Al-Qaida revisited

November 15th, 2013 - Folks, the following is an article on the state of al-Qaida in 2013 that I was asked to contribute to the "Security Times", a special edition of the "Atlantic Times". The original online link is here (and the original layout is nicer, of course, too). I hope you enjoy it - and I am excited about your comments. I would also like to thank some of you for your input, namely Leah Farrall, Will McCants, Greg Johnson, Aaron Zelin, Andrew Lebovich and Raffaello Pantucci. Don't hold them responsible for any of what I say here, though - they were just kind enough to comment on the draft! 

In September 2013, al-Qaeda published a five page Arabic document called “General Clarifications for Jihadist Action.“ It was authored by Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Amir or leader of al-Qaeda, who had been Osama Bin Laden’s deputy and became his successor after the Saudi was killed by US Navy Seals in May 2011. The document is fascinating for many reasons, but especially because it isn’t addressed to a Western audience as speeches by al-Qaeda’s leadership often at least partly are for propaganda purposes. Instead it is, in Zawahiri’s own words, addressed to “the leaders of all entities belonging to al-Qaeda and to our helpers and those who sympathize with us” as well as to “their followers, be they leaders or individuals.”

This is a large group of people. And it is noteworthy that al-Zawahiri doesn’t seem to be placing a lot of emphasis on the brand name of his group. Instead everybody is invited to feel addressed. So what is al-Qaeda in 2013? An open network? Or still a hierarchical organization? Is it a network of networks? Or a system of franchise operations?

The truth is that al-Qaeda in 2013 is all of the above. Al-Qaeda can be structured as it is in Yemen. But it is also open, given that the central leadership has repeatedly asked sympathizers in the West to act in its name and on their own initiative. Al-Qaeda’s presence and influence can be obscure as is the case with the co-operation with al-Shabaab in Somalia. Or opaque, as it is in relation to various local Jihadist groups across the Arab world calling themselves Ansar al-Sharia, whose agendas overlap with al-Qaeda’s. Then again, the central leadership can appear like a company’s headquarters, for example when the North African branch, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), reprimands fighters for not filling in forms properly. Wile in other instances al-Qaeda even hides behind other names – like Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria.

At first glance this may seem erratic. But from al-Qaeda’s point of view it is an asset to be able to appear in whatever form may be best at a given place or moment in time. The case of Jabhat al-Nusra, now probably the strongest faction in Syria’s civil war, illustrates that: Even though the group was set up by al-Qaeda in Iraq, it didn’t use that group’s name so as to not alienate Syrians. Only after its support base had solidified, did the group admit to being part of the al-Qaeda nexus.

It is partly by this means that al-Qaeda over the past two years managed to establish bridgeheads in Arab countries destabilized by rebellions. In Libya and in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula for example it is quite evident that al-Qaeda plays a role – in all but name. Should al-Qaeda cadres one day feel they would benefit from the brand name, they will introduce it there.

The exploitation of the unstable situation following the Arab rebellions is currently al-Qaeda’s most important project. At first the uprisings weakened al-Qaeda because the Jihadists had always claimed they would be the ones to cause the fall of the “tyrannical“ Arab regimes, or “the near enemy.” But this ideological defeat has since been compensated for by a huge influx of volunteers, an active role in Syria’s civil war and large areas elsewhere in which the network can operate fairly freely for lack of state control.

After roughly a decade in which al-Qaeda’s main interest was to plot spectacular attacks against Western targets, or “the far enemy,” the pendulum is now swinging back toward the near enemy. This is not only a strategic decision by the central leadership. It is also what most new recruits are interested in.

This is not to say al-Qaeda is no longer interested in launching attacks on the West; Al-Zawahiri called for them. And al-Qaeda’s branch in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP), headquartered in Yemen, is likely still devoting resources to that end. Of all groups in the nexus they have the greatest capabilities to do so. With Ibrahim al-Asiri they have a master bomb maker in their ranks who has already proven his expertise when AQAP tried to down a US jet in 2009 and two cargo planes in 2010. Furthermore, AQAP’s Amir Nasir al-Wuhayshi has recently been promoted to al-Qaeda’s overall Number 2. He will want to prove his ability, and an attack outside the region is hard currency in this regard.

But the focus is now on the Arab world – and on Africa, where the expansion politics of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, started years ago, are now paying off. In the conflict that shook Mali in 2012, AQIM’s fighters played an important role, in alliance with other Jihadist networks. They have been driven out of Mali’s towns since, but are still in the region. In addition, Jihadist veteran and training networks now connect Northern Africa not only with Mali but also with Nigeria. Add to that a large number of weapons that were acquired from the Libyan army’s depots, and it becomes quite clear that a string of African states in which militant Islamists are active may witness eruptions of violence instigated or supported by AQIM in the years to come.

In Somalia meanwhile al- Shabaab may be under pressure; but as the attack on the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya in September 2013 demonstrated, the group is capable of high profile terror attacks. They may have been helped by AQAP. But in either case there is little reason to assume that strikes like this will not happen again as long as African Union forces are fighting al-Shabaab in Somalia.

In the Middle East prospects are equally bleak. The demise of the Assad regime is clearly not the only aim that Jihadists are pursuing in Syria. They want to establish an Islamist proto-state; and they are enthusiastic about the proximity to Israel. Approximately 6,000 non-Syrian Jihadists are currently in the country, many have battlefield experience. They constitute a troubling long-term problem in any scenario. Concerns over what they may plan to do in the future are rising in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey – even more so as al-Qaeda in Iraq is perpetrating mass casualty attacks at almost the rate seen in 2005 and 2006 while at the same time maintaining a presence in Syria.

In Egypt another pressing issue exists: Since the military unseated President Mohamed Morsi in July 2013, Islamists there feel disenfranchised. Al-Qaeda is interested in winning them over. It is partly for this reason that al-Zawahiri in his “guidelines“ portrays al-Qaeda as a group that will not use excessive violence and has a clear agenda. Egpytian Muslim brotherhood supporters are not natural allies of al-Qaeda, but a more focused, more civil version of that group may be attractive to some. A lot has been written in the past few years about the alleged end of al-Qaeda. Certainly, the US drone campaign has killed many important leaders and diminished the group’s capabilities.

But al-Qaeda is once more proving to be very resilient – because it is able to adapt. Just as it did, for example, at the beginning of the Afghanistan war when the group all but gave up its safe haven and ordered most cadres to go back to their home countries to continue the project from there. This is how AQAP and AQIM came about.

We are presently witnessing another transformation, as al-Qaeda not only shifts focus but also allows for more co-operation and integration with local groups at the expense of micro-management by a central leadership, which can’t be maintained under these circumstances. Of course this transformation comes at a risk: Al-Qaeda is lacking coherence and leadership. In almost every theater there are severe internal conflicts. AQIM has splintered; al-Shabaab assassinates dissident cadres; in Syria al-Qaeda is present with two groups at the same time, one loyal to al-Zawahiri, the other to the AQIM leadership.

All of this has weakened al-Qaeda. The organization is not in good shape – as an organization. But what could be called the global Jihadist movement – with al-Qaeda at its helm – is faring well. The net result is as troubling as it is evident: Al-Qaeda and its allies are as big a threat to global security as they have ever been.

Yassin Musharbash is a Berlin-based investigative reporter and terrorism analyst with the German weekly newspaper Die Zeit.

(c) The Security Times, Yassin Musharbash 

A few Thoughts on Syria Intervention(s)

September 7th, 2013 - I am, as a rule, not a fan of military interventions. I have never served in the military and when I actually had to make a choice about whether or not to, because back then Germany had compulsory military service, I chose to do civil service instead.

But I also studied International Relations, and I am realist enough to believe there are wars of choice and wars of necessity. The problem with Syria at the moment, though, is that this particular paradigm doesn't help. As far as I am concerned, the situation in Syria is unique. Unique at least in the sense that I don't find it helpful to compare it to what many people now compare it to: Halabja; Bosnia; Serbia; Libya. None of that helps me make up my mind.

What I do see though is that what should be separate discussions are more and more turning into one single discussion. Which again does explicitly not help.

Here is what I think.

1.- There is dirty little secret, an elephant in the room, that few people talk about, and it is this: The best (not the perfect, but the best) moment for an international intervention in Syria has long passed. It would have been roughly one and a half years ago when costs and results would have been possible to calculate. They aren't anymore. Which is why until the use of chemical weapons on a large scale became a near indisputable fact a lot of people were happy not to be asked about such an intervention anymore and were evenly happy not to raise the issue anymore. Now the situation has changed. There is an obvious reason to discuss the issue again.

2.- But, and this is a big but: This very fact means that we are now talking about a different kind of intervention for a different reason. Or to be precise: At least some of us are. Which leads me to this:

3.- What's being discussed at the moment, is really three different interventions: a) punitive reaction to use of CW. b) An intervention that would degrade the Syrian regime's capabilities and thus change the balance of power in favour of the opposing forces. c) An intervention that would actually (even if not publicly announced) degrade the capabilities not only of the regime but perhaps also of those powers within the opposition that are deemed dangerous, namely the Jihadists.

4.- These different approaches need to be treated and discussed separately. I believe that it is possible, e.g., to be in favour of one option and for very good reasons to be against the other ones at the same time. I personally for example think that CW use can't go unanswered. But am I in favour of an intervention that would degrade the regime to a degree that it would practically hand victory (whatever that is in Syria) to the opposing forces (no matter who they might be in a given place)? Not so sure.

5.- Which leads to another issue which in a way also is another elephant in the room that some participants in the debate like to not discuss: What kind of situation do we want to see in Syria? "I want Assad gone" is just not enough anymore. In my view, it is high time to talk about how the international community is going to react to the presence of a solidified Jihadist force in Syria. The fact of 6000 foreign fighters needs addressing as there won't be any domestic power able to reign them in in the foreseeable future, no matter what the outcome of the civil war. They will look for and find niches and operate from out of there. 

6.- And there is another big issue: How is Assad going to react? What do we know about the decision making processes in the Syrian regime? I daresay: Not a whole lot. Which effectively means, the possible scenarios in front of us range from "he will do nothing" to "all hell will break loose". I personally deny to make predictions about the regime reaction to strikes. I know too little.

7.- Given that, what should guide our decisions? A principle (CW use can't go unanswered!) or a desired outcome (We will make sure he can't use it anymore!) or caution (What if he starts a doomsday scenario?) or pragmatism (We have to react, but if we are going to, it is an opportunity to influence the outcome of the civil war)? I have to admit I have no easy answer. I personally lean towards reacting in a limited way. It seems the safest way to possibly achieve deterrence while at the same time not provoke the apocalypse.

8.- But I also believe that it is time to ask the question of what Assad is actually fighting for. What is he hoping to achieve at this point? Regaining control of the entire country is unrealistic. But if that is true, the question is: Wouldn't any hope of starting a politically moderated settlement have to start with this? I hate to say this because I would personally like to see all of this regime removed; but the regime hasn't collapsed, and it doesn't look like it is going to, so at least we have to think about  another terrible questions: How long could this civil war last? How many more may have to die in the absence of a military solution or a political settlement?

9.- My last point: At this moment in time, I believe, it is also necessary to take precautions against the prospect that the Syrian drama spreads to other countries in the region. It already has started to. But if powers like Germany are unwilling to take part in any proposed kind of interventions, they should at least make more of an effort to help stabilize Jordan and Lebanon and take in Syrian refugees.

This has been a long post. I hope I didn't bore you. If it didn't help you, it did at least help me in organizing my thoughts. I have spent most of my life discussing and studying the Middle East. The Syrian conflict really gets to me. I love that country and I really hope that one day not too far away I can visit their again and meet my Syrian friends. It's just that right now I can't see the light at the end of the tunnel. 

AQI + S = ISIGS

April, 9th, 2013 - Cole Bunzel on Jihadica has already made a number of crucial points about the declaration by AQI Amir al-Baghdadi that Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria is in fact part of AQI's Islamic State of Iraq, which as Al-Baghdadi claims, should from now on be referred to as „Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria“.

In any case, I just want to add a little to his analysis with which I almost entirely agree.

First of all, I believe it is important to bear in mind that this is NOT a merger. I think al-Baghdadi is speaking the truth when he claims that AQI sent people to Syria to start a platform there. Jabhat al-Nusra therefor IS AQI right from the start. As such, it has profited from transfer of cadres as well as know-how (esp bomb making, I would imagine.) Jabhat al-Nusra also implemented some of the „leassons learnt“ from AQI - like trying not to alienate local population too much. (They aren't consistantly good at that, though – I have interviewed refugess from Aleppo and Homs who told me how Jabha-cadres hunted down and executed Christians. This is reminiscent of what AQI did with Shiites in Iraq.)

Secondly, though, the union means that we are now pretty much dealing for the first time with the equivalent of something like AQAP in the Near East. Iraq and Syria together are the defining places in this region. AQ has now transcended the last reserve of national borders.

Thirdly, the union being what it is (namely a brain child of AQI and AQI's original ideology, as is apparent from al-Baghdadis speech), we should expect a rise in the threat level in the region, esp in Jordan and Lebanon, but also Turkey and Israel. Al-Sarqawi, the founder of AQI, always made it quite clear that Jihad in Iraq for him was a means of getting closer to Jerusalem. This is Jihadist dialectics. AQ has now come much closer to Israel, thanks to their network in Syria. They will try to close in, so to say. And given the more or less destabilized areas available to them (Lebanon border, partly also the Iraqi and Turkish and Jordanien border) they have room to manouver. More chaos = more opportunites for AQ.

So, in a nut shell: I believe it is IMPORTANT, even though it might have been little surprising, to know that AQI and Jabhat al-Nusra form a unified body. This is not about AQ supporting Jihadists in Syria, this is AQ expliting another local conflict. In the end, the aim is larger: dominance on the ground where it can be won; attacks on Israel; international attacks.

Cheers, Y.