Y

A few Thoughts on the ISIS-"Caliphate"

June 30th, 2014 - On Sunday, ISIS declared the existence of a "Caliphate" and changed its name to "The Islamic State", dropping "in Iraq and Greater Syria" in an effort to signal a universal claim of leadership and authority over all Muslims wherever they may live. This declaration was spread through an audio by ISIS's official speaker and also in a written version, supplied in several languages. There is little reason to believe this is a fake, given the established channels of distribution, the content and the reactions of ISIS sympathizers.

Many of us have been watching ISIS, al-Qaida and other Jihadist organizations for a while, and we will have a lot to report and discuss in the days and weeks to come, so I will keep this brief. These are just some early thoughts I have been having today and wanted to share with you.

1. In its declaration (Peter von Ostaeyen has covered it here), ISIS stresses the lack of legitimacy of existing Muslim states. This falls in line with ISIS ideology (and the ideology of the groups that ISIS stems from). But it should still be taken seriously. ISIS is clearly not done yet.

2.- ISIS clearly believes that a critical mass of Muslims sympathizes with them. I believe they may be making the mistake of over-estimating that support.

3.- ISIS is very likely hoping that the declaration of the "Caliphate" may lead to tribes or villages or other groups of people outside of the Iraq/Syria-thetare declaring their allegiance to Abu Bakr. While ISIS would know pretty well that this is not sustainable, it could still lead to a degree of chaos and strife in countries like Jordan or Lebanon or Saudi Arabia that may suit ISIS quite well. Remember: Since Zarqawi's days we know that the concept of destabilizing countries is part of the DNA of that group.

4.- It is interesting to note that ISIS argues that any delay in the declaration of a "Caliphate" would be wrong. Saying we had to announce it rather than we wanted to announce it is clever and can become part of a narrative that has the power to convince more people.

5.- You can't declare a Caliphate every other week. This is something that Abu Bakr can do once, and only once. This is why I think he must be pretty confident that even if everybody around him unites against him, he is still able to hold onto some areas.

6.- In terms of historic connection, I think it is important to understand that ISIS is not seeing this is a continuation of the Caliphate that was abolished in 1924. I think ISIS would claim that this Caliphate of theirs is the direct successor the the Caliphate of Ali. Jihadists aren't huge fans of the Ummayads, Abbassids and Ottomans.

7.- Declaring a Caliphate is a direct challenge to the leaders of Jordan and Morocco who are widely considered to be actual descendants of the Prophet Mohammed and (in theory) eligible for the position. It's going to be interesting to see how they will react. Anything ranging from ridiculing ISIS to asking for a war is possible.

8.- Of course Al-Qaida's reaction should be interesting, too. I am personally quite sure that Aiman al-Zawahiri would rather shoot himself than swear allegiance to Abu Bakr, but there may be important people within the AQ nexus who will think more pragmatically (and who don't like al-Zawahiri). There are significant rumors about voices within AQIM and AQAP looking at ISIS favorably. It is definitely not unthinkable that parts of al-Qaida switch to al-Baghdadi.

Al-Qaida revisited

November 15th, 2013 - Folks, the following is an article on the state of al-Qaida in 2013 that I was asked to contribute to the "Security Times", a special edition of the "Atlantic Times". The original online link is here (and the original layout is nicer, of course, too). I hope you enjoy it - and I am excited about your comments. I would also like to thank some of you for your input, namely Leah Farrall, Will McCants, Greg Johnson, Aaron Zelin, Andrew Lebovich and Raffaello Pantucci. Don't hold them responsible for any of what I say here, though - they were just kind enough to comment on the draft! 

In September 2013, al-Qaeda published a five page Arabic document called “General Clarifications for Jihadist Action.“ It was authored by Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Amir or leader of al-Qaeda, who had been Osama Bin Laden’s deputy and became his successor after the Saudi was killed by US Navy Seals in May 2011. The document is fascinating for many reasons, but especially because it isn’t addressed to a Western audience as speeches by al-Qaeda’s leadership often at least partly are for propaganda purposes. Instead it is, in Zawahiri’s own words, addressed to “the leaders of all entities belonging to al-Qaeda and to our helpers and those who sympathize with us” as well as to “their followers, be they leaders or individuals.”

This is a large group of people. And it is noteworthy that al-Zawahiri doesn’t seem to be placing a lot of emphasis on the brand name of his group. Instead everybody is invited to feel addressed. So what is al-Qaeda in 2013? An open network? Or still a hierarchical organization? Is it a network of networks? Or a system of franchise operations?

The truth is that al-Qaeda in 2013 is all of the above. Al-Qaeda can be structured as it is in Yemen. But it is also open, given that the central leadership has repeatedly asked sympathizers in the West to act in its name and on their own initiative. Al-Qaeda’s presence and influence can be obscure as is the case with the co-operation with al-Shabaab in Somalia. Or opaque, as it is in relation to various local Jihadist groups across the Arab world calling themselves Ansar al-Sharia, whose agendas overlap with al-Qaeda’s. Then again, the central leadership can appear like a company’s headquarters, for example when the North African branch, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), reprimands fighters for not filling in forms properly. Wile in other instances al-Qaeda even hides behind other names – like Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria.

At first glance this may seem erratic. But from al-Qaeda’s point of view it is an asset to be able to appear in whatever form may be best at a given place or moment in time. The case of Jabhat al-Nusra, now probably the strongest faction in Syria’s civil war, illustrates that: Even though the group was set up by al-Qaeda in Iraq, it didn’t use that group’s name so as to not alienate Syrians. Only after its support base had solidified, did the group admit to being part of the al-Qaeda nexus.

It is partly by this means that al-Qaeda over the past two years managed to establish bridgeheads in Arab countries destabilized by rebellions. In Libya and in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula for example it is quite evident that al-Qaeda plays a role – in all but name. Should al-Qaeda cadres one day feel they would benefit from the brand name, they will introduce it there.

The exploitation of the unstable situation following the Arab rebellions is currently al-Qaeda’s most important project. At first the uprisings weakened al-Qaeda because the Jihadists had always claimed they would be the ones to cause the fall of the “tyrannical“ Arab regimes, or “the near enemy.” But this ideological defeat has since been compensated for by a huge influx of volunteers, an active role in Syria’s civil war and large areas elsewhere in which the network can operate fairly freely for lack of state control.

After roughly a decade in which al-Qaeda’s main interest was to plot spectacular attacks against Western targets, or “the far enemy,” the pendulum is now swinging back toward the near enemy. This is not only a strategic decision by the central leadership. It is also what most new recruits are interested in.

This is not to say al-Qaeda is no longer interested in launching attacks on the West; Al-Zawahiri called for them. And al-Qaeda’s branch in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP), headquartered in Yemen, is likely still devoting resources to that end. Of all groups in the nexus they have the greatest capabilities to do so. With Ibrahim al-Asiri they have a master bomb maker in their ranks who has already proven his expertise when AQAP tried to down a US jet in 2009 and two cargo planes in 2010. Furthermore, AQAP’s Amir Nasir al-Wuhayshi has recently been promoted to al-Qaeda’s overall Number 2. He will want to prove his ability, and an attack outside the region is hard currency in this regard.

But the focus is now on the Arab world – and on Africa, where the expansion politics of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, started years ago, are now paying off. In the conflict that shook Mali in 2012, AQIM’s fighters played an important role, in alliance with other Jihadist networks. They have been driven out of Mali’s towns since, but are still in the region. In addition, Jihadist veteran and training networks now connect Northern Africa not only with Mali but also with Nigeria. Add to that a large number of weapons that were acquired from the Libyan army’s depots, and it becomes quite clear that a string of African states in which militant Islamists are active may witness eruptions of violence instigated or supported by AQIM in the years to come.

In Somalia meanwhile al- Shabaab may be under pressure; but as the attack on the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya in September 2013 demonstrated, the group is capable of high profile terror attacks. They may have been helped by AQAP. But in either case there is little reason to assume that strikes like this will not happen again as long as African Union forces are fighting al-Shabaab in Somalia.

In the Middle East prospects are equally bleak. The demise of the Assad regime is clearly not the only aim that Jihadists are pursuing in Syria. They want to establish an Islamist proto-state; and they are enthusiastic about the proximity to Israel. Approximately 6,000 non-Syrian Jihadists are currently in the country, many have battlefield experience. They constitute a troubling long-term problem in any scenario. Concerns over what they may plan to do in the future are rising in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey – even more so as al-Qaeda in Iraq is perpetrating mass casualty attacks at almost the rate seen in 2005 and 2006 while at the same time maintaining a presence in Syria.

In Egypt another pressing issue exists: Since the military unseated President Mohamed Morsi in July 2013, Islamists there feel disenfranchised. Al-Qaeda is interested in winning them over. It is partly for this reason that al-Zawahiri in his “guidelines“ portrays al-Qaeda as a group that will not use excessive violence and has a clear agenda. Egpytian Muslim brotherhood supporters are not natural allies of al-Qaeda, but a more focused, more civil version of that group may be attractive to some. A lot has been written in the past few years about the alleged end of al-Qaeda. Certainly, the US drone campaign has killed many important leaders and diminished the group’s capabilities.

But al-Qaeda is once more proving to be very resilient – because it is able to adapt. Just as it did, for example, at the beginning of the Afghanistan war when the group all but gave up its safe haven and ordered most cadres to go back to their home countries to continue the project from there. This is how AQAP and AQIM came about.

We are presently witnessing another transformation, as al-Qaeda not only shifts focus but also allows for more co-operation and integration with local groups at the expense of micro-management by a central leadership, which can’t be maintained under these circumstances. Of course this transformation comes at a risk: Al-Qaeda is lacking coherence and leadership. In almost every theater there are severe internal conflicts. AQIM has splintered; al-Shabaab assassinates dissident cadres; in Syria al-Qaeda is present with two groups at the same time, one loyal to al-Zawahiri, the other to the AQIM leadership.

All of this has weakened al-Qaeda. The organization is not in good shape – as an organization. But what could be called the global Jihadist movement – with al-Qaeda at its helm – is faring well. The net result is as troubling as it is evident: Al-Qaeda and its allies are as big a threat to global security as they have ever been.

Yassin Musharbash is a Berlin-based investigative reporter and terrorism analyst with the German weekly newspaper Die Zeit.

(c) The Security Times, Yassin Musharbash 

A few random Thoughts on current Terror Warnings

August 4th, 2013 - This is going to be a rather brief post. Most of you will be familiar with the bulk of what has been reported thus far about the current concerns raised by the US administration and CT community in regard to a possibly immanent terror attack by AQ against US and/or Western targets. I would like to add a few random and not-so-random thoughts to the debate surrounding this development, especially because I believe that the usual kind of echo chamber is starting to manifest itself in some of the reporting, and I feel that some healthy out-of-the-box thinking may be a remedy of sorts.

So, here are a few things I have been chewing on.

1.- Of course AQAP is dangerous. But it is not the only network in the Global Jihadist movement that is theoretically capable of delivering a blow to the US or the West in the Middle East, the Muslim World or beyond. Just two examples: Nobody believed the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) had any internationalist intentions until they sent an attack team to Germany. And hardly anybody thought it likely that the TTP would engage in international terrorism before the Times Square attack.

2.- AQAP has proven it has international ambitions, true. But I would very certainly not put it beyond AQIM (in whatever state they may currently be) to out of a sudden enter center stage with an attack in the West. They have threatened to do so before and the fact they haven't done so does not necessarily mean they can't. They have the funds, they have the experience. And while I am at it: to a lesser degree, this is also true for AQI/ISIS.

3.- According to some reporting, people with knowledge of the nature of the intel have suggested that a tipping point had been reached because the muscle terrorists had been selected. If that is true, it may signal an important new phase within that plot. But it would decisively not make it more likely that said strike is immanent. Quite the opposite, actually: The larger the plot, the more likely that team selection needs to happen quite some time before execution.

4.- What effect might the public and global warnings have on the terrorists, assuming that a plot has actually been set in motion? Would they not be likely to hold off for a while rather than proceed? If AQ is anything, they are patient.

Please don't get me wrong. I am not trying to down-talk any concerns. I can easily imagine how Aiman al-Sawahiri would gladly invest quite a lot of energy and resources into a major plot, for example an attack that would be, say, jointly planned and executed by AQc and AQAP.

I am just feeling uneasy if the reporting gets too narrow. The most likely scenario is sometimes the most likely scenario only by a very small margin. 

Prepare for Blackout

I have been wanting to write this down for a while, so I may as well do it now with half an hour to spare: I believe that al-Qaida, or more precisely al-Qaida Central, is rapidly becoming more and more difficult to cover, analyze and understand -- for academics, journalists and government agencies alike. And as a journalist, I am happy to be the first to admit that.

The main reason, of course, are the deaths of important Qaida cadres over the past few years. Now this post is NOT about whether or not that is a good thing, it is solely about the consequences in terms of understanding our common subject matter.

One could also put it this way: I believe there are not many experts around at all who could write even one page profiles of the ten most important people inside AQ Central right now. My feeling is that some experts treat this like a dirty secret: THEY know it, their colleagues know it, but they won't admit it. But the truth is, if you are an "average" expert who has no day-to-day access to super secret dossiers and intel and HumInt or SigInt, general visibility of AQ central is down to a fairly historic low and unlikely to increase any time soon.

Sure, Ayman al-Zawahiri is still around. And Adam Gadahn is (who is more important than many thought according to the Abbottabad documents but not important in any meaningful way). Abu Yahya al-Libi is likely not around any more. Saif al-Adel might be, but most of us have no real idea of his impact, and info provided by people who say they do is conflicting. And after these we are down to... what... Khaled al-Husaynan?

I may be exaggerating here, but I am trying to make a point: In the future it is going to be more likely that we will miss important developments than it was in the previous years. It is to be assumed that people inside of and close to al-Qaida Central have taken up positions or are acting in ways that are important who we do not even know. This may mean, for example, that some of them can talk to individuals and groups that AQ could formerly not talk to. Cooperations may have become viable that we would have thought impossible. I guess all I am really saying is: We may well be surprised before we know it. And: I think it is important to acknowledge that.

As I said, this is true for AQ Central. Visibility is still fairly good for AQAP. It was never good for AQI after Zarqawi's death. And it was mostly murky for AQIM ever since they joined. It is reasonable for al-Shabaab. So we are not left with nothing.

But at the core of expertise, at least in my book, is a certain degree of transparency. I personally will find it easier to trust those experts who'll admit that there is a hell of a lot we do NOT know - and much less we DO know.

Cheers,

Y.


PS: It is true of course that a large part of good info on the inner working of AQ central in the last few years came by way of statements of arrested recruits, and we may see more of that in the future. But as helpful as these info were, in some cases they pointed to the exact problem I am describing in this post. For example, we learned that Sheikh Yunis al-Mauretani was apparently immensely important in 08/09 re: euro plot. But I have yet to meet anyone who could tell me more than four sentences worth about him...

Interesting Arrest in Spain

According to this report by Fox News Spanish police arrested a man who allegedly worked 8 – 15 hours online every day on behalf of AQ-C, AQAP and AQIM, busying himself with what was described as recruiting and transportation issues. He is also said to have administered one of the world's most important jihadist forums.

Now this clearly sounds interesting, and I fully share @azelin's speculation that this sounds as if the man (apparently a Jordanian-born Saudi) may have been involved in the al-Fajr project.

Al-Fajr kept me quite busy for a while back in 2008 when I published an article about them after I had learned what Western intelligence services believed to have found out at the time - namely that al-Fajr, which appeared then and still appears mainly as a distribution network for propaganda from the outside, was in reality also a secret communications channel linking AQ central leadership with the leadership of the branches and top tier website administrators. This way crude and uncut versions of terror videos were said to be moved.

Another example according to my sources at the time was that AQ central used the communication system for reminding Iraqi cadres of handing over due money in one case. It was also believed that only around two dozens people had the necessary log in information for that „forum inside the forums“ or for what one agent dubbed „al-Qaida's intranet“.

It is of course not easy to judge whether al-Fajr still has that role today. But if it turned out to be true that the man arrested in Spain was in fact an al-Fajr operative, it would be a very interesting case indeed – and one where I would dearly like to follow court proceedings should he ever be prosecuted.