Do we have to talk Scenarios?

June, 10th, 2014 - The take-over of large parts of Mosul by ISIS has huge repercussions, some in the short term, quite a few in the long term. All of them are scary. None of them allow for any side interested in the future of Syria, Iraq or, in fact, the Middle East, to not at least think about possible reactions.

Why? Because Mosul is not any city. It is a big city, it is a commercial centre, it is the gateway to Syria and it is home to a diverse ethnic mix - including many Sunnis, but also Kurds, Christian, Yezids, among other groups. 

As long as ISIS can hold on to Mosul, a major hub is added to the loosely connected chain of islands under ISIS influence, now ranging from the outskirts of Aleppo in Syria to parts of central Iraq. It is telling and concerning that Iraq's security services apparently didn't put up much of a fight but instead seem to have left in a hurry. Given that the state of Iraq didn't manage to regain control over Faluja and Ramadi, I don't see how that is going to happen in the case of Mosul. 

It is going to be vital now what the Kurdish factions decide to do. They are probably the only ones who could make a difference at this point, but I assume they will, for the time being at least, concentrate on protecting the Kurdish areas in the environment of Mosul rather than challenging ISIS full-on. 

Given that, ISIS stands to exploit their seizure of Mosul - which includes, according to reasonable reports, not only weaponry and military vehicles, but also funds. Some of these additional resources will be poured into the Syrian struggle, making life harder for those Syrian rebels fighting the Syrian regime and ISIS at the same time. Those are the immediate repercussions. 

But it is also worthwhile noting that ISIS is coming closer to making good on their promise of statehood (not in any traditional, international law kind of sense, of course). I am ready to call their entity a pseudo-state at this point. Or perhaps even a proto-state. Why is that? Because they have displayed a learning curve as far as governing goes. Wherever ISIS takes control, the following things happen: Implementation of a harsh version Sharia law; supplying citizens with food; changing school curricula; training Imams; offering other services. Recently, e.g., ISIS boasted they had set in place a consumer protection agency. I don't think many Syrians like this style of governance; but they may, in many cases, prefer enduring it to fighting against ISIS. 

Now all of this is concerning enough. But the situation is even more concerning because ISIS isn't and never was about either Iraq or Syria. ISIS (even back then when it was the official Iraqi branch of al-Qaida) was about creating a coherent area of influence, ready to serve as an operational basis. National borders don't mean anything to ISIS. (And it is telling that in the wake of the fall of Mosul, some of their pundits declared the end of the Sykes-Picot-borders). To put in different terms: ISIS isn't fighting against anyone as much as they are trying to gain from the current situation in Iraq and Syria. And they are having successes. The momentum is on their side. 

This is why we may have reached a point where we need to talk about scenarios - because I, for one, believe that this debate will start soon. Who has a mandate, who feels a responsibility, who is capable of taking on ISIS? 

As I see it, no-one within Syria and Iraq has the power by himself to accomplish this. The Iraqi state already failed in Faluja and Ramadi. The Kurdish militias may not be strong enough. Jabhat al-Nusra and their allies in Syria aren't either. 

But allowing ISIS to go on should not be an option. ISIS fighters may not be a large force, but they also shouldn't be underestimated. They will not stop at Mosul. Why should they? So what's next? 

ISIS is currently exercising control over an area almost the size of Belgium. That is enough to have anyone worry. If they consolidate their position, if they are able to move resources and fighters, train fighters and make plans for expansion, they will do just that. The result would be that the problem grows bigger swiftly, with every new territorial gain increasing the risk of terror attacks beyond Iraq and Syria. 

I am not a fan of military inventions, as I have stated here before. I also am convinced that the best moment to intervene in Syria has long, long passed and won't come back. But I also believe that it is silly and ignorant to just close one's eyes in the face of this danger. 

Clearly, there is no power in sight that would at this point in time propagate intervention. However, I daresay that we will wee a debate about deploying US drones to Iraq in Syria soon - as dangerous as that would be, given the densely populated areas we are talking about here. 

I am quite ready to admit that I don't have a solution either. I guess all I am saying is that this problem is not going to go away by itself. So what I would really like to see is an informed debate about options before we find ourselves in a situation where our only option left to us is to discuss measures already taken. 

That means that now is the right time to talk scenarios. Even if we may not enjoy that. 

Al-Qaida revisited

November 15th, 2013 - Folks, the following is an article on the state of al-Qaida in 2013 that I was asked to contribute to the "Security Times", a special edition of the "Atlantic Times". The original online link is here (and the original layout is nicer, of course, too). I hope you enjoy it - and I am excited about your comments. I would also like to thank some of you for your input, namely Leah Farrall, Will McCants, Greg Johnson, Aaron Zelin, Andrew Lebovich and Raffaello Pantucci. Don't hold them responsible for any of what I say here, though - they were just kind enough to comment on the draft! 

In September 2013, al-Qaeda published a five page Arabic document called “General Clarifications for Jihadist Action.“ It was authored by Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Amir or leader of al-Qaeda, who had been Osama Bin Laden’s deputy and became his successor after the Saudi was killed by US Navy Seals in May 2011. The document is fascinating for many reasons, but especially because it isn’t addressed to a Western audience as speeches by al-Qaeda’s leadership often at least partly are for propaganda purposes. Instead it is, in Zawahiri’s own words, addressed to “the leaders of all entities belonging to al-Qaeda and to our helpers and those who sympathize with us” as well as to “their followers, be they leaders or individuals.”

This is a large group of people. And it is noteworthy that al-Zawahiri doesn’t seem to be placing a lot of emphasis on the brand name of his group. Instead everybody is invited to feel addressed. So what is al-Qaeda in 2013? An open network? Or still a hierarchical organization? Is it a network of networks? Or a system of franchise operations?

The truth is that al-Qaeda in 2013 is all of the above. Al-Qaeda can be structured as it is in Yemen. But it is also open, given that the central leadership has repeatedly asked sympathizers in the West to act in its name and on their own initiative. Al-Qaeda’s presence and influence can be obscure as is the case with the co-operation with al-Shabaab in Somalia. Or opaque, as it is in relation to various local Jihadist groups across the Arab world calling themselves Ansar al-Sharia, whose agendas overlap with al-Qaeda’s. Then again, the central leadership can appear like a company’s headquarters, for example when the North African branch, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), reprimands fighters for not filling in forms properly. Wile in other instances al-Qaeda even hides behind other names – like Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria.

At first glance this may seem erratic. But from al-Qaeda’s point of view it is an asset to be able to appear in whatever form may be best at a given place or moment in time. The case of Jabhat al-Nusra, now probably the strongest faction in Syria’s civil war, illustrates that: Even though the group was set up by al-Qaeda in Iraq, it didn’t use that group’s name so as to not alienate Syrians. Only after its support base had solidified, did the group admit to being part of the al-Qaeda nexus.

It is partly by this means that al-Qaeda over the past two years managed to establish bridgeheads in Arab countries destabilized by rebellions. In Libya and in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula for example it is quite evident that al-Qaeda plays a role – in all but name. Should al-Qaeda cadres one day feel they would benefit from the brand name, they will introduce it there.

The exploitation of the unstable situation following the Arab rebellions is currently al-Qaeda’s most important project. At first the uprisings weakened al-Qaeda because the Jihadists had always claimed they would be the ones to cause the fall of the “tyrannical“ Arab regimes, or “the near enemy.” But this ideological defeat has since been compensated for by a huge influx of volunteers, an active role in Syria’s civil war and large areas elsewhere in which the network can operate fairly freely for lack of state control.

After roughly a decade in which al-Qaeda’s main interest was to plot spectacular attacks against Western targets, or “the far enemy,” the pendulum is now swinging back toward the near enemy. This is not only a strategic decision by the central leadership. It is also what most new recruits are interested in.

This is not to say al-Qaeda is no longer interested in launching attacks on the West; Al-Zawahiri called for them. And al-Qaeda’s branch in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP), headquartered in Yemen, is likely still devoting resources to that end. Of all groups in the nexus they have the greatest capabilities to do so. With Ibrahim al-Asiri they have a master bomb maker in their ranks who has already proven his expertise when AQAP tried to down a US jet in 2009 and two cargo planes in 2010. Furthermore, AQAP’s Amir Nasir al-Wuhayshi has recently been promoted to al-Qaeda’s overall Number 2. He will want to prove his ability, and an attack outside the region is hard currency in this regard.

But the focus is now on the Arab world – and on Africa, where the expansion politics of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, started years ago, are now paying off. In the conflict that shook Mali in 2012, AQIM’s fighters played an important role, in alliance with other Jihadist networks. They have been driven out of Mali’s towns since, but are still in the region. In addition, Jihadist veteran and training networks now connect Northern Africa not only with Mali but also with Nigeria. Add to that a large number of weapons that were acquired from the Libyan army’s depots, and it becomes quite clear that a string of African states in which militant Islamists are active may witness eruptions of violence instigated or supported by AQIM in the years to come.

In Somalia meanwhile al- Shabaab may be under pressure; but as the attack on the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya in September 2013 demonstrated, the group is capable of high profile terror attacks. They may have been helped by AQAP. But in either case there is little reason to assume that strikes like this will not happen again as long as African Union forces are fighting al-Shabaab in Somalia.

In the Middle East prospects are equally bleak. The demise of the Assad regime is clearly not the only aim that Jihadists are pursuing in Syria. They want to establish an Islamist proto-state; and they are enthusiastic about the proximity to Israel. Approximately 6,000 non-Syrian Jihadists are currently in the country, many have battlefield experience. They constitute a troubling long-term problem in any scenario. Concerns over what they may plan to do in the future are rising in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey – even more so as al-Qaeda in Iraq is perpetrating mass casualty attacks at almost the rate seen in 2005 and 2006 while at the same time maintaining a presence in Syria.

In Egypt another pressing issue exists: Since the military unseated President Mohamed Morsi in July 2013, Islamists there feel disenfranchised. Al-Qaeda is interested in winning them over. It is partly for this reason that al-Zawahiri in his “guidelines“ portrays al-Qaeda as a group that will not use excessive violence and has a clear agenda. Egpytian Muslim brotherhood supporters are not natural allies of al-Qaeda, but a more focused, more civil version of that group may be attractive to some. A lot has been written in the past few years about the alleged end of al-Qaeda. Certainly, the US drone campaign has killed many important leaders and diminished the group’s capabilities.

But al-Qaeda is once more proving to be very resilient – because it is able to adapt. Just as it did, for example, at the beginning of the Afghanistan war when the group all but gave up its safe haven and ordered most cadres to go back to their home countries to continue the project from there. This is how AQAP and AQIM came about.

We are presently witnessing another transformation, as al-Qaeda not only shifts focus but also allows for more co-operation and integration with local groups at the expense of micro-management by a central leadership, which can’t be maintained under these circumstances. Of course this transformation comes at a risk: Al-Qaeda is lacking coherence and leadership. In almost every theater there are severe internal conflicts. AQIM has splintered; al-Shabaab assassinates dissident cadres; in Syria al-Qaeda is present with two groups at the same time, one loyal to al-Zawahiri, the other to the AQIM leadership.

All of this has weakened al-Qaeda. The organization is not in good shape – as an organization. But what could be called the global Jihadist movement – with al-Qaeda at its helm – is faring well. The net result is as troubling as it is evident: Al-Qaeda and its allies are as big a threat to global security as they have ever been.

Yassin Musharbash is a Berlin-based investigative reporter and terrorism analyst with the German weekly newspaper Die Zeit.

(c) The Security Times, Yassin Musharbash 

Do German Data help the US with Drone strikes?

August 21st, 2013 - The NSA debate is obviously following different patterns in different countries. In Germany, one aspect currently under debate, is whether our foreign intel agency, the Bundesnachrichtendienst or BND, may have supplied SIGINT data to the NSA (or the US in a more abstract way of speaking) that could have or may actually have been used in lethal drone strikes. 

Here is what we think we know so far. The BND, who is obviously also active in Afghanistan, is actively sharing data gleaned from SIGINT operations there with the NSA and/or other US institutions. While that fact is hardly news, the extent to which this happens is - for some of us. According to "DER SPIEGEL" (and based on Snowdon documentation), for example, in the month of December of 2012 alone 500 m. data have been transferred one way or another to the US. The BND has been quoted as saying that they themselves believe that number must include data they seized in Afghanistan, namely a lot of mobile phone tracking data the BND is scooping up there. 

The "Süddeutsche Zeitung" recently added to that, reporting that the BND shares Afghan mobile phone numbers with the US in bulk. (And the associated data, I would assume. But I can't prove that.) 

The "Süddeutsche" as well as "DER SPIEGEL" raised the question of whether theses data may have been used in programming targets for drone strikes against assumed terrorists in AfPak. According to several media, the BND seems to be reasonably certain they haven't. For one, they say they never transfer data without stressing that they can't be used for things like torture or sentencing someone to death. (A bit academic, I know, but apparently they state that every single time.) The BND is also on record saying that the mobile phone data they provide are not precise enough for targeting. 

I am not an expert on targeting or target programming. But I would like to think common sense dictates that mobile phone data of a suspect do help quite a bit to figure out his whereabouts. And I have no doubts the US is ready to and can take it from there. 

I have a former CIA analyst on the record, telling me: "I doubt that any german official could credibly make a blanket claim that their intelligence has never assisted with a lethal drone strike". He also said: "It's a war, for crying out loud! If German intelligence is not passing along the best possible information that helps protect NATO forces in Afghanistan from attack--including locational information used to target hostile forces--then they are simply not doing their job." (First bit of that quote is in tomorrow's edition of DIE ZEIT, where I work.)

In a German context, if it ever were established as a fact that German data were used to program a lethal drone strike, there would be an outcry - partly because there have been at least to Jihadists from Germany killed by US drones; but mainly because hardly anyone here, including the government, will condone lethal drone strikes. They are largely considered extra-legal. And definitely as something you don't want to be associated with. 

For me this is one of the questions raised in the course of the Snowdon Leaks that I consider important in a German context. Ironically, as I understand it, the BND, even if he wanted to, wouldn't even be able to find out if their data have ever been crucial for an actual strike. Because the US would very likely not even tell them. 

In any case, be assured that I will be following this trail. And if one of you ever comes across anything outside of Germany that may help getting closer to an answer, do let me know! 

Cheers, Y. 

Obama in Berlin

June 19th, 2013 - When Barack Obama spoke in Berlin in 2008, I was there. As one in a crowd of what I think where 200.000 people. It was a nice, sunny day, just like today, there was beer and hope. Both in large quantities. Obama's speech was awesome. Inspiring. A portrayal of a world he wanted to help become real. I was one of those Europeans who would have voted for him if only we had been allowed to. I also would have voted for him as Secretary General of the United Nations. Or captain of the Enterprise, for that matter. I just felt that he was a man who could bring about change. Actual and real change. He was the antidote to George W Bush. To cynicism. To anything evil, wicked, twisted.

Today Obama was in Berlin again. I am four years older, as is Obama, as is the world. He spoke in front of 4000 selected people, I wasn't one of them. I listened to the live stream instead. It was still a good speech by many standards. It didn't stir any of the emotions I had in 2008.

I am not naive. I have a reasonable understanding of what a US president can achieve. This is not about blame. Or even disappointment. At least not on a purely emotional level.

But the thing with today's speech is that I felt Obama was trying to sell us cheaply. I mean, honestly, as nice as it sounds to diminish the US and Russian nuclear arsenal: That just is not one of the hot issues in international politics right now. Today is about Syria much more than about that. About the repercussions of drone warfare. About civil liberties vis a vis eavesdropping. Guantanamo. Pakistan. The Middle East. TURKEY.

Obama touched on most of that - a little. But he offered no vision, he instilled no hope or optimism, he didn't chart a course, he didn't inspire anyone on any of these issues today.

Maybe that's asking for too much. Really, it may be. He is not my president, after all. He is not almighty. He can't walk on water.

But I do still feel entitled to a stake in what he says and does. He is a Nobel Peace Laureate! When he was awarded that prize I remember saying to a friend that I wished he would not accept it - and declare instead that he would gladly do so AFTER his term or his two terms in office. When he felt he had earned it.

I know I am leaving out a lot of perspectives here, for one: the US domestic one.

But since many of those who will read this will be Americans, I thought you might be interested in what it feels like to be an Obama fan in Europe - and be somewhat disappointed.

I guess I am disappointed because I didn't get a sense of how he was re-defining his grand vision and ideas now that he is on the job. I would have been very happy with him admitting that things aren't easy, that it is all about finding partners and taking small steps.

But that's not what I heard today.

What I heard was another set of grand ideas, as if nothing had changed. As if he was still a candidate.

And THAT is why I somehow didn't feel that I was being taken seriously.

I would still vote for Barack Obama if I could.

But I also wish I would have been more impressed than I was today.