How Germany plans to strip Jihadists of their Citizenship

March 5th, 2019 - The German Ministries of Interior and Justice have come to a basic understanding about how they want to try and strip German jihadists of their citizenship. Because this is by no means a trivial matter, I thought it might be useful to describe their plan in a some detail.

1.- It's not a new plan 

The current grand coalition government has already agreed in principle to tackle this issue in their co-operation agreement upon forming a government. But until now they didn't get around to passing the respective law (or more precisely: to amend the citizenship law).

One reason for the delay is that, according to the Ministry of Justice (led by the Social Democrats) the Ministry of Interior (led by the Conservatives) demanded changes that went beyond what had been agreed upon in the coalition's co-operation agreement.

In the light of the problem surrounding the German IS population now being held in Syria in SDF camps, the issue became more pressing, resulting in declarations from both ministers that they found enough common ground to start the process.


2.- Three basic principles 

What the ministers have agreed upon, are three basic principles. They want to amend the law in such a way that the citizenship can be revoked if all of the following conditions apply:

a) person in question is older than 18 years;

b) person in question must hold at least one other citizenship, as German law forbids it to render anyone stateless;

c) person in question must have participated in battle on behalf of a "terror militia".

In addition to this it is clear that the law will only apply to future cases. So the current inmates in Syria and Iraq won't be affected no matter what.


3.- Problems of scope and definition 

Beyond the fact that an agreement has been declared, nothing definite has been put into writing. What does exist, however, is a draft for an amendment of the respective law, authored by the Ministry of the Interior. That ministry clearly expects their document to be the document of reference in the process. But it is not entirely clear that the Ministry of Justice concurs. Technically, this draft is currently in the process of reconciliation between the two ministries.

In my view, this draft contains several passages that warrant further debate. Let me give you a few examples:

a) What is a "terror militia"?

The draft document defines a terror militia as an "entity organized in a paramilitary fashion that pursues the aim of violently annihilating the structures of a foreign state and erect in it's stead new state structures or structures similar to those of a state in a manner that contradicts international law." (Translation is mine; original German version can be found in my ZEIT ONLINE article here.)

In my view, this definition fits IS almost perfectly. It does not, however, fit Al-Qaeda or Al-Shabaab, to name just two Jihadist organizations that have access to foreign fighters, all that well. Do we need a "Lex Daesh" - or rather a law that covers all Jihadist terrorist organizations? (On the other hand: if you leave the definition too open, you could end up with the problem of criminalizing the joining of groups that aren't that problematic.)

b) What if "the other state" also revokes citizenship?

What happens if Germany strips a dual German-Egyptian citizen of his German nationality, and then Egypt does the same thing - have we then not rendered him stateless at least in an indirect manner? Until now, I have not heard a good answer to this possible dilemma.

c) What if "the other state" is not a state of law? 

Let's say "the other state" does not revoke the citizenship but is very keen to receive our fictional formerly German foreign fighter - because that state wants to torture him or lock him away forever or sentence him to death? Does there not exist some degree of  responsibility on the part of Germany to prevent such treatment?

Right now, the Ministry of Interior insists that if they have it their way, this problem would not be a factor at all: German citizenship would be revoked without assessing individual repercussions.


d) Will there be legal recourse? And who calls the shots anyway? 

The Ministry of Interior says they imagine some way of legal recourse against the decision would be available. But I assume that would be theoretical mostly - since the law is aimed at people living abroad who won't be able to return to Germany after the revocation of citizenship. So it's safe to say that it's going to be very complicated to take legal action against this decision.

A decision that will be taken by ... who exactly? According to the draft amendment the decision would be up to the administrative bodies of each the 16 German states.

But here is a problem I see: It is already hard for German courts of law to prove that foreign fighters participated in a battle. How will these bodies be able to determine this with much less expertise and access to specialized resources at their hands? Will a picture on Facebook with a gun in your hand be enough? Or the statement of somebody who claims to have fought alongside of you?

All these are open questions right now.


4.- What will happen next? 

A lot depends on the Ministry of Justice now, as the ball in their court: they are expected to send comments on the draft back to the Ministry of Interior. So they have to make up their minds about how much debate and conflict they want to invite or risk - especially given that there is public pressure to get this amendment passed.

I don't want to make predictions here, but I would not be surprised if the Ministry of Justice will declare they do have a few issues with the current draft.

In fact I hope so.

I think the draft can be and ought to be improved.

What US intel knows about Anis Amri's relation to IS in Libya - and their relation to IS Central

March 1st, 2019 - I recently had a chance to study a secret three page memo produced by German domestic intelligence agency BfV (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) in January of 2017. The document contains notes from an analysis authored by their US intelligence counterparts on "the role of IS Libya in regard to the attack of December 19th 2016 in Berlin", which of course is the van attack on a Christmas market in the German capital by Tunisian citizen Anis Amri that killed twelve people.

Together with my colleagues at DIE ZEIT, I have published extensively on Anis Amri, his background, his attack and it's preparation (see here and here, e.g., both articles in German).

But the BfV memo does contain some new information that is actually quite interesting, especially as it sheds some light on the hitherto speculative nature of the relationship between IS in Libya and IS central in Syria.

Original IS central claim of responsibility for Berlin attack

What we knew until now was that Anis Amri in his attempt to join up with IS resorted to contacting Tunisian extremists, some of which he very likely knew from back home. More than once Amri made it clear in his messages that he was willing to conduct a terror attack in Germany but felt he needed guidance. The Tunisian IS members he corresponded with, some of whom were fighting with IS Libya in Libya at the time, promised him they would put him in touch with an authorized handler.

Finally found: Some missing pieces of the Puzzle

In the end, they managed to do just that: A mysterious man with the nickname "Moumou1" got in touch with Amri, supplied him with a pdf brochure addressing willing terrorists and chatted with him until and even during the day of the attack. Amri even sent "Moumou1" a picture from inside the van after he had taken control of it and killed the driver, only moments before he crashed it into the crowd at the Christmas market.

"Moumou1" has since been identified somewhat confidently by German and Tunisian investigators as a Tunisian citizen who was and likely still is involved with IS Libya in Libya. So we know for a fact that Amri had a relation with IS Libya. But in fact, we also only know for sure that he had a relation with IS Libya. We do not know that he ever had a personal connection with IS central in Syria, even though IS central claimed responsibility for his attack a day after it happened and published a video taped by Amri prior to the attack in which he offered his Bai'a to IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi on December 23rd. We had, until very recently, no idea whatsoever how it came about that IS central got to claim the attack and publish the video.

Now some of the missing pieces of the puzzle are available through the secret memo:

According to the document, US intel informed their German colleagues that a media representative of IS Libya named "Rashid" "informed core IS about the role of IS Libya in the attack and co-ordinated the public claim of responsibility by IS". This means that IS Libya got in touch with HQ in Syria right after the attack and offered to IS central that HQ take credit for it (rather than claim it for themselves).

In addition to this, the memo states that according to US intel, IS central in Syria was expecting more attacks by IS Libya since "requirements for media post-production for future attacks were addressed" between the two IS structures.

US intelligence, according to the Germans, believed that IS central in Syria interpreted the Berlin attack as proof that IS Libya way capable of their own external operations planning.

(If you allow me a little aside here: To me, this relation between HQ and an aspiring branch is strikingly reminiscent of the kind of relation that AQ central had with AQAP for a while.)

Amri sent a second video to IS Libya 

A last piece of detail in the memo that deserves our attention is about a hitherto unknown second video by Anis Amri. I already mentioned the video that we all know and that was published by IS central on December 23rd 2016. But the memo states that according to US intelligence a second video was received by IS Libya on October 23rd, 2016.

Unfortunately, US intel doesn't seem to know what's on that video, but clearly the assumption is that it might be similar in intent, meaning that Amri may have made up his mind about wanting to actually commit an attack by that date at the latest.

Until know, German investigators assumed the earliest date they could establish for Amri having decided upon an attack was either October 31st or November 1st, 2016: the dates on which according to their technical investigation Amri's other video must have been taped.

I for one am very curious if we will ever get to see that second video. Maybe it was not up to the standards that Amri's comrades expected, and in that case it will never be shown. But maybe they will publish it on the occasion of some anniversary of the attack - like AQ did with previously unknown video testimony of members of the 9/11 cell even years after the attack.

They mystery of Amri's friend Bilel B. 

Be that as it may, but let me conclude by bringing you up to date on a few aspects of the Amri saga that have recently been debated in Germany and have led to some confusion in the media.

One German magazine recently ran an article claiming that Amri's friend Bilel B., who was a suspected co-conspirator for almost a year and sent back to Tunisia in Februar 2017 in spite of that fact, was in fact an asset of Moroccan intelligence. It went on to suggest that Bilel B. was spirited away to Tunisia in order to cover this all up.

No proof was offered to back up this proposition. So what to make of it?

I will put it this way: I have read around a hundred thousand pages of documents relating to the investigation and no-where was there any indication that this might be the case. Also, German officials said on and off the record they have no information to that effect.

Another allegation was that a video existed that allegedly shows Bilel B. as a knocks down a bystander with a wooden two-by-four in the immediate aftermath of Amri's attack in order to open up the way for Amri to flee. And that this tape was also being hidden.

While a bystander was in fact hurt (and is still in a coma), German officials have stated very clearly that no footage exists that would place Bilel B. at the scene at that time.

I concur with that in that I am also not aware of any such footage.

This is not to say Bilel B. didn't know anything about the attack. He very well may have: He met Amri on the evening before for dinner. He is a hardened Jihadist. He took pictures of the exact place that Amri drove through with his van - but months earlier.

But there is no proof that Bilel B. was a co-conspirator. I am afraid, we may never know for certain. Maybe German authorities should not have shipped him to Tunisia in such a hurry but spent a little more time looking into him. But that's another story. (And one that I might well come back to.)

Anyway, thanks for stopping by and bye-bye!

PS: Here is the link to my story about the BfV Memo for ZEIT ONLINE (German). 

Edit: Due to a spelling mistake, it said that there was "now" proof that Bilel B. was a co-conspirator, but it should have said "no" and was corrected. 

How ISIS will react to the Mosul Offensive

October 18th, 2016 - In recent weeks I have had the chance to speak to several knowledgable and interesting people. I can't identify most of them by name and therefore won't identify any of them just to be on the safe side.

Suffice it to say that one of them says of himself that he is an ISIS member (full bai'a and all); that two more consider themselves supporters of ISIS and know a number of people who formally joined and/or are currently in Syria or Iraq; that another two are former Baath era military officers and that three of them are members of Syrian rebel groups.

Of course this is a group of truly varied backgrounds. The interesting thing, however, is that they largely agreed on how ISIS has prepared for the battle of Mosul and what might be happening next.

This is what they largely agree on:

* ISIS will not waste a significant number of fighters in the defense of Mosul. The lowest estimate was as low as 300.

* ISIS will try and make the unavoidable fall of Mosul as expensive as possible for the attackers: They will encounter massive amounts of booby traps; perhaps snipers.

* ISIS will try and exfiltrate into a) those desert areas of Iraq that are close to communities where there is a certain degree of tacit or open support for them and b) those areas of Syria and Iraq still under their control including some that have probably been prepared for that purpose in advance like al-Qaim but also the lesser known area of Bir Qassab in Syria.

* ISIS will not be destroyed by the loss of Mosul at all but is quite capable of surviving and perhaps even making a come-back after a while, especially when Mosul and the liberated areas can't be pacified properly.

* Foreign fighters of ISIS will have a hard time leaving the theatre of war: Most of their passports would have been burnt a long time ago, most of their governments know them and would immediately arrest them. This means they will either die fighting or try and lay low with the local contingent.

* ISIS will soon return to guerrilla tactics, especially in Iraq, attacking "everyone not IS" with all means possible, ranging from sniping attacks to IEDs and skirmishes.

Some of this may not be super exciting stuff and you may have come across it elsewhere. But I found it interesting that a group that diverse would agree on so many things.

An Analysis of 3000 Islamic State Entry Documents

April 7th, 2016 - I have recently had a chance to take a good look at just over 3000 foreign fighter entry documents of the "Islamic State" (IS), a collection that I believe to be partly or even largely identical to the ones that Zaman al-Wasl, SkyNews and several German media have reported about a few weeks ago. I have published an analysis of these documents in today's new issue of DIE ZEIT, the paper I work for. The article can be found online here, but is entirely in German.

For the sake of non-German speakers, I have decided to share my main findings in English here.

I have used two approaches in analyzing the documents. One is a systematic, number-based approach, one is an anecdotal approach. I believe both to be revealing in their own way.


1.- The forms itself 

The forms are standardized and they ask for answers to 23 questions. The IS wants to know about the real name and the kunya of the recruit, they ask for the name of the mother, nationality, date of birth, the blood typ, the point of border crossing, an address, prior Jihad experience and specializations, among other things. Two questions are multiple choice: Does the recruit want to become a) a fighter, b) a suicide bomber or c) an Inghimasi. And the recruit is asked to classify his level of Sharia literacy: a) weak or b) medium or c) student/scholar level. Recruits are also asked for an address or phone number to contact in the case of their deaths. And lastly, there is a column called "comments", which IS cadres have in some cases used to add interesting additional information.



2.- "Statistical" findings

The IS cadres who filled in the forms where not all equally diligent. In many cases, the forms are not fully complete. Also the ways in which answers have been taken down are not 100 per cent coherent. So it can happen that someone who has the kunya "Abu XYZ al-Almani" may not have listed an address in Germany or a German nationality, but a phone number in Tunisia. Is he to be considered a German? And if not: What then?

It is therefor only possible to reach conclusions that cannot be considered hard statistical science. I have nonetheless tried to work the numbers as much as I could.

Here are the most important results:

• Just under ten per cent offer to die as suicide bombers ("Istishhadi"). Even less want to be an Ighimasi. The vast majority opts to become a "fighter" ("muqatil"). 
• Roughly three quarters think of their own knowledge of Sharia as "weak". 
• The large majority of recruits is aged between 20 and 30 and appears to have had no real jobs or jobs that require little training or have had no advanced schooling. 
• The biggest contingents reflected in the documents are from Tunisia and Saudi Arabia, followed by Libya, Morocca and Egypt. 

3.- Anecdotal observations 

The "comments" that IS cadres added are very revealing even if they are very diverse. Each entry consists of a few words only but sometimes feel like a short story, giving us an idea of the personalities attracted to the IS.

Following is a small list of such comments I found particularly interesting:

• "Used to be with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan for 5 years"
• "Can see very well, even in the night, ma shah Allah!" 
• This brother came spontaneously after he met other brother at the airport who were on their way here
• Used to be with Jabhat al-Nusra 
• Radar operator! 
• "Important ** has chemical experience"
• This brother has buried 400 moroccan dirhams in Europa before he travelled here
• The effects of this brother are meant as a present for the Mujahidin when he dies (these effects are listed as 2 phones and 4000 euros worth of currency)
• "Has switched to 'suicide bomber'"
• His parents are to be notified of his death, but without mentioning it was a suicide bombing 
• "Please tell my father and my mother to forgive me"
• trained on a 23 cannon 

If one looks at the backgrounds and prior occupations of the recruits, other interesting find can be made. Here are a few examples: 

• a former Kuwaiti soldier
• a former Saudi soldier
• a former Cairo Imam 
• an ex soccer player
• an unemployed truck driver with six kids
• a student of Sharia from an Islamic university 

4.- A careful Assessment 

3.000 out of what are possibly 30.000 IS fighters is a pretty good sample but there may be serious distortions we don't know of and we can't say if our sample is fully representative.

Certainly the sample contains little in the way of sensations, even though known terrorists are among those whose entry forms are available like Mohamed Belkaid, recently killed in a Brussels raid. Much rather, the sample solidifies some of our assumptions.

Further research into these docs is needed, for example in order to find out who travelled to the IS with who, something that is especially interesting in regard to European foreign fighters and the terrorist network they have established between France and Belgium.

The anecdotal observations give un an idea of the spectrum we can find within the IS: veterans of Jihad next to beginners, professionals next to scared people, educated and skilled people next to untrained and probably not very intelligent recruits. Not all of these will turn out to be master warriors, master terrorists or even master administration officials.

I want to conclude this brief post with two quotes. I asked Leah Farrall of Sydney University, a true expert on the history of Jihadism and an author of a great book (The Arabs at War in Afghanistan) for her opinion on the administrative behavior of the IS. Here is what she said:

Al Qaeda bureaucratised the jihad long before Isis, which benefited from inheriting many of its forms and processes when the two split. Poorly organised terrorist groups have short life spans. Al Qaeda turns 30 next year. The mixing of bureaucratised jihadis with former regime elements makes for an even more paperwork driven organisation.

And I asked Thomas Hegghammer of the FFI and Oslo University, who has focused on Foreign Fighters and Jihadist Culture in his work, about what he thinks these anecdotes tell us. He said this:

The files show that the foreigners come from a wide range of backgrounds and bring different skill sets, but they expect the same outcome: death. They also show that IS is combing the recruit population for special skills or connections for use in operations. 

I fully agree with both of them.


Let the debate begin!

 

Syrian Elephants in the Room

November 29th, 2015 - I acknowledge that the Paris attacks have changed the debate. I understand why France chose to retaliate with air strikes on Raqqa, one of the in fact two capitals of the "Caliphate" the "Islamic State" (IS) pronounced last year. I even get why the German government has decided to support France and all the other countries bombing the IS with reconnaissance capabilities.

However, there still are two elephants in the room when we are discussing fighting the IS, and they ought to be addressed.

The first problematic issue, the first elephant if you so want, is that the IS exists in Syria AND Iraq. Russian President Vladimir Putin has seen to it that currently most politicians in the West talk and argue as if the Caliphate was a problem that is inextricably linked to the fate of "president" Bashar al-Assad. Well, it is not.  As a matter of fact, consider these two things:

1.- If the IS were to be driven out of all Syrian territory tomorrow, with - for argument's sake -  the help of Putin, Assad, the US, all Arabs: Would the IS be defeated? - Clearly not.

2.- If Assad stays in power or not, how much of a difference does it make in terms of the chances of the IS to survive? - Clearly: very little.

What does that mean? It means this: The political future of Syria and the demise of the IS are in fact two mostly separate issues. I know this is counter-intuitive. But looking at it in this way makes the choices in front of us much easier. We do not need Assad to finish the IS. Period.

Which leads me to the second elephant in the room: The fact that the ongoing discussion of whether there should/might/can be a role for Assad or one of his relatives or proxies in the future as a leader of an interim Syrian government that would in one way or another include opposition forces and at a later point in time hand over power to that opposition seems to be based on the idea that Syria still somehow is a state and will be a single united state in the future.

Well... as much as I would like that as somebody who really loves Syria and the Syrians, I believe we should face the possibility that partition, de facto or de jure, is the more likely scenario. Because here is the thing:

1.- Assad is not going to get all of Syria back.
2.- The opposition is not going to be able to get all of Syria under it's control.

This is not purely a matter of military might. It also has to do with legitimacy. Assad has killed hundreds of thousands, but there are millions who support him inside Syria and wish for him to stay in power. It is a fact. These people are spread over a largely coherent mass of land in the country. Most of the rest of the country (not counting IS territory) is strongly against Assad and will not accept a future tole for him or one of his proxies. He has a lot of actual legitimacy in one part of Syria and almost zero legitimacy in the rest of the country.

To put it another way: What if the question is the wrong one? Should we really be discussing a role for Assad for all of Syria at this point in time? I don't think so. But do those people who staunchly support him have a right to be heard? Well, I am not fond of admitting it, but I think they do. (I am saying that even though I personally think he needs to be sent to The Hague.)

It all boils down to this: What is better, a real ceasefire with a de facto partition? Or an agreement pertaining to the whole of Syria, but one that is going to be so feeble that the likelihood it will just jumpstart another round in this terrible war is rather big?

I know, I know, I haven't even discussed the Kurdish issue. And I haven't offered any ideas on Iraq. But hey, there are just a few thoughts.

Good night, Y.

What should we make of the IS claim of responsibility?

1.- Does the incident at all look like a possible "Islamic State" attack? 

I would put it this way: Downing a Russian airliner is quite conceivably something that the "Islamic State" would be wanting to achieve right now, given that the Russian air force has, among other groups, also hit the IS in recent airstrikes in Syria.

2.- What exactly has the "IS" claimed this far? 

The most important item so far is the written claim of responsibility put out via IS and pro IS Twitter channels. It is in the name of the "Sinai Province" of the IS, of which we know that it actually exists. The format and style of the claim also resemble what we have been seeing in recent months, not only on a daily basis from within IS territories in Syria and Iraq, but also when IS "wilayat" or "provinces" (meaning branches) claimed certain attacks, for example in Kuwait or Tunisia earlier this year. This written claim is therefor either authentic or a fairly sophisticated fake.

In this claim, the IS Sinai province says that "soldiers of the Caliphate" had managed to down the Russian jet, killing all of the "Russian Crusaders" on board. It makes reference to the Russians killing scores of people in Syria every day and goes on to state that the Russians and their allies won't be safe in Muslim lands or in the skies above them.

The IS Headquarters, however, seems to have elevated this claim to another level when it put out an audio version of the claim later today. This audio is a verbatim of the written claim but was published by the official IS radio station "al-Bayan", meaning that the IS central command or Headquarters or leadership or whatever you want to call it echoed the claim of the Sinai Jihadists and thus documented that they thought it was credible enough to amplify it.

Apart from that, the claim was also run prominently on the website of al-Shmukh, a top tier Jihadist internet forum. If they run it, they also think it is likely true.



Then there is, thirdly, a rather obscure video of 20 seconds length. As far as I can see, it was taken off YouTube already, but there is still an embedded version of it to be found here.

In this short clip, a plane is shown that eventually drops out of the sky, apparently hit by a missile or rocket or blown apart by an onboard explosive device. I don't think that anyone can confirm at this point that this video even shows the Russian plane in questions. This video is even more obscure because it carries no audio claim, but features, at the very beginning, the logo of the IS province in the Sinai - albeit an outdated version of it.

This makes me very skeptical of the authenticity of this particular video.





3.- Is the claim by the IS Sinai province credible? 

First of all, it is important to note that the IS Sinai Province claim doesn't contain a single shred of information that would reveal insider knowledge of the attack or the modus operandi. No weapon system is mentioned, no information on what exactly it was that brought the jet down is offered. That is usually not a good sign.

Secondly, a lot of people who know more about jets and weapon systems than I do are saying that the plane was flying much too high for the IS to be able to hit it with the most advanced system at their disposal, which apparently are man pads. I will not weigh in, as this is a technical discussion. But as far as I understand we don't know yet if the jet was perhaps brought down by an explosive device onboard the plane - which leaves us with the theoretical possibility that the IS brought one there. These questions may, however, soon be answered by experts with access to the flight recorder, etc.

What makes me wonder in regard to the credibility of the claim is another thing: The IS usually doesn't lie. It does lie, to be sure, but not as a rule. And as a rule of thumb I believe it is fair to say that the bigger the operation or attack in question, the less likely it has been (so far, at least) that the IS was presenting a complete lie. This record is not impeccable, as especially in the beginning of the IS's expansion in Syria it seems that the IS was sometimes quite happy to claim responsibility for other groups' attacks.

However, the IS HQ is taking a risk here by amplifying the claim published by their Sinai group if it turned out to be a lie. Retaining credibility is of great concern to Jihadist groups: you can quickly loose support and supporters if you are caught claiming stuff you didn't do. It is not sustainable.

Bearing this in mind, I am wondering if the IS for some reason may really believe it was them - even if in reality it may not have have been them. Sounds crazy, I know. Just a thought.

4.- So, what should me make of all of this?  

That's easy:

* This incident should NOT be counted as an IS terror attack (yet).
* We should consider the written claim of responsibility by the IS Sinai province as quite possibly authentic, but not beyond doubt. Furthermore we should bear in mind that even if authentic, it can still be false or untruthful.
* We need to look closely at what the technical investigations will tell us.
* We should look out for IS publications containing credible pieces of insider information.

How to (not) deal with Jihadist propaganda on the Web

October 9th, 2014 - Jihadists may dream about the world as it was in the 7th century on the Arabian Peninsula, but making use of the internet never was a problem for them. They look at it as Godsend. The most democratic of mass media is also the most effective tool for spreading Jihadist propaganda. Is it possible to take this tool away from the Jihadists? 

The short answer, of course, is: No. 

Granted, it has become more difficult for the "Islamic State" in particular to maintain an organized online presence. In June the IS had a Twitter account for every single one of its "provinces", through which the organization spread communiqués, propaganda, pictures and videos. When Twitter shut down these accounts in September, the IS accounts migrated to the Russian Facebook-style Social Media website VK. Two weeks later VK shut these accounts down, too. Until today, the IS hasn't come up with a new, comparable system of accounts. But the material that the group wants to publish still finds it's way. Partly through some of the Jihadist web forums that have performed this function for years now. Partly through other, personal Twitter accounts that are less easy to connect to the IS. And these are just two ways that still work. There are more. They are a bit less obvious now, but if you know what you are looking for and if you are smart enough to change your searching parameters a little, you will find what you are looking for sooner or later. "It's even possible", says Aaron Zelin, a US-based terrorism researcher who also runs the blog jihadology.net for primary-source material, "that they (the Jihadists) might try and create their own platform in the future." 

The EU now seems to be looking into ways to at least minimize the spread of such propaganda. Yesterday, a dinner took place in Luxembourg, to which the parting EU home affairs commissioner Cecilia Malmström had not only invited the EU ministers of interior affairs but also representatives of some of the bigger internet corporations and providers like Google, Facebook, YouTube and Twitter. I haven't heard about any results of the meeting yet. But a spokesperson for the Commission told me ahead of the dinner that the aim was to foster dialogue between law enforcement and intelligence agencies on the one side and private internet companies on the other side. The idea was to look at "tools and techniques to respond to terrorist online activities". 

I think it is important to understand that talking to the big internet companies may help to limit the spreading of Terrorist propaganda on mainstream platforms. But it will not help stop it altogether. The example mentioned above illustrates that: You may be able to get official IS accounts off Twitter; but already now many of the videos in question are being uploaded to opaque hosting websites that law enforcement has a very hard time identifying, let alone prosecuting. "It does make sense to talk to Facebook, YouTube and Twitter", says Nico Prucha from the Vienna University. "But the other side would have to be equally well connected in order to effectively limit the flow of propaganda." 

Unfortunately, it isn't. And more than that: It is biased, too, consciously or not. Twitter and YouTube have for years not done very much at all to stem Jihadist propaganda. It was the videos of the murders of US journalists James Foley and Stephen Sotloff that seem to have turned the tide. I tried it: It has become very difficult indeed to find the original full-length videos of their murders on the web. But it is still fairly easy to find the arguably more influential, very glossy and high profile recruiting and propaganda videos "Breaking of the Borders", "Upon the Prophetic Methodology" or "Flames of War". 

The EU, however, seems to also be looking at a second way: Countering the propaganda's content rather than it's publication. Or as Malmström's spokesperson put it to me: a "particular regard to the development of specific counter-narrative initiatives" was to be given at the dinner. 

I personally don't like the notion of "counter-narratives". I know the term has been around for a while. And I understand why it looks like a tempting idea: It seems easy to debunk and de-mistify a a lot of the claims that Jihadists make in their propaganda. But the problem is two-fold. For one, no Western state authorities have any credibility among those that are being targeted by IS propaganda; they would very likely just laugh at such attempts. And secondly: Who would formulate such counter-narratives, based on what authority? Is it, for example, conceivable that the EU lets the world know what a proper interpretation of Koranic verses is and what is not? 

In January 2011 I was at a CT conference in Riyadh, Saudi-Arabia. "Counter-Narratives" were being discussed there, too. In more than just one session. On the second day, I asked the interpreter in his cabin, who was translating between the English and the Arabic, how he rendered the term "counter-narrative" into Arabic. He said he used the word "tashih". Now that means "correction". That's a very different thing from what other people have in mind when they talk about counter-narratives. In Germany, for example, officials tell me that they would like to spread the message that democracy gives everyone the opportunity to play a part in the shaping of a country's policies. I doubt that the Saudis see that as a good counter-narrative. One person's counter-narrative can be very different from another person's counter-narrative. And we have no guarantee that any one of them will work. (In a way, but that's just an aside, the US State department's "Think again, turn away" campaign on Twitter is a kind of counter-narrative initiative. I don't think it is a huge success.) 

Also, I have another, more general problem with the term: I think it is too defensive. Why is "our" narrative the "counter-narrative"? Isn't "theirs"?

So what can we do? I believe we have to accept that Jihadists will be around online for as long as there is a free internet. And in fact, for many researchers and even law enforcement and intelligence agencies, this is an important keyhole through which they can better understand the Jihadists' thinking. 

By this, I am not saying that it is necessarily wrong to try and make it more difficult for Jihadists to gain access to large numbers of people, among them potential sympathizers. But I do say this: Online presence isn't the biggest problem. Even if it were possible to block the Jihadists' access to the internet entirely, they would still be around. In the real world. 

It's a tool. It is not where they live. 

NOTE: This blog post is an extended and somewhat different version of an article I published in this week's edition of DIE ZEIT. If you wish to quote from it, please contact me. 

5 Things we don't know about the Caliphate

August 26th, 2014 - Right now, a lot of people (and media) are asking for information on the "Islamic State", the "Caliphate" of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and other things related to Jihadist activities in Syria and Iraq. That's perfectly understandable. But while I am answering as many of these questions as I can, I think it is equally important that we (and by "we" I mean those of us who have followed events there since, let's say, the days of Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi) don't forget that there are a whole lot of questions we can't answer (even if these are not the questions we are usually asked).

So in the interest of self-discipline, academic transparency and self-questioning, here is a brief list of the five most important things we (or I, at least) do not know about the Caliphate, but really wish I knew:

1.- How important is the role of al-Baghdadi?

He is obviously the poster guy of IS, but in what ways does he direct operations, how much power of command does he yield, and what is his relation to his deputies and field commanders, given that at least some of them are apparently former Ba'ath regime military men? How much initiative are commanders in the field allowed? Have rules been laid out of whether or not and if so how to execute people - and if so, before or after the first instances occurred? Mind you, I haven't read a single article in which even three commanders of IS have been plausibly named. But understanding the extent of al-Baghdadi's control and wether he is all micro or macro would be very helpful indeed.

2.- Is there a plan for expansion of the "Caliphate"?

And by that a mean: A real, tangible one, not the ideological version. In propaganda videos, all sorts of targets are being named: Samarra, Najaf, Baghdad in Iraq; Damascus, Mecca, Jerusalem on a more ideologically motivated level; Rome as a symbol. But that is not helpful in predicting the IS's next moves. These will be determined by their reading of military conditions on the ground, or so I assume. So will they sit in Mosul and Raqqa and consolidate before their next move at a big city or town? Are they busy forging new alliances elsewhere in order to repeat what happened in Mosul? Are they clever enough not to try and take Baghdad - or stupid enough to play with that idea at this point? I can make assumptions, but they are based on my idea of IS, rather than facts.

3.- Does al-Baghdadi/IS want to strike in the West? 

The thing is: With al-Qaida, we always had a pretty good idea of what they thought was in their interest. With IS, we do not. With al-Qaida, we knew that - to a degree - we could rely on their words; they hardly ever struck in places they didn't mention/threaten/warn before. With IS, we do not know. IS is not like al-Qaida. There is no reason to assume they follow the same lead here. Al-Baghdadi may in fact be plotting huge attacks in the West without ever mentioning any desire of that sort. Or the opposite may be true: He may be all about focusing on the region and not give a thought to striking anywhere in the West.

4.- Is there communication between IS and al-Qaida's branches? 

Success is sexy. Aiman al-Sawahiri is not. Is it conceivable that one day we will wake up to a video message by the leadership of AQAP or AQIM or both pledging allegiance to al-Baghdadi? Absolutely. Or so I believe. And that would be a game changer. Because the "Caliphate" as a state would suddenly become much more supranational/supra-state than it is. Such a move would spell the end f al-Qaida and likely be a rallying cry for many more recruits to come. It is, in a way, a very-bad-case-scenario. Right now, I can't assess the likelihood of this happening. AQ and its branches haven't been saying a whole lot about IS at all. So: Is there communication? Perhaps even negociations? I don't know. I daresay no-one really does. Which means that this 3-a.m.-scenario lingers above our heads....

5.- How stable/instable are relations to allies and helpers? 

It is evident that IS could not have taken Mosul by itself. We have hints that the relation to former regimes cadres and Sunni Sheikhs in Iraq are at least instable. But that's about it. We don't know these parties' calculations well enough to foresee how far these alliances may carry IS. And whether they can be brokered in other areas than the ones where they already exist. Is money a factor here? And if so, how convincing is it? And how much of it does IS have?



There are more questions, of course. Maybe some of you have strong opinions on one of these, maybe some of you have entirely different questions. In any case, I believe that admitting to what we don't know will eventually help us more than pretending we have all the answers.

As always, I am looking forward to your comments!

Cheers, Y

A few Thoughts on the ISIS-"Caliphate"

June 30th, 2014 - On Sunday, ISIS declared the existence of a "Caliphate" and changed its name to "The Islamic State", dropping "in Iraq and Greater Syria" in an effort to signal a universal claim of leadership and authority over all Muslims wherever they may live. This declaration was spread through an audio by ISIS's official speaker and also in a written version, supplied in several languages. There is little reason to believe this is a fake, given the established channels of distribution, the content and the reactions of ISIS sympathizers.

Many of us have been watching ISIS, al-Qaida and other Jihadist organizations for a while, and we will have a lot to report and discuss in the days and weeks to come, so I will keep this brief. These are just some early thoughts I have been having today and wanted to share with you.

1. In its declaration (Peter von Ostaeyen has covered it here), ISIS stresses the lack of legitimacy of existing Muslim states. This falls in line with ISIS ideology (and the ideology of the groups that ISIS stems from). But it should still be taken seriously. ISIS is clearly not done yet.

2.- ISIS clearly believes that a critical mass of Muslims sympathizes with them. I believe they may be making the mistake of over-estimating that support.

3.- ISIS is very likely hoping that the declaration of the "Caliphate" may lead to tribes or villages or other groups of people outside of the Iraq/Syria-thetare declaring their allegiance to Abu Bakr. While ISIS would know pretty well that this is not sustainable, it could still lead to a degree of chaos and strife in countries like Jordan or Lebanon or Saudi Arabia that may suit ISIS quite well. Remember: Since Zarqawi's days we know that the concept of destabilizing countries is part of the DNA of that group.

4.- It is interesting to note that ISIS argues that any delay in the declaration of a "Caliphate" would be wrong. Saying we had to announce it rather than we wanted to announce it is clever and can become part of a narrative that has the power to convince more people.

5.- You can't declare a Caliphate every other week. This is something that Abu Bakr can do once, and only once. This is why I think he must be pretty confident that even if everybody around him unites against him, he is still able to hold onto some areas.

6.- In terms of historic connection, I think it is important to understand that ISIS is not seeing this is a continuation of the Caliphate that was abolished in 1924. I think ISIS would claim that this Caliphate of theirs is the direct successor the the Caliphate of Ali. Jihadists aren't huge fans of the Ummayads, Abbassids and Ottomans.

7.- Declaring a Caliphate is a direct challenge to the leaders of Jordan and Morocco who are widely considered to be actual descendants of the Prophet Mohammed and (in theory) eligible for the position. It's going to be interesting to see how they will react. Anything ranging from ridiculing ISIS to asking for a war is possible.

8.- Of course Al-Qaida's reaction should be interesting, too. I am personally quite sure that Aiman al-Zawahiri would rather shoot himself than swear allegiance to Abu Bakr, but there may be important people within the AQ nexus who will think more pragmatically (and who don't like al-Zawahiri). There are significant rumors about voices within AQIM and AQAP looking at ISIS favorably. It is definitely not unthinkable that parts of al-Qaida switch to al-Baghdadi.

Do we have to talk Scenarios?

June, 10th, 2014 - The take-over of large parts of Mosul by ISIS has huge repercussions, some in the short term, quite a few in the long term. All of them are scary. None of them allow for any side interested in the future of Syria, Iraq or, in fact, the Middle East, to not at least think about possible reactions.

Why? Because Mosul is not any city. It is a big city, it is a commercial centre, it is the gateway to Syria and it is home to a diverse ethnic mix - including many Sunnis, but also Kurds, Christian, Yezids, among other groups. 

As long as ISIS can hold on to Mosul, a major hub is added to the loosely connected chain of islands under ISIS influence, now ranging from the outskirts of Aleppo in Syria to parts of central Iraq. It is telling and concerning that Iraq's security services apparently didn't put up much of a fight but instead seem to have left in a hurry. Given that the state of Iraq didn't manage to regain control over Faluja and Ramadi, I don't see how that is going to happen in the case of Mosul. 

It is going to be vital now what the Kurdish factions decide to do. They are probably the only ones who could make a difference at this point, but I assume they will, for the time being at least, concentrate on protecting the Kurdish areas in the environment of Mosul rather than challenging ISIS full-on. 

Given that, ISIS stands to exploit their seizure of Mosul - which includes, according to reasonable reports, not only weaponry and military vehicles, but also funds. Some of these additional resources will be poured into the Syrian struggle, making life harder for those Syrian rebels fighting the Syrian regime and ISIS at the same time. Those are the immediate repercussions. 

But it is also worthwhile noting that ISIS is coming closer to making good on their promise of statehood (not in any traditional, international law kind of sense, of course). I am ready to call their entity a pseudo-state at this point. Or perhaps even a proto-state. Why is that? Because they have displayed a learning curve as far as governing goes. Wherever ISIS takes control, the following things happen: Implementation of a harsh version Sharia law; supplying citizens with food; changing school curricula; training Imams; offering other services. Recently, e.g., ISIS boasted they had set in place a consumer protection agency. I don't think many Syrians like this style of governance; but they may, in many cases, prefer enduring it to fighting against ISIS. 

Now all of this is concerning enough. But the situation is even more concerning because ISIS isn't and never was about either Iraq or Syria. ISIS (even back then when it was the official Iraqi branch of al-Qaida) was about creating a coherent area of influence, ready to serve as an operational basis. National borders don't mean anything to ISIS. (And it is telling that in the wake of the fall of Mosul, some of their pundits declared the end of the Sykes-Picot-borders). To put in different terms: ISIS isn't fighting against anyone as much as they are trying to gain from the current situation in Iraq and Syria. And they are having successes. The momentum is on their side. 

This is why we may have reached a point where we need to talk about scenarios - because I, for one, believe that this debate will start soon. Who has a mandate, who feels a responsibility, who is capable of taking on ISIS? 

As I see it, no-one within Syria and Iraq has the power by himself to accomplish this. The Iraqi state already failed in Faluja and Ramadi. The Kurdish militias may not be strong enough. Jabhat al-Nusra and their allies in Syria aren't either. 

But allowing ISIS to go on should not be an option. ISIS fighters may not be a large force, but they also shouldn't be underestimated. They will not stop at Mosul. Why should they? So what's next? 

ISIS is currently exercising control over an area almost the size of Belgium. That is enough to have anyone worry. If they consolidate their position, if they are able to move resources and fighters, train fighters and make plans for expansion, they will do just that. The result would be that the problem grows bigger swiftly, with every new territorial gain increasing the risk of terror attacks beyond Iraq and Syria. 

I am not a fan of military inventions, as I have stated here before. I also am convinced that the best moment to intervene in Syria has long, long passed and won't come back. But I also believe that it is silly and ignorant to just close one's eyes in the face of this danger. 

Clearly, there is no power in sight that would at this point in time propagate intervention. However, I daresay that we will wee a debate about deploying US drones to Iraq in Syria soon - as dangerous as that would be, given the densely populated areas we are talking about here. 

I am quite ready to admit that I don't have a solution either. I guess all I am saying is that this problem is not going to go away by itself. So what I would really like to see is an informed debate about options before we find ourselves in a situation where our only option left to us is to discuss measures already taken. 

That means that now is the right time to talk scenarios. Even if we may not enjoy that.