Another German Jihadist Killed by Drone

January 14th - In February 2012, a German Jihadist by the name of Patrick N. was killed by a drone in Waziristan according to a two-part audio message issued by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The news was first reported on Sunday; I have now had a chance to take a look at the message and to speak to a few people about it.

First of all, there is little reason to dispute the basic facts presented by German IMU member and unofficial spokesman "Abu Adam". Patrick N. travelled to Pakistan with his wife and two children in October of 2011. There is older footage in IMU tapes in which he is shown smiling and suggesting that other German Muslims follow his example. He says he was about to depart for training camp next, so this footage seems to have been recorded fairly early after his arrival. Three months later he was dead. According to "Abu Adam", he was killed in a drone strike that, he maintains, killed ten other people from different nations alongside Patrick N.

According to the IMU message N. grew up in a children's home after the death of his mother and his grandparents. He is said to have converted in Islam at the age of 14 in 2001.

N. would be the 5th German drone victim so far.

By now it also transpired that N. was arrested briefly by the German police (and let go without any charges) very shortly before he left for Pakistan.

What remains unclear at this time is who else was killed in said drone strike and what, if any, "high value targets" were among those targeted. Patrick N. is unlikely to have been such a HVT, firstly given his arrival only three months prior and secondly given the IMU's assurances that he never took part in any actual fighting.

More as or rather if more news trickle in. 

Al-Qaida revisited

November 15th, 2013 - Folks, the following is an article on the state of al-Qaida in 2013 that I was asked to contribute to the "Security Times", a special edition of the "Atlantic Times". The original online link is here (and the original layout is nicer, of course, too). I hope you enjoy it - and I am excited about your comments. I would also like to thank some of you for your input, namely Leah Farrall, Will McCants, Greg Johnson, Aaron Zelin, Andrew Lebovich and Raffaello Pantucci. Don't hold them responsible for any of what I say here, though - they were just kind enough to comment on the draft! 

In September 2013, al-Qaeda published a five page Arabic document called “General Clarifications for Jihadist Action.“ It was authored by Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Amir or leader of al-Qaeda, who had been Osama Bin Laden’s deputy and became his successor after the Saudi was killed by US Navy Seals in May 2011. The document is fascinating for many reasons, but especially because it isn’t addressed to a Western audience as speeches by al-Qaeda’s leadership often at least partly are for propaganda purposes. Instead it is, in Zawahiri’s own words, addressed to “the leaders of all entities belonging to al-Qaeda and to our helpers and those who sympathize with us” as well as to “their followers, be they leaders or individuals.”

This is a large group of people. And it is noteworthy that al-Zawahiri doesn’t seem to be placing a lot of emphasis on the brand name of his group. Instead everybody is invited to feel addressed. So what is al-Qaeda in 2013? An open network? Or still a hierarchical organization? Is it a network of networks? Or a system of franchise operations?

The truth is that al-Qaeda in 2013 is all of the above. Al-Qaeda can be structured as it is in Yemen. But it is also open, given that the central leadership has repeatedly asked sympathizers in the West to act in its name and on their own initiative. Al-Qaeda’s presence and influence can be obscure as is the case with the co-operation with al-Shabaab in Somalia. Or opaque, as it is in relation to various local Jihadist groups across the Arab world calling themselves Ansar al-Sharia, whose agendas overlap with al-Qaeda’s. Then again, the central leadership can appear like a company’s headquarters, for example when the North African branch, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), reprimands fighters for not filling in forms properly. Wile in other instances al-Qaeda even hides behind other names – like Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria.

At first glance this may seem erratic. But from al-Qaeda’s point of view it is an asset to be able to appear in whatever form may be best at a given place or moment in time. The case of Jabhat al-Nusra, now probably the strongest faction in Syria’s civil war, illustrates that: Even though the group was set up by al-Qaeda in Iraq, it didn’t use that group’s name so as to not alienate Syrians. Only after its support base had solidified, did the group admit to being part of the al-Qaeda nexus.

It is partly by this means that al-Qaeda over the past two years managed to establish bridgeheads in Arab countries destabilized by rebellions. In Libya and in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula for example it is quite evident that al-Qaeda plays a role – in all but name. Should al-Qaeda cadres one day feel they would benefit from the brand name, they will introduce it there.

The exploitation of the unstable situation following the Arab rebellions is currently al-Qaeda’s most important project. At first the uprisings weakened al-Qaeda because the Jihadists had always claimed they would be the ones to cause the fall of the “tyrannical“ Arab regimes, or “the near enemy.” But this ideological defeat has since been compensated for by a huge influx of volunteers, an active role in Syria’s civil war and large areas elsewhere in which the network can operate fairly freely for lack of state control.

After roughly a decade in which al-Qaeda’s main interest was to plot spectacular attacks against Western targets, or “the far enemy,” the pendulum is now swinging back toward the near enemy. This is not only a strategic decision by the central leadership. It is also what most new recruits are interested in.

This is not to say al-Qaeda is no longer interested in launching attacks on the West; Al-Zawahiri called for them. And al-Qaeda’s branch in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP), headquartered in Yemen, is likely still devoting resources to that end. Of all groups in the nexus they have the greatest capabilities to do so. With Ibrahim al-Asiri they have a master bomb maker in their ranks who has already proven his expertise when AQAP tried to down a US jet in 2009 and two cargo planes in 2010. Furthermore, AQAP’s Amir Nasir al-Wuhayshi has recently been promoted to al-Qaeda’s overall Number 2. He will want to prove his ability, and an attack outside the region is hard currency in this regard.

But the focus is now on the Arab world – and on Africa, where the expansion politics of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, started years ago, are now paying off. In the conflict that shook Mali in 2012, AQIM’s fighters played an important role, in alliance with other Jihadist networks. They have been driven out of Mali’s towns since, but are still in the region. In addition, Jihadist veteran and training networks now connect Northern Africa not only with Mali but also with Nigeria. Add to that a large number of weapons that were acquired from the Libyan army’s depots, and it becomes quite clear that a string of African states in which militant Islamists are active may witness eruptions of violence instigated or supported by AQIM in the years to come.

In Somalia meanwhile al- Shabaab may be under pressure; but as the attack on the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya in September 2013 demonstrated, the group is capable of high profile terror attacks. They may have been helped by AQAP. But in either case there is little reason to assume that strikes like this will not happen again as long as African Union forces are fighting al-Shabaab in Somalia.

In the Middle East prospects are equally bleak. The demise of the Assad regime is clearly not the only aim that Jihadists are pursuing in Syria. They want to establish an Islamist proto-state; and they are enthusiastic about the proximity to Israel. Approximately 6,000 non-Syrian Jihadists are currently in the country, many have battlefield experience. They constitute a troubling long-term problem in any scenario. Concerns over what they may plan to do in the future are rising in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey – even more so as al-Qaeda in Iraq is perpetrating mass casualty attacks at almost the rate seen in 2005 and 2006 while at the same time maintaining a presence in Syria.

In Egypt another pressing issue exists: Since the military unseated President Mohamed Morsi in July 2013, Islamists there feel disenfranchised. Al-Qaeda is interested in winning them over. It is partly for this reason that al-Zawahiri in his “guidelines“ portrays al-Qaeda as a group that will not use excessive violence and has a clear agenda. Egpytian Muslim brotherhood supporters are not natural allies of al-Qaeda, but a more focused, more civil version of that group may be attractive to some. A lot has been written in the past few years about the alleged end of al-Qaeda. Certainly, the US drone campaign has killed many important leaders and diminished the group’s capabilities.

But al-Qaeda is once more proving to be very resilient – because it is able to adapt. Just as it did, for example, at the beginning of the Afghanistan war when the group all but gave up its safe haven and ordered most cadres to go back to their home countries to continue the project from there. This is how AQAP and AQIM came about.

We are presently witnessing another transformation, as al-Qaeda not only shifts focus but also allows for more co-operation and integration with local groups at the expense of micro-management by a central leadership, which can’t be maintained under these circumstances. Of course this transformation comes at a risk: Al-Qaeda is lacking coherence and leadership. In almost every theater there are severe internal conflicts. AQIM has splintered; al-Shabaab assassinates dissident cadres; in Syria al-Qaeda is present with two groups at the same time, one loyal to al-Zawahiri, the other to the AQIM leadership.

All of this has weakened al-Qaeda. The organization is not in good shape – as an organization. But what could be called the global Jihadist movement – with al-Qaeda at its helm – is faring well. The net result is as troubling as it is evident: Al-Qaeda and its allies are as big a threat to global security as they have ever been.

Yassin Musharbash is a Berlin-based investigative reporter and terrorism analyst with the German weekly newspaper Die Zeit.

(c) The Security Times, Yassin Musharbash 

Germany and the NSA

July, 3rd 2013 - There has been a bit of a debate recently in the US and outside about how many terror attacks have actually been prevented by the NSA - or rather: with the help of information and analysis provided by the NSA (not the same thing, obviously). NSA chief Keith Alexander on June 21st in front of the US Congress put the number at 54 cases, 25 of which he said had concerned Europe. 

In at least two cases I can confirm that based on interviews I had with parties who have knowledge of those cases. One case won't be a surprise to many of you: The detection and subsequent arrest of the "Sauerland Cell" in 2007, who had planned attacks in Germany on behalf of the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU). 

The second case is maybe not exactly a surprise either, but was at least not publicly known until now: It is the arrest of the suspected Al-Qaida cell around Abdeladiem El-K., currently standing trial in Düsseldorf for alleged membership in AQ. (I am mentioning this second case in an NSA story in tomorrow's edition of DIE ZEIT.) 

However, there is more. Because from what I learnt it seems that in both cases the key was that the NSA was able to tap into communications of terror organizations in AfPak at senior levels. 

Let's take a look at how the Sauerland Cell investigation started: According to court documents, in November 2006 police in the German state of Baden-Württemberg passed on the following piece of information to the federal police, which it said it had received from the US Airforce Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) in Stuttgart: 

„GERMANY/ PAKISTAN: In late Oct 06, according to sensitive reporting, the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) established direct links to an ethnic Turkish associate in Germany, possibly in the vicinity of Stuttgart. The associate may be either Muaz or Zafer, two ethnic Turks from accordingGermany who attended IJU-sponsored training in Pakistan, beginning in late Jun or early Jul 06. Muaz was known to have completed his training by late Aug 06, at which time he traveled to eastern Iran. Materials describing the manufacture and use of poisons, the assembly of explosives and detonators, as well as other extremlst training Information, may have already been made available to the ethnic Turk in Germany.“

Now I don't know the exact role of AFOSI. But according to my sources, the original information definitely came by way of the NSA. Perhaps that fact for some reason needed to be obscured and information fed into alternative channels. I wouldn't know. But the actual origin of the information seems to have been email communications inside the IJU that the NSA was able to exploit. 

It was suggested to me that this was similar in the case of Abdeladim El-K. Which is especially interesting since he is alleged to have been in touch with Al-Qaida's high ranking operative Younis al-Mauretani, who must be considered as having been responsible for a lot of the Euro Plot Planning in and around 2009. 

To me that seems to make stronger the case of those who argue that targeted tapping is much more effective than trying to find terrorist networks within the haystack of intercepted big data. But in all honesty: I am not a SIGINT expert; I just thought you might find this interesting. 

Cheers, Y. 

The 18th Document, Part II

March, 27th, 2013 - Some of you have asked me whether the Abottabad document that surfaced in a trial here recently and that I have reported about last week had been declassified. I do assume that the U.S. government had to declassify it in some way or another, at least technically, so as to be able to share it with a foreign government. But I am not familiar with U.S. procedures.

However, as far as Germany is concerned, court documents aren't usually made available by the authorities here, and this document hasn't. It is therefor not in the public domain in this country. It was talked about abstractly in the court room, though (I wasn't at the trial in Düsseldorf. But I gather that this must have been the case from some of the reporting from there.)

Be that as it may, since some of you are experts in the field and as such also interested in details, I am happy to share a few more points mentioned in this letter by Abu Yunis al-Mauretani to Osama Bin Laden. They are not as exciting, naturally, as what I ran in my original report. But maybe some of it relates to a question or two some of you might be working on. 

I will do this is a short list of bullet points. But please bear in mind that this does not represent the chronological order or any other order of the actual letter. The document in question somewhat jumps between points, spheres, places and times, so I feel it is justifiable to impose another kind of order on it. 

1.- When al-Mauretani speaks about his plan to have a group of recruits ready to go back to the West and take up work there, he names the following areas of expertise as examples: "Research and Study", Business, Infiltration, secure recruitment, organizing training. So these are categories important to him. It is not entirely clear, however, whether he is talking about actual or imagined recruits possessing those capabilities. 

2.- Repeatedly, he makes it clear that the recruits he is talking about will need time to settle in or find the positions appropriate for their later task. This is clearly a mid term to long term scheme he is discussing. I don't like the term, but what he really seems to be describing is how he plans to plant "sleepers" in the West. 

3.- Al-Mauretani seems to be hinting at Africa as being the place where recruits would (and perhaps re-group) go if something went wrong along the way. In this context he also mentions the Shabaab, making it sound as if there existed (at the time) working relations betweens them and AQc. But again: This passage is not entirely lucid. 

4.- As far as finances go, al-Mauretani makes an interesting hint in that he talks about plans to start companies, preferably in "remote and poor African states" that are far away from conflict. He even suggests bribing government officials. The backdrop of this idea partly seems to be that al-Mauretani feels that in Arab states the security institutions are too aware and too alert. 

5.- Al-Mauretani talks a lot about maritime terrorism and underwater targets or targets in the oceans. But interestingly he also says that there is a huge black market in the open seas and that he would like AQ to profit from it. 

6.- Al-Mauretani in one passage makes an interesting distinction between those recruits who are "willing to assume martyrdom (shahada)" and those who aren't. He evens mentions a "commission for martyr operations". 

7.- In regard to Abu Yahya al-Libi, back then one of AQ's most important cadres and responsible to a large degree for all things theological and ideological, he says: Abu Yahya will "decide personally about an appropriate place" to be at, or will task a third person with finding such a place. I find this interesting as it tells us a little bit about the degree of autonomy of top leadership as regards their whereabouts in the face of drones. 

8.- Al-Mauretani suggests that there was still a degree of book keeping happening between AQc and the branches at the time. 

9.- He also names as one aim the plan to undermine certain Western policies like "We will not negociate with terrorists". He says that the West did just do that in hostage situations in the Maghreb. And this policy will become obsolete one companies would one day directly negotiate with "us". 

Ok, that's it for tonight. Good night. Y. 

The 18th Document Or: News from Abottabad

March 20^th, 2013 - OK, folks, this is an exclusive: Until today the US government has only published 17 of the probably thousands of documents it seized in Abottabad during the raid on Osama Bin Laden. But now an 18^th document has surfaced – and surprisingy enough here in Germany. I have had a chance to study the document. In this Thursday's issue of DIE ZEIT I have a brief report about it, but there is also an extended online version I did for ZEIT ONLINE, already up on the website. If you can't read German, here are some key points.

• The document is a letter by Junis al-Mauretani to Osama Bin Laden, dated March 2010. It is 17 pages in the original Arabic.
• It was sent to German authorities by the US Department of Justice in April 2012 after the Germans had asked if the US did perhaps have any information about three young men standing trial in Düsseldorf at the moment for alleged membership in al-Qaida.
• The reason the US shared this particular document with the Germans is that in it, al-Mauretani refers to a Moroccan recruit whose date of birth he gives - and which is the same as the date of birth of one of the defendants in said trial.
• In essence, the letter is a sketch or rather a vision of a comprehensive plot against the West, including maritime, economical and other sensitive targets. There is a certain emphasis on critical infrastructure, as al-Mauretani singles out water dams, underwater gas pipelines, bridges between cities and tunnels connecting countries, as well as internet cables as potential targets.
• He even suggests to explore underwater pipelines with civil submarines, and he maintains that the pipelines have safety valves every 10 km – a fact, he says, that would need to be taken into account.
• He also says that airborne terrorism is still a possibility but suggests that AQ cadres after learning how to fly should try to get themselves employed (I assume: by airlines). Then they could, he says, for example put their co-pilot to sleep with a seditive and fly the plane into the intended target. As one possible target he suggests the Saudi oil installation at Abqaiq.
• He also claims that there is a process in place by which followers would be asked to enter into sensitive jobs, e.g. in the transport business for oil and gas. By this, he suggests, it could become easier to attack targets like airports, love parades (sic!) and highly frequented tunnels.
• Other operatives would be asked to study physics or chemistry so that they could be made use of at a later time. The term he uses a lot in this respect is „infiltration“.
• There is also an interesting passage in which he claims that AQIM has enough funds to help finance his ideas and that the cadres there trust him personally.
• He also asks OBL to prepare a speech in which he would threaten Europe. This should be done in sync with the operational planning. Around two weeks after the speech, in which he asks OBL to say that patience with the Europeans had run out, the first strike would happen, al-Mauretani says. And shortly after that, the US would be struck.

These are the key facts in the documents. If you are interested in my analysis, I will say the following:

• First of all, the stlye (and some of the content) of the document does seem generally reconcilable with the 17 documents published thus far. For example, Mauretani addresses OBL as "Zamarai". 
• The content also seems to fit rather nicely with information gleaned from other terror trials. It seems to support the notion that AQ was in and around 2010 trying rather hard to plot attacks against the West. For example, two German Jihadists after their apprehension stated that they had met al-Mauretani in Waziristan and that he had spoken about a plot against the West in which no-one would have to die and that it would concentrate on economic targets.
• I have the impression that al-Mauretani was trying to achieve three objectives by his vision: being economically hurtful; being original; and being risk avert.
• The document as such though is not what most in the West would consider a coherent memo. It is much rather the typcal AQ mixture of megalomania and micromanagement that is also reflected in other documents. This is why I call it a vision or attack sketch rather than a plan. There are fairly wild jumps between what I would consider viable ideas (like letting people train how to fly and have them employed by airlines) and the fantastic – like passages about the future military generals of the future Islamic State.
• In essence, the document has definitely great historical value: It offers a rare glimpse into AQ thinking at that ca. 2010. I daresay though that is not operationally important in the now, even if some ideas may have trickled down and be alive elsewhere in the network. This is mainly for four reasons: Al-Mauretani was captured in September 2011; OBL is dead; many recruits from Western countries possibly involved with this very scheme have been arrested; and AQ 2013 is under much more pressure than AQ 2010. And this is not even taking into consideration other factors like the Arab spting and its repercussions.

Apart from the other 17 Abottabad documents, there is one other set of documents that I suggest should be read together with this new letter, and that's the three English documents German authorities believe to stem from AQ core and which were found on a memory device of another terror suspect. I wrote about those documents in March last year on this blog, too. If you then take into consideration what apprehend terror suspects have said in trials or at other occasions, the Euro Plot Scheme of AQ of 2009/2010 becomes almost palpable. I would argue that three aspects of it are now grounded evident due to what we have seen, heard and observed:

1.- Al-Mauretani seems to have been responsible for the reporting to OBL, perhaps the finances, most likely the "grand vision", too. He seems to have wanted to strike economic targets and infrastructure in the West, using Western recruits who he wanted to infiltrate into potentially interesting positions.

2.- AQ during that time actively recruited Westerners - even from among other Jihadist groups like the IMU. I think this means that they wanted this to be large and comprehensive effort - probably sending all of them back around the same time but not striking immediately but rather asking them to recruit even more people and then lie down until told to act. Al-Mauretani in several cases made sure there would be secure means of communications.

3.- The other set of documents seized here in Germany strongly suggest that there was also a Pakistani contingent working inside the larger AQ effort, probably clustered around Rashid Rauf. It could, I believe, also have included Ilyas Kashmiri.

The whole thing, of course, failed in a lot of ways, as you all are aware. But then again: Our visibility is not very good at the moment. So I will only say it is unlikely the Euro Plot is still on the table in its original form.

Lastly, a little aside:

Johannes Pausch, an attorney for one of the defendants, in fact the one possibly mentioned in the document, told me that he was „doubtful“ of the authenticity of the document. He said he couldn't believe that AQ would be careless enough to e.g. put a real date of birth into writing just like that. Today, three FBI agents will be called as witnesses in the Düsseldorf court and they will be asked to describe how the document was seized, transported and logged and who had access to it. This is supposed to help answer questions like: Was the document put into the right context? And did somebody have a theoretical chance to manipulate it?

What I would say in this regard is that in fact there does remain an issue of authenticity. But this issue relates to all of the Abottabad documents. We now know 17 (– well, 18 –) of what are very likely thousands of documents seized on that day in May 2011. Obviously, there is no material acquired by independent sources to compare it against. We have never really seen documents of this kind before. It is therefor near impossible to prove beyond doubt that any of these documents are authentic. We can believe it and work with them. Maybe we even should. And I am certainly not a conspiracy theorist. But for the sake of academic purity I will nonethelesse maintain that there is no proof of authenticity in the true sense of the word.

But be that as it may, I have to say I had a few very interesting days with this one document. And of yourse I am very interested in your thoughts. So, bring it on, please!

(PS. Please bear in mind that this is my private blog. You can't attribute any of it to DIE ZEIT, the paper I work at. At least not without asking.)

Cheers, Yassin  

A Norwegian with the IMU

- August 23rd, 2012: In a recent video publication of the Waziristan based Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) a Norwegian with the nom de guerre Abu Bilal is being featured. I believe it is the first case of a Norwegian featuring in a jihadist video of an internationally known terrorist entity. 

The IMU however, it should be noted, has for the past few years accepted quite a number of so called foreign fighters, most of them from Germany. 

The IMU was virtually unknown in German until when a few years back two German speaking Jihadists appeared in a propaganda video of that group. When I was at SPIEGEL ONLINE, we managed to identify them as two brothers from the German city of Bonn. 

Years later they described in a written statement how they originally hooked up with the IMU: They had been in Yemen before, with Jihadists there. They suggested the two brothers leave for Waziristan as they considered Yemen too dangerous. It so happened that IMU cadres had a role in the transfer and when the two Germans asked what group they‘d be with they were told they were free to choose. They chose the group that helped them into Waziristan - and thus the IMU got hold of their first foreign fighters from a Western country. 

This unforeseeable accident had repercussions, however, because the two brothers soon discovered their talent for PR. German authorities are convinced that a number of Germans who later also joined the IMU did so because of the promises of the two brothers: hospitals, kindergardens, and a so friendly, solid, international community of fighters. 

At the peak there probably were as many as a dozen Germans with the IMU. They took part in fights against the Pakistani Army or raids against the US army in Afghanistan. Several died, in fire fights or by US drone. 

The current state of the IMU is diffcult to estimate from here. But it is probably not too good, even though it is one of the larger enterprises in the area. Foreign Fighters that were caught spoke of a lack of food and resources and a also a high degree of paranoia for spies in the IMU. This bad mood probably played a role when al-Qaida in 2009 and 2010 took over several foreign fighters from the IMU. They probably had more to offer. 

Generally speaking the IMU is rather big and rather dangerous - but also not very internationalist. It seems it mainly focuses on the Pakistani Army. It is not known for plotting actual attacks in the West. (But this of course MAY change according to availability of resources.) 

So if out of seemingly nowhere a Norwegians joins IMU#S ranks, I would personally not be surprised if it turns out that Abu Bilal at some point in the not too far ago past ran into German Radicals. But this is pure speculation. We will probably soon now more about this case. 

Good night, 

Y. 

PS: If you speak Norwegian, I spoke to VG about this today: http://www.vg.no/nyheter/utenriks/terrorisme/artikkel.php?artid=10060228 (Link via @Hilango, request from VG via @lars_akerhaug)