Al-Qaida revisited

November 15th, 2013 - Folks, the following is an article on the state of al-Qaida in 2013 that I was asked to contribute to the "Security Times", a special edition of the "Atlantic Times". The original online link is here (and the original layout is nicer, of course, too). I hope you enjoy it - and I am excited about your comments. I would also like to thank some of you for your input, namely Leah Farrall, Will McCants, Greg Johnson, Aaron Zelin, Andrew Lebovich and Raffaello Pantucci. Don't hold them responsible for any of what I say here, though - they were just kind enough to comment on the draft! 

In September 2013, al-Qaeda published a five page Arabic document called “General Clarifications for Jihadist Action.“ It was authored by Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Amir or leader of al-Qaeda, who had been Osama Bin Laden’s deputy and became his successor after the Saudi was killed by US Navy Seals in May 2011. The document is fascinating for many reasons, but especially because it isn’t addressed to a Western audience as speeches by al-Qaeda’s leadership often at least partly are for propaganda purposes. Instead it is, in Zawahiri’s own words, addressed to “the leaders of all entities belonging to al-Qaeda and to our helpers and those who sympathize with us” as well as to “their followers, be they leaders or individuals.”

This is a large group of people. And it is noteworthy that al-Zawahiri doesn’t seem to be placing a lot of emphasis on the brand name of his group. Instead everybody is invited to feel addressed. So what is al-Qaeda in 2013? An open network? Or still a hierarchical organization? Is it a network of networks? Or a system of franchise operations?

The truth is that al-Qaeda in 2013 is all of the above. Al-Qaeda can be structured as it is in Yemen. But it is also open, given that the central leadership has repeatedly asked sympathizers in the West to act in its name and on their own initiative. Al-Qaeda’s presence and influence can be obscure as is the case with the co-operation with al-Shabaab in Somalia. Or opaque, as it is in relation to various local Jihadist groups across the Arab world calling themselves Ansar al-Sharia, whose agendas overlap with al-Qaeda’s. Then again, the central leadership can appear like a company’s headquarters, for example when the North African branch, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), reprimands fighters for not filling in forms properly. Wile in other instances al-Qaeda even hides behind other names – like Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria.

At first glance this may seem erratic. But from al-Qaeda’s point of view it is an asset to be able to appear in whatever form may be best at a given place or moment in time. The case of Jabhat al-Nusra, now probably the strongest faction in Syria’s civil war, illustrates that: Even though the group was set up by al-Qaeda in Iraq, it didn’t use that group’s name so as to not alienate Syrians. Only after its support base had solidified, did the group admit to being part of the al-Qaeda nexus.

It is partly by this means that al-Qaeda over the past two years managed to establish bridgeheads in Arab countries destabilized by rebellions. In Libya and in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula for example it is quite evident that al-Qaeda plays a role – in all but name. Should al-Qaeda cadres one day feel they would benefit from the brand name, they will introduce it there.

The exploitation of the unstable situation following the Arab rebellions is currently al-Qaeda’s most important project. At first the uprisings weakened al-Qaeda because the Jihadists had always claimed they would be the ones to cause the fall of the “tyrannical“ Arab regimes, or “the near enemy.” But this ideological defeat has since been compensated for by a huge influx of volunteers, an active role in Syria’s civil war and large areas elsewhere in which the network can operate fairly freely for lack of state control.

After roughly a decade in which al-Qaeda’s main interest was to plot spectacular attacks against Western targets, or “the far enemy,” the pendulum is now swinging back toward the near enemy. This is not only a strategic decision by the central leadership. It is also what most new recruits are interested in.

This is not to say al-Qaeda is no longer interested in launching attacks on the West; Al-Zawahiri called for them. And al-Qaeda’s branch in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP), headquartered in Yemen, is likely still devoting resources to that end. Of all groups in the nexus they have the greatest capabilities to do so. With Ibrahim al-Asiri they have a master bomb maker in their ranks who has already proven his expertise when AQAP tried to down a US jet in 2009 and two cargo planes in 2010. Furthermore, AQAP’s Amir Nasir al-Wuhayshi has recently been promoted to al-Qaeda’s overall Number 2. He will want to prove his ability, and an attack outside the region is hard currency in this regard.

But the focus is now on the Arab world – and on Africa, where the expansion politics of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, started years ago, are now paying off. In the conflict that shook Mali in 2012, AQIM’s fighters played an important role, in alliance with other Jihadist networks. They have been driven out of Mali’s towns since, but are still in the region. In addition, Jihadist veteran and training networks now connect Northern Africa not only with Mali but also with Nigeria. Add to that a large number of weapons that were acquired from the Libyan army’s depots, and it becomes quite clear that a string of African states in which militant Islamists are active may witness eruptions of violence instigated or supported by AQIM in the years to come.

In Somalia meanwhile al- Shabaab may be under pressure; but as the attack on the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya in September 2013 demonstrated, the group is capable of high profile terror attacks. They may have been helped by AQAP. But in either case there is little reason to assume that strikes like this will not happen again as long as African Union forces are fighting al-Shabaab in Somalia.

In the Middle East prospects are equally bleak. The demise of the Assad regime is clearly not the only aim that Jihadists are pursuing in Syria. They want to establish an Islamist proto-state; and they are enthusiastic about the proximity to Israel. Approximately 6,000 non-Syrian Jihadists are currently in the country, many have battlefield experience. They constitute a troubling long-term problem in any scenario. Concerns over what they may plan to do in the future are rising in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey – even more so as al-Qaeda in Iraq is perpetrating mass casualty attacks at almost the rate seen in 2005 and 2006 while at the same time maintaining a presence in Syria.

In Egypt another pressing issue exists: Since the military unseated President Mohamed Morsi in July 2013, Islamists there feel disenfranchised. Al-Qaeda is interested in winning them over. It is partly for this reason that al-Zawahiri in his “guidelines“ portrays al-Qaeda as a group that will not use excessive violence and has a clear agenda. Egpytian Muslim brotherhood supporters are not natural allies of al-Qaeda, but a more focused, more civil version of that group may be attractive to some. A lot has been written in the past few years about the alleged end of al-Qaeda. Certainly, the US drone campaign has killed many important leaders and diminished the group’s capabilities.

But al-Qaeda is once more proving to be very resilient – because it is able to adapt. Just as it did, for example, at the beginning of the Afghanistan war when the group all but gave up its safe haven and ordered most cadres to go back to their home countries to continue the project from there. This is how AQAP and AQIM came about.

We are presently witnessing another transformation, as al-Qaeda not only shifts focus but also allows for more co-operation and integration with local groups at the expense of micro-management by a central leadership, which can’t be maintained under these circumstances. Of course this transformation comes at a risk: Al-Qaeda is lacking coherence and leadership. In almost every theater there are severe internal conflicts. AQIM has splintered; al-Shabaab assassinates dissident cadres; in Syria al-Qaeda is present with two groups at the same time, one loyal to al-Zawahiri, the other to the AQIM leadership.

All of this has weakened al-Qaeda. The organization is not in good shape – as an organization. But what could be called the global Jihadist movement – with al-Qaeda at its helm – is faring well. The net result is as troubling as it is evident: Al-Qaeda and its allies are as big a threat to global security as they have ever been.

Yassin Musharbash is a Berlin-based investigative reporter and terrorism analyst with the German weekly newspaper Die Zeit.

(c) The Security Times, Yassin Musharbash 

A few random Thoughts on current Terror Warnings

August 4th, 2013 - This is going to be a rather brief post. Most of you will be familiar with the bulk of what has been reported thus far about the current concerns raised by the US administration and CT community in regard to a possibly immanent terror attack by AQ against US and/or Western targets. I would like to add a few random and not-so-random thoughts to the debate surrounding this development, especially because I believe that the usual kind of echo chamber is starting to manifest itself in some of the reporting, and I feel that some healthy out-of-the-box thinking may be a remedy of sorts.

So, here are a few things I have been chewing on.

1.- Of course AQAP is dangerous. But it is not the only network in the Global Jihadist movement that is theoretically capable of delivering a blow to the US or the West in the Middle East, the Muslim World or beyond. Just two examples: Nobody believed the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) had any internationalist intentions until they sent an attack team to Germany. And hardly anybody thought it likely that the TTP would engage in international terrorism before the Times Square attack.

2.- AQAP has proven it has international ambitions, true. But I would very certainly not put it beyond AQIM (in whatever state they may currently be) to out of a sudden enter center stage with an attack in the West. They have threatened to do so before and the fact they haven't done so does not necessarily mean they can't. They have the funds, they have the experience. And while I am at it: to a lesser degree, this is also true for AQI/ISIS.

3.- According to some reporting, people with knowledge of the nature of the intel have suggested that a tipping point had been reached because the muscle terrorists had been selected. If that is true, it may signal an important new phase within that plot. But it would decisively not make it more likely that said strike is immanent. Quite the opposite, actually: The larger the plot, the more likely that team selection needs to happen quite some time before execution.

4.- What effect might the public and global warnings have on the terrorists, assuming that a plot has actually been set in motion? Would they not be likely to hold off for a while rather than proceed? If AQ is anything, they are patient.

Please don't get me wrong. I am not trying to down-talk any concerns. I can easily imagine how Aiman al-Sawahiri would gladly invest quite a lot of energy and resources into a major plot, for example an attack that would be, say, jointly planned and executed by AQc and AQAP.

I am just feeling uneasy if the reporting gets too narrow. The most likely scenario is sometimes the most likely scenario only by a very small margin. 

Jabhat al-Nusra responds

April 10, 2013 - Today, Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) responded to yesterday's declaration of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) according to which they were in fact a union and shared the common name of Islamic State in Iraq and reader Syria (ISIGS). The 7 min Audio is by al-Jawlani, a known JN leader. There is little reason to suspect it is not authentic: The download links were supplied by JN's twitter account, Jihadists on their websites take it to be true.

The audio is interesting, but also somewhat confusing.

Here are a few points and a few thoughts on what they could mean.

1.- Jawlani says JN leadership only learned about AQI statement from the media. He refers to it as "if it is authentic..." - This clearly indicates there was little in the way of synchronizing the declaration. Jawlani can be understood as being not too happy about the process.

2.- Jawlani does, however, explicitly swear (literally: "repeat") allegiance (bai'a) to Ayman al-Zawahiri. He does it in the name of all JN members. - This means that, despite of whatever differences there may remain between AQI nd JN leaderships, JN does consider itself part of th AQ universe.

3.- Jawlani does, however, NOT embrace the common name of ISIGS. He also maintains that "nothing will change" in JN and that "JN will stay as you have gotten to know it". - I take this to show that Jawlani fears that the AQ-Connection may cost JN sympathies in Syria (re-visit @azelin's piece from yesterday for the dynamic involved here!)

4.- Jawlani's talks a little about the history of JN. He describes it as a "project" put before AQI's al-Baghdadi in Iraq. Al-Baghdadi approved of it, Jawlani says. He also says there is a "long history" they share. - So there definitely is a strong tie between JN and AQI.

However, there seem to remain certain differences in the interpretation of the exact nature of their relationship. Are they one, as al-Baghdadi suggested yesterday? Or are they two? Or one and and a half? Does Jawlani think that al-Baghdadi's statement was premature? Today's statement didn't make this any clearer.

So, there is a lot to interpret, discuss and debate for all of us. I am curious about your input!

Cheers, Y

PS: I mistakenly twittered at a very early moment in time that Jawlani did in fact confirm the existence of ISIGS. I corrected that later. I would like to repeat this correction here. He did not explicitly embrace that term and make it his own. My bad. It was based on a misunderstanding of the original Arabic. 

AQI + S = ISIGS

April, 9th, 2013 - Cole Bunzel on Jihadica has already made a number of crucial points about the declaration by AQI Amir al-Baghdadi that Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria is in fact part of AQI's Islamic State of Iraq, which as Al-Baghdadi claims, should from now on be referred to as „Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria“.

In any case, I just want to add a little to his analysis with which I almost entirely agree.

First of all, I believe it is important to bear in mind that this is NOT a merger. I think al-Baghdadi is speaking the truth when he claims that AQI sent people to Syria to start a platform there. Jabhat al-Nusra therefor IS AQI right from the start. As such, it has profited from transfer of cadres as well as know-how (esp bomb making, I would imagine.) Jabhat al-Nusra also implemented some of the „leassons learnt“ from AQI - like trying not to alienate local population too much. (They aren't consistantly good at that, though – I have interviewed refugess from Aleppo and Homs who told me how Jabha-cadres hunted down and executed Christians. This is reminiscent of what AQI did with Shiites in Iraq.)

Secondly, though, the union means that we are now pretty much dealing for the first time with the equivalent of something like AQAP in the Near East. Iraq and Syria together are the defining places in this region. AQ has now transcended the last reserve of national borders.

Thirdly, the union being what it is (namely a brain child of AQI and AQI's original ideology, as is apparent from al-Baghdadis speech), we should expect a rise in the threat level in the region, esp in Jordan and Lebanon, but also Turkey and Israel. Al-Sarqawi, the founder of AQI, always made it quite clear that Jihad in Iraq for him was a means of getting closer to Jerusalem. This is Jihadist dialectics. AQ has now come much closer to Israel, thanks to their network in Syria. They will try to close in, so to say. And given the more or less destabilized areas available to them (Lebanon border, partly also the Iraqi and Turkish and Jordanien border) they have room to manouver. More chaos = more opportunites for AQ.

So, in a nut shell: I believe it is IMPORTANT, even though it might have been little surprising, to know that AQI and Jabhat al-Nusra form a unified body. This is not about AQ supporting Jihadists in Syria, this is AQ expliting another local conflict. In the end, the aim is larger: dominance on the ground where it can be won; attacks on Israel; international attacks.

Cheers, Y.